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Furthermore, all existing cultures need radical changes because of their deep-seated 
sexist, racist and other biases which cause considerable suffering to large sections of their 
members. 
- Bikhu Parekh 
Non essent omnia, si essent aequalia  
(If all things were similar, all things would not exist)  
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Since the 1970s multiculturalism has emerged as an important area of scholarship 
within both academic and applied psychology.  Scholars have offered a range of theories 
to assist psychologists in understanding the ways cultural context impacts psychological 
development and well-being with the aim of moving the field towards an affirming 
position on psychological differences that depart from the Eurocentric mainstream.  One 
prominent example is the Multiple Dimensions of Counseling Competency (MDCC) by 
D. W. Sue (2001) which enjoins psychologists and counselors to acquire knowledge, 
awareness, and skills (KA&S) for five different racial and ethnic groups to promote 
culturally affirming work in a variety of professional and societal contexts.  KA&S 
approaches like the MDCC remain the primary mode for conceptualizing multicultural 
competence today.  
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This dissertation begins with a critical analysis of the extant multicultural 
competency literature which yields three important areas of concern.  First, theorists face 
a dilemma regarding the definition of culture itself.  Race and ethnicity receive stronger 
emphasis in the multicultural discourse which marginalizes other oppressed voices and 
perpetuates the invisibility of their unique struggles. In turn, attempts to expand the 
definition of culture to a non-hierarchical approach to all social identities and contexts 
draws attention away from race, an area already too easily avoided.  Currently, no 
solution has balanced these two poles in the treatment of the word culture.  Second, 
current models draw no limits to cultural relativism leaving questions of intragroup 
oppression unanswered.  Third, models inadequately conceptualize the multiple social 
and cultural identities within the same person and offer insufficient guidance to 
professionals when intrapersonal identities conflict.  
Each of these three concerns is addressed by drawing from interdisciplinary 
scholarship in anthropology, political philosophy, and social psychology.  These answers 
yield a new model for work with diverse social identities, Recognition Competency 
Theory (RCT).  This new approach to competency with diverse populations has 
implications for the ways the psychology of oppression is conceptualized, taught, and 
treated as a focus of professional policy.   Strengths of this new model, its relationship to 
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 is a 21-year-old second generation Chinese American college senior 
attending a large public university in the Midwestern United States.  The first in his 
family to attend college, he comes from a highly conservative Christian family from a 
small town.  Ron presented at his college counseling center reporting a high level of 
distress following his first sexual encounter with another male at a recent party on 
campus.  Ron told his counselor that he had questioned his sexuality for years, often 
imagining himself with another male, but had never pursued a same sex relationship or 
sexual encounter because of his religious beliefs.  In addition, Ron expressed strong 
career ambivalence about his declared major in biochemistry and the application process 
for medical school.  He stated that he had wanted to be a doctor when he started college, 
but after job shadowing several physicians and exploring other fields, he knew that he no 
longer had an interest in pursuing a career in medicine.  Though a strong candidate for 
medical school (excellent MCAT scores, high GPA, and several internship experiences), 
Ron reported that he had lately experienced depressive symptoms because he feels 
increasingly trapped into entering a career in which he has no interest.  When asked why 
he did not change majors or pursue an alternative career, Ron stated that he experiences a 
large degree of pressure from his family to attend medical school, and that it would be a 
tremendous source of disappointment and shame to them if he pursued his interests in 
journalism. Additionally, Ron stated that his family would view a degree in journalism as 
a wasteful insult to the many sacrifices his parents had made so that he could attend 
college.  
 
Working in a setting with a very limited number of sessions, Ron’s counselor 
used the remainder of the intake session to devise a goal oriented treatment plan for the 
fall semester.  First, the counselor urged Ron to differentiate from his family’s priorities 
and start exploring his own interests in earnest.  The counselor offered Ron career testing 
to open up new options, urged him to stop his application process for medical school, and 
began focusing on how Ron could confront his family about his disinterest in medicine.  
The counselor also perceived Ron as somewhat high in dependency on his family and 
believed Ron was avoiding responsibility for his own life choices.  Therefore, the 
counselor used various role play exercises to help Ron become more assertive and move 
towards the healthy step of separation/individuation. The counselor’s personal beliefs 
prohibited directly supporting students’ exploration and integration of any same sex 
desires or coming out process.  The counselor therefore acted in accordance with what 
the counselor viewed as the ethically responsible choice in such cases.  Instead of 
offering Ron help with exploring his sexuality directly, the counselor offered Ron a 
referral to another therapist open to working with LGBT issues at the counseling center.   
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Additionally, the counselor told Ron of an LGBT support group on campus and 
gave him a pamphlet from an LGBT resource center in town for Ron’s sexuality 
concerns.  Though Ron scheduled a follow-up appointment with this counselor, he did 
not attend the session nor did he follow up on the other resources given to him by the 
counselor.  
 
The case above concisely illustrates many aspects of the need for multicultural 
education and training of counselors, psychologists, and other helping professionals.  
There were several decisions the counselor made both in conceptualization and treatment 
that did not take Ron’s possible cultural differences from the Western mainstream into 
account.  First, the counselor characterizes Ron’s relationship with his family as 
dependent and selects interventions that encourage differentiation.  Instead, the counselor 
would have done better to recognize that in this case a move towards individuation 
essentially demands that Ron align with the Western priorities of individualism and 
abandon a possible collectivist orientation in his family unit.  This abrupt shift away from 
his family’s cultural values could actually intensify rather than diminish Ron’s distress.  
Second, the counselor offers Ron career testing, urges him to disengage with his current 
career plan, and confront his family about these actions as soon as possible.  Given that 
such a course of action may have a tremendous impact on Ron’s family unit (of which 
Ron himself is an obvious component), this could also be characterized as a culturally 
insensitive treatment choice.   Third, the counselor chose a goal-oriented approach in a 
short-term individual therapy modality.  Given Ron’s cultural background, the counselor 
might have instead chosen to explore with Ron how appropriate it would have been to 
encourage involvement from Ron’s family in his course of treatment.   Given these 
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mistakes, what is the state of contemporary multicultural training for counselors?  What 
theories exist and how would they be implemented to avoid harm and foster positive life 
changes in a case such as Ron’s?  
This scenario also offers us the opportunity to explore other more abstract and 
philosophical questions within multicultural competency.  First, what constitutes culture?  
The critiques of the counselor’s choices offered in the preceding paragraph focus on 
counselor insensitivity towards collectivist cultural norms.  Yet Ron also has other 
relevant diversity statuses which were unexamined during his treatment including race, 
socioeconomic status, religion, gender, sexual orientation and so on.  Are any of these 
many other statuses also qualified to be treated as “culture” for the purposes of 
counseling competence?  If so, with regard to which of these many statuses should a 
licensed mental health professional be expected to hold competence?  Should some 
statuses take priority in multicultural counseling training to the marginalization or total 
exclusion of others?   
On a more abstract level, is it even useful to parse identity statuses into a 
compartmentalized model of competence with race competence conceptualized as 
distinctly different from competence with gender, disability, or other statuses?  Indeed, in 
what ways do contemporary models of multicultural competence succeed or fail to 
address the complex interactions that occur among various identity statuses in a case such 
as Ron’s?  In other words, do our current models of multicultural competence do an 
adequate job of sensitizing counselors to the interaction among Ron’s racial, ethnic, 
sexual orientation, religious, gender, and socioeconomic identities?   
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The counselor’s own beliefs prohibit the affirmation of Ron’s possible same sex 
sexual orientation.  Yet, the counselor does not abandon Ron completely and indeed 
offers him several potentially very helpful referrals.  Must counselors be required to hold 
an affirming (or at least have no disaffirming) stance towards all client areas of difference 
in order to be deemed culturally competent regardless of the counselor’s own code of 
beliefs, religious or otherwise?  What place should a therapist’s values hold in the 
treatment relationship? Does this counselor’s solution of referring out those clients that 
challenge the counselor’s personal values reflect a tacit permission given to counselors to 
affirm some identities and not others? Is the counselor’s refusal to engage with this aspect 
of Ron’s identity itself an act of judgment or rejection?  Furthermore, to what extent is it 
an act of political hegemony?  
The above represent only some of the fundamental questions that will be explored 
in this dissertation.  A theoretical methodology has been chosen given the highly 
philosophical and subjective nature of these questions. The concept of goodness is a 
question of moral philosophy and beyond the scope of empirical investigation alone.  As 
a community of scholars, psychologists can only arrive at answers to the questions 
outlined above and aspire towards a more perfect consensus through scholarly discourse 
and public debate. The author will therefore rely upon a cross-disciplinary survey of 
relevant scholarship from within the multicultural psychology, social psychology, and 
political theory literature.  The result will take the form of a critical analysis of 
contemporary theoretical models of multicultural counseling competency in an attempt to 
provide a discursive answer to these questions.  
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The project is divided into seven chapters organized in three parts.  Part I of the 
dissertation will ground the reader in the relevant historical and theoretical contexts that 
have led to the development of multiculturalism and multicultural competency as 
important issues for contemporary psychologists.  Chapter 1 will explore major questions 
and debates within contemporary multicultural psychology.  The chapter begins with a 
brief overview of multiculturalism’s historical milestones as it developed into a major 
focus of psychological research and practice in the final quarter of the twentieth century.  
This review foreshadows several important questions about the definition of culture and 
the internal oppression structures within oppressed groups that are explored more fully 
throughout the remainder of the project.   
Chapter 2 outlines what we may call discrete identity models of multicultural 
counseling competency (MCC).  The term discrete is chosen here because these theories 
encourage counselors to have awareness and skills for each group based component a 
client’s identity (e.g., race or gender) but do not offer specific tools for addressing the 
interactions among these identity statuses (e.g., race and gender).  Scholarship in this 
chapter varies widely but the work of Derald Wing Sue is a particular focus.   Using a 
chronological approach, the key points of these models will be discussed.  The chapter 
will conclude by analyzing the strengths and limitations of these models and identify the 
questions they leave unanswered.  These questions will serve to focus the remainder of 
the project.   
Chapter 3 will review more recent theories addressing a theme that I classify as 
multiplicity (i.e., multiple social identities and oppressions within the same person or 
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group).  Two important works in this area will help focus the discussion.  The first is 
Enns and Forrest’s (2005a) Teaching and social justice: Integrating multicultural and 
feminist theories in the classroom.  The second is Pedersen, Crethar, and Carlson’s 
(2008) Inclusive Cultural Empathy: Making relationships central in counseling and 
psychotherapy.  The strengths, limitations, and unanswered questions of work in this area 
will be reviewed. The chapter will conclude with a summary of Part II which will 
reinforce my position that current models of multicultural competency and multiplicity 
do not yet adequately address (a) contestations over the definition of culture, (b) cultural 
relativism and intragroup oppression, or (c) multiple social identities within the same 
person.   
Part II attempts to offer preliminary answers to the problems of contemporary 
MCC models identified in Part I.  In chapter 4, I will systematically respond to the 
question of how culture should be defined in psychology.   Through reviewing a range of 
definitions and theories of culture, I ultimately endorse a more restricted definition of 
culture.  I urge psychologists to stop attempting to respond to the needs of groups not 
traditionally considered cultures by expanding the meaning of the word culture itself.  
Instead, I propose we centralize a different concept which might unify the needs of a 
wide range of social identities, including culture, in our conversations and theories about 
social oppression.   
Chapter 5 draws upon political philosophy in search of the new concept that could 
replace culture at the center of the psychology of difference.   The chapter will examine 
the development of multiculturalism as a project among political theorists and how it has 
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given rise to a new approach called the politics of recognition.  The core themes of the 
politics of recognition are reviewed and their implications for multicultural psychology 
are discussed.  From this, I take the position that we must recentralize the debate in 
psychology about social oppression around the concept of political recognition instead of 
culture.  It is from this stance that I argue we should subsume multicultural competency 
in a larger theory we may call recognition competency.  The concept of recognition 
throws open a wide range of other social identities to which psychologists and political 
theorists must attend.  Consequently, the remainder of chapter 5 draws from the social 
psychology literature to discuss identity theory and how it may help psychologists more 
accurately approach multiple social identities.  
Chapter 6 will address intergroup evaluation and critique which is one of the most 
controversial aspects of identity politics and multiculturalism in particular.  Drawing 
from Parekh’s (2006) procedures for intercultural evaluation, the author will argue that 
psychology should begin to critically examine systems of social identity meanings in 
order to respond to the dangers of cultural and intergroup relativism.  Further, I argue that 
psychologists should voice critique and even intervene with those practices associated 
with a social identity violate standards of minimal human rights.  This gives rise to a 
fourth dimension of RCT which will be called the critical dimension.   
Part III of the dissertation is comprised of chapter 7 which offers a summary of 
the project.  Taken together, chapters 4-6 give rise to a new theory of competency with 
diverse social identities called Recognition Competency Theory (RCT).  This theory 
extends and transforms D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC.  Using the three dimensions of the 
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MDCC as a starting point, RCT recentralizes the MDCC’s core concepts around the 
concept of recognition instead of particular cultural groups.  While this shift leaves some 
elements of the MDCC’s structure largely unchanged (e.g., foci of intervention) other 
aspects of the MDCC must be reshaped entirely (e.g., particular social identities).  The 
addition of a fourth critical dimension to the theory which addresses intergroup 
evaluation is the author’s own contribution.   Following this summary of RCT is a 
discussion its practical implications, limitations, and directions for future research.  The 
project will conclude with an aspirational statement for the field of counseling 
psychology and its (often unconscious) blend of equal parts scholarship, mental health 
practice, and political stance.  
Before beginning, it is vital for the author to locate himself in this discourse and 
to make transparent those aspects of identity that have undoubtedly impacted the 
motivation for and positions taken within this project.   I am a White, gay male from the 
Northeastern United States of mixed French and Irish ancestry.  Additionally, I come 
from a lower-middle socioeconomic status family, have been legally blind since birth, 
identify as agnostic, and am a first generation college student.  Thus, as one with multiple 
intersecting identities, two of which are the very archetype of privilege (i.e., Caucasian, 
male), my curiosity to examine what place the intersection of identities should hold in 
counselor training is in part personally motivated. However, to the extent consciously 
possible, I have attempted give equal weight in attention to all aspects of privilege and 
oppression in this document.   Therefore, the identity statuses in case examples, various 
developmental theories focusing on a particular group, and other instances where a 
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specific factor (or set of factors) are named and explored have been chosen to represent 
as many areas of diversity as possible with no conscious focus given to any specific 




Part I. A Discursive Analysis of Current Multicultural Competency Models 
Chapter 1. Multiculturalism Meets Psychology: The “Fourth Force” 
Ralph Ellison captured the lived experience of oppression in five words with the 
now iconic declaration “I am an invisible man.” (1947, p. 3).   For socially oppressed 
groups including women, people with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, sexual 
minorities, and many others, the history of psychology in the twentieth century is the 
narrative of invisibility (Becker, 1997; D. W. Sue & D. Sue, 2008).  Stanley Sue (2009) 
recounts several historic barriers to ethnic minority representation in psychology.  These 
include an underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minority doctoral level psychologists, 
a general lack of knowledge about racial and ethnic minority issues in the field, 
unconscious racial bias in research methods and interpretation, and failures of policies 
intended to reduce institutionalized racism.  
Despite these barriers, the early 1970s witnessed a burgeoning of multiculturally 
focused literature which had begun to shed light on the psychology of oppressed groups.  
For example, Vontress (1971) published an article investigating the impact of racial 
differences on counseling rapport.  Likewise, McFadden (1976) explored the most 
common presenting concerns of African Americans seeking counseling.  In the decades 
that followed publications in the field began to focus on other racial and ethnic groups, 
sexual orientation, and gender (Reynolds & Pope, 1991).  By the early 1990s 
multiculturalism had gained enough traction that scholars such as Pedersen began stating 
that multiculturalism was now the fourth force in psychology, the first three being 
psychoanalysis, humanism, and behaviorism (Pedersen, 1991; 1999).   
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Progress has continued over the last two decades and issues of human difference 
continue to grow in importance to the work of psychologists both in and outside the 
academy.  The “Guidelines on multicultural education, training, research, practice, and 
organizational change” (American Psychological Association [APA], 2003) state that  
Multiculturalism, in an absolute sense, recognizes the broad scope of dimensions 
of race, ethnicity, language, sexual orientation, gender, age, disability, class 
status, education, religious/spiritual orientation, and other cultural dimensions. All 
of these are critical aspects of an individual's ethnic/racial and personal identity, 
and psychologists are encouraged to be cognizant of issues related to all of these 
dimensions of culture.  In addition, each cultural dimension has unique issues and 
concerns. As noted by the “Guidelines for Psychotherapy with Lesbian, Gay, and 
Bisexual Clients” (APA, 2000), each individual belongs to/identifies with a 
number of identities, and some of those identities interact with each other. To 
effectively help clients, to effectively train students, to be most effective as agents 
of change and as scientists, psychologists are encouraged to be familiar with 
issues of these multiple identities within and between individuals. However, as we 
noted earlier, in these guidelines, we use the term multicultural rather narrowly to 
connote interactions between racial and ethnic groups in the United States and the 
implications for education, training, research, practice, and organizational change 
 (p. 380).   
In the same article the authors demonstrate that the racial and ethnic makeup of 
the United States’ population has and continues to become increasingly diverse over the 
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past twenty years.  While the guidelines’ authors acknowledge many dimensions of 
identity (e.g., gender, religion) as part of a person’s identity, they later restrict their 
working definition exclusively to matters of race and ethnicity for the remainder of the 
document.  Likely this is because other guidelines had been already published which 
address other specific aspects of human difference.  Examples include guidelines on 
issues of gender (APA, 1978), disability (APA, 1982), intersections of language with 
other statuses (APA, 1993), sexuality (APA, 2000), and most recently age status (APA, 
2004).  
Requirements for the accreditation of doctoral training programs in professional 
psychology further evidence multiculturalism’s increasing presence in the field.  
Programs in school, clinical, counseling, and professional psychology must make efforts 
to attract and retain people from diverse personal backgrounds and maintain a non-
threatening and supportive atmosphere of these differences.  Further, programs must 
“…have and implement a thoughtful and coherent plan to provide students with relevant 
knowledge and experiences about the role of cultural and individual diversity in 
psychological phenomena as they relate to the science and practice of psychology” (APA, 
2007, p. 10).  Psychologists are therefore now more than ever required to educate 
themselves and become sensitive to many aspects of human difference in all areas of 
research and practice.   
Various models of multicultural competency have been developed to help 
psychologists meet these requirements in doctoral training programs.  The principles of 
many of these competency models rest upon the ever growing literature on specific 
13 
  
aspects of human difference.  For example, a PsycInfo keyword search conducted in 
May, 2011 for the term “racial identity” yields a return of 2,537 results. Similarly, 
“sexual identity” yields 2,984, “disabilities” and “mental health” yields 14,695, “ethnic 
identity” yields 10,033, “gender identity” yields 7,349, and “gay and sexuality” yields 
1,872.  Clearly, human diversity is a proverbial “hot topic” within contemporary 
psychology with significant bodies of literature exploring nearly every categorical 
grouping of human oppression.   
The purpose of this chapter is threefold.  First, the chapter will offer the reader a 
broad overview of multicultural psychology’s development as a major force of 
psychological research and practice in the late twentieth century.  The evolution of 
oppression identity development models will serve to focus this historical narrative.  The 
genesis of these models has thrown open controversies within the field.   
The chapter’s second purpose is to take positions on several core questions.  First, 
what place do privileged researchers have in the study of oppressed groups?  Related to 
this, what place should be made for studying privileged groups (e.g., men, Whites).  
Second, how are psychologists to solve the problem of silencing internal differences 
when conducting group based research?  For example, how should psychologists 
studying African Americans respond to accusations that African American scholarship 
has a long history of silencing such internally oppressed voices as Black women and the 
Black LGBT population?  Third, the chapter will introduce the debate on what should 
constitute culture in the term multiculturalism.  In other words, should the operational 
definition of culture in pedagogical and clinical contexts only refer to race and ethnicity 
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or should it include gender, disability, age status, and other oppressed identities?  Should 
the term multiculturalism be replaced with another more inclusive term? The question of 
defining culture is extraordinarily complex and will serve as a guiding theme throughout 
later chapters in this document.  A definitive position is offered in chapter 4.   
The third purpose of the chapter is to use the positions offered on the questions 
above to begin identifying areas of content for a theory of multicultural competence.  The 
systematic identification of content areas that should be included in a theory of 
multicultural competence is the second thread that will serve to guide the entire narrative 
of this document.  
Evolution of Single Dimensional Oppression Identity Development Models 
Developmental psychology offers the scholar a wide range of theories explaining 
numerous dimensions of human growth across the life span in areas such as relational 
attachment, cognitive development, ego defenses, and so forth.  The scholars behind 
many of these theories include some of the giants of psychology such as John Bowlby, 
Jean Piaget, and Sigmund Freud.  Subsequent research often supports the notion that such 
theories are cross-culturally inapplicable.  Therefore, the universality of applicability 
within traditional developmental theories is often the subject of fierce critique. Further, 
the validity of many developmental theories has been accused of being inapplicable to 
certain populations within the very cultural context they were written as exemplified in 
feminist and queer positions on Freud (Crain, 2005).  A classic example of within culture 
inapplicability is Kohlberg’s six level theory of moral reasoning.  Muuss (1988) discusses 
feminist scholar Carol Gilligan’s critique of Kohlberg’s finding that, on average, men 
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scored at the fourth stage of moral reasoning while women averaged at level three.  
Gilligan argued that rather than drawing the pejorative and sexist conclusion that women 
were less mature than men in their moral reasoning, one should interpret this data to 
mean that women had a qualitatively and distinctly different process of moral reasoning 
development.  This ultimately led to the generation of a female moral development model 
with different developmental stages complementing those in Kohlberg’s male-oriented 
theory.   
This example highlights the confound of research and politics, motivating 
scholars such as White (1999) to remind all psychologists that research is not only an 
intellectual but an ethical  and political  enterprise.  To imagine oneself politically neutral 
in their scholarship is not only naïve but invites hegemony and oppression, outcomes that 
are entirely incompatible with both the general principles of psychological ethics (APA, 
2002) and the spirit of the multicultural movement itself.  Indeed, to postulate a position 
of absolute objectivity is to naively deny the ubiquitous and inescapable political, 
economic, and other social influences shaping our worldview to the point of dangerous 
negligence and self-deception (Cushman, 1990; Cushman & Gilford, 1999).   
The clarification of cultural limitations within classical developmental theories is 
therefore an important concern.  Given that developmental theories are inapplicable on a 
universal level, it follows that cross-cultural validity testing, expansion, and even 
alternative psychological theories from those derived on socially dominant populations 
are necessary.  This is especially true since the theorists generating such theories are 
themselves often privileged in the areas of race, socioeconomic status (SES), gender, and 
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so forth.  Consequently, new theories concerning racial identity development burgeoned 
in the late 1970s.  Soon after, researchers also attended to other unexplored dimensions of 
human development such as gender identity, and sexual orientation. Such theories gave 
visibility and voice to many groups previously marginalized by traditional psychology.  
Still, while the creation of such developmental models for some aspects of human 
difference has empowered some groups, the neglect of other marginalized populations 
has continued. This section will use the racial identity development literature as an 
archetype to explore the strengths and limitations of all such single dimensional research 
and its contributions to the development, and at times the stagnation, of a social justice-
oriented psychology.   
Racial Identity Development Models 
Tatum (1997) explains that many self-identified White Americans do not 
consciously examine their racial identity throughout the course of their developmental 
cycle.  Tatum argues that this non-examining stance stems from White privilege.  
Essentially, to be White is to be “normal.”  However, for people of color, a consciousness 
of being different begins at a very early age.  Numerous models of racial identity 
development now offer knowledge of this developmental process to researchers, 
practitioners, and the general public.  
The five stage Cross model of Black identity development is now considered 
classical within the multicultural literature (W. E. Cross, 1978; W. E. Cross, Jr., 
Ponterotto, Casas, Suzuki, & Alexander, 1995).  Beginning in the “pre-encounter” stage 
an individual does not yet have a sense of racial identity.  Next, in the “encounter” stage, 
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event(s) usually trigger the realization that one is a target of racism, and the person begins 
to question what it means to be Black.  Anger towards Whites is most often found in this 
stage.  The individual moves onto “immersion/emersion” where a desire to learn about 
one’s own race, its symbols, and history becomes paramount.  Fourth, during 
“internalization,” one experiences a sense of internalized security in their racial identity 
and is able to safely form relationships across racial groups including relationships with 
Whites.  The final stage is “internalization-commitment” where one moves beyond 
simply a personal sense of safety in their racial identity to becoming one who actively 
works for the betterment of Blacks in society at large.  Not all people move through all 
five stages nor is it true that to reach stage five means an individual will never experience 
emotions, attitudes, and events more typically associated with earlier stages.   
Helms takes a step further by including the dominant culture in her “White and 
People of Color Identity Model” (Helms, 1990; Helms, Ponterotto, Casas, Suzuki, & 
Alexander, 1995).  While Blacks must work in their development against internalizing a 
false negative self-identity, Whites must search for a true positive racial identity instead 
of a false positive racial identity. In other words, a White person often enjoys a sense of 
positive racial self-regard because of the societal mandate that to be White is to be good, 
normal, attractive, and so forth.  Likewise, people of color often struggle with false 
negative racial self-regard because of the other side of the mandate, to be “not White” is 
to be bad, abnormal, unattractive, and so forth.  Helms argues that both sets of self-
directed racial identity feelings are equally untenable because both sets are founded on 
assumptions internalized from ubiquitous racist messages in society rather than on any 
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empirical reality.  In other words, there is no objective inferiority or superiority between 
racial groups.   Thus, the foundation of true positive White racial identity is a White 
person’s positive human qualities such as a beneficent disposition or belief in social 
equality for all human beings.  Helms thereby revolutionarily proposes that the 
internalization of true positive racial identity through challenge of the societal status quo 
makes a sense of racial pride available to both the dominant and oppressed group.  In 
other words positive racial pride for people of color would not rest on an artificial 
reaction to an unresolved negative self image; it would be authentic, integrated, and 
unthreatened by continuing societal pressures.  Likewise, true “White pride” would stand 
opposed to that based on the false positive racial identity derived from the superiority 
myths associated with members of hate groups. 
The identity model is comprised of six stages beginning with “contact” where one 
is unaware of being White or of White privilege.  In “disintegration” one encounters first 
hand their White privilege usually in the context of a friendship or relationship (e.g., one 
goes shopping with a friend of color who is treated with suspicion and hostility by store 
staff).  A negative sense of racial identity is often found at this stage commonly known as 
“White guilt” or “White shame.”  In reaction to this, the third stage of “reintegration” 
involves a sense of hostility and resentment towards people of color, essentially an ego 
defense in reaction to White guilt by blaming the victim.  The logic here is essentially the 
self statement: “If only they would change I would no longer have to feel guilt and/or 
shame about being White.”  In the “pseudo-independent” stage a person is aware of their 
privilege and moves beyond fear and anger to a desire to join with people of color.  
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Following this, in “immersion/emersion” a desire to find a positive White identity is 
paramount and individuals begin to search for good examples of White allies to move 
themselves beyond a guilty identity of “victimizer.”  Finally, in the “autonomy” stage 
individuals have achieved a core and stable positive White identity. At this point one 
takes an entirely balanced and objective view of others as both individual and members 
of groups, no longer needing to sacrifice one view for the other.  
Helms’s model offers rich understanding of White racial identity development.  
Yet, the existence of this model offers up two important questions.  First, are issues 
pertaining to groups with privileged or dominant status also worthy of study?  The 
privileged (e.g., Whites, men, heterosexuals) have too long defined normalcy at the 
expense of others.  Many would argue that the privileged identity development or 
dimensions of mental health specific to privileged populations has always been the status 
quo of mainstream psychological research.  Therefore, for what reasons should these 
issues receive any special attention?  Second, do privileged researchers have any right to 
conduct research on the psychology of oppression they themselves do not experience? 
Does not such inquiry invite danger and continued misunderstanding between groups?  
Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.  
Do We Need a Psychology Concerning Privilege? 
So then, should dominant group statuses receive their own unique attention in 
psychological research?  The question centers upon a subordinate concern: Can members 
of a dominant group themselves experience unique forms of harm by the same system of 
oppression which affords them certain privileges?  For example, can men be harmed by 
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sexism?  If so, the psychology of men and masculinity would stand alongside feminist 
psychology as a legitimate and socially relevant inquiry.  In his answer to this very 
question Liu (2005) offers a convincing rationale in favor of scientific inquiry into 
dominant group population issues.  He takes the position that men’s issues are an 
important multicultural competency.  In his view practitioners should make themselves 
knowledgeable about the unique mental health challenges of men just as they would any 
other multicultural population or social group.  He states that within systems of 
dominance and subjugation there are harmful consequences for stepping out of one’s 
ascribed social role regardless of whether it is in a place of privilege or oppression.  It is 
easier to imagine the latter case.  Women who engage in displays of aggression which 
their respective cultures classify as masculine are labeled with pejoratives ranging from 
“hostile” to “bitch” to worse.  It is more difficult to imagine men being harmed by sexism 
since intuitively they stand only to gain by bias in gender which favors men.  Indeed, 
some may take offense at the very thought that men could also be hurt by sexism.   
Yet Liu (2005) shows through several examples that there may be traumatic and 
catastrophic consequences for any male who has the audacity to decline his ascribed 
privilege by stepping out of the masculine role.  Such consequences range from the early 
bullying of “sissy” boys in the schoolyard to violent physical and sexual assaults to the 
murder of effeminate and transgendered men in adulthood.  The same social systemic 
safeguards that violently maintain female subjugation are equally swift and forceful in 
their interventions to ensure that men stay within their involuntarily proscribed, albeit 
privileged, gender role.  This captures beautifully that despite the fact that some are 
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privileged and others are not, there is tremendous truth to the old folk maxim that “no one 
is free until everyone is free.”  While some may be guards and others inmates, all of us 
live inside prisons of social injustice from which none have the ability to escape 
regardless of their group membership. 
The extent to which dominant groups warrant study also centers on the posture 
taken in conducting such research and the intended use of its results.  Research into 
dominant groups is hegemonic and indefensible if the rationale for such projects is the 
position that men, heterosexuals, or Whites deserve and are entitled to special attention 
because of their latent superiority to other groups.   However, symptoms of certain 
psychological disorders can manifest differently in men than in women.  For example, 
some researchers have begun to conceptualize manifestations of depression in men as a 
distinct phenotypic subtype of the disorder (Addis, 2008).  When such differences occur, 
arguments can be made in favor of specific attention to these groups in order to more 
effectively relieve symptoms and facilitate therapy on the grounds that all human beings 
deserve effective psychological treatment.   
An additional point can be made in favor of studying groups that are socially 
privileged. If we take the position that psychology should act as a force for greater social 
equity and justice it is vital that systems of social inequity be understood if for no other 
reason than to dismantle them more efficiently.  Mechanisms of privilege and the ways 
such mechanisms favor certain populations are no less part of systems of social power 
than mechanisms of oppression.  Social privilege and socially privileged populations 
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must be studied if we are to have a holistic and comprehensive understanding of social 
justice and injustice. 
It is therefore position of this author that psychology should include dominant 
group status as a specific grouping variable and as a specific population of study on the 
grounds that dominant group members (a) are not immune from being damaged by the 
same system that gives them privilege, (b) their privilege does not negate their worth and 
dignity as human beings, (c) psychological constructs (e.g., psychopathology) can 
manifest differently in dominant groups, and (d) such research can inform and facilitate 
social justice oriented projects aimed at intergroup alliance building, distributive justice, 
and education.  A final caveat must be made with regard to the distributive justice of 
scholarly attention.  Scholars conducting inquiries into men, the able bodied, Whites, and 
other privileged groups should bear in mind that these groups already enjoy a dominant 
voice in social structures at large.  Accordingly, researchers should take proactive steps to 
explicitly address imbalances in scholastic attention given to different groups.  Dominant 
group focused scholarship is socially just only to the degree it counteracts rather than 
reinforces the subordinate status of oppressed populations.   
The Privileged Researching Oppression 
Whether any individual has the right to investigate and study issues related to an 
oppressed status that he himself or she herself does not share is important for the field at 
large.  The position one takes in answering this question carries determining implications 
for how multicultural research, training, and practice should be conducted.  The question 
of privileged individuals studying oppression issues is also especially salient in the 
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context of this project.  Literature directly related to race and ethnicity must be discussed 
and at times interrogated in order to conduct any project exploring multicultural 
counseling competency (MCC).  As a White male, I am aware that these are areas in 
which I enjoy tremendous privilege.  It is therefore vital that the narrative voice of this 
project be contextualized with the utmost transparency.  Further, it is necessary that my 
idiosyncratic constellation of oppressed identities in the area of ability status, minority 
sexual orientation, and socioeconomic status be used with integrity and not as a tool to 
deny or distance from my more privileged identities.   
This section will first offer a discussion of the positions held by eleven 
multicultural scholars on the issue of what role White researchers should have in studying 
race and ethnicity.  I will then synthesize these perspectives into a position on what role 
White researchers should have in exploring the broader field of multicultural 
competency.  The section will conclude with a brief discussion of implications for 
multicultural competency theory.   
A key dialogue in Boston.  At the 1990 American Psychological Association 
Convention in Boston, Joseph Ponterotto chaired a symposium which explored the 
impact of White scholars’ participation in cross-cultural research.  In 1993 a special issue 
of The Counseling Psychologist contained both a summary of the symposium (Mio & 
Iwamasa, 1993) and a series of eight articles by the symposium presenters (Atkinson, 
1993; Casas & San Miguel, 1993; Helms, 1993; Ivey, 1993; Parham, 1993; Pedersen, 
1993; Ponterotto, 1993; D. W. Sue, 1993).  The multitude of perspectives offered in these 
nine articles provides the tools to construct an answer to this challenging question.  
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The discussion concerning what voice (if any) racially privileged researchers 
should have in studying racial and ethnic minority issues centers on several overlapping 
themes.  These include ethical concerns centering upon the ways multicultural research 
has been historically conducted and misused, professional turf or ownership of 
multicultural issues, the political unity between multicultural scholars of all racial and 
ethnic identities, and the fact that cultural identity is a universal factor for any researcher 
regardless of her or his racial and/or ethnic identity (Atkinson, 1993; Pedersen, 1993).   
Regarding historical misuse and misconduct of cross-cultural scholarship, 
Atkinson (1993) explained that the history of multicultural psychology (MP) includes 
numerous violations  of the principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, privacy, 
gratitude, and reparation towards minority group subjects.  For example, D. W. Sue’s 
symposium presentation referenced a particularly egregious case of cross-cultural 
maleficence in the work of Cyril Burt and Arthur Jensen who concluded that African 
Americans were of inferior intelligence to Whites (Mio & Iwamasa, 1993).  This 
misconception persists to the present day in some circles.   
Parham (1993) also cited similar unjust scholarship as an explanation for the 
strong resentment towards White cross-cultural researchers held by many racial and 
ethnic minority scholars.  In the area of ingratitude Parham pointed out that many 
members of racial and ethnic minority communities feel that research conducted by 
Whites has led to erroneous conclusions about minority groups and has also failed to 
benefit minority communities.  He also highlighted the fact that many racial and ethnic 
minority researchers who pioneered the areas of cross-cultural psychological studies too 
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often fail to receive proper recognition or citation for their work (Mio & Iwamasa, 1993).  
Parham’s article went on to point out that a double standard exists for White researchers 
as compared to researchers of color in three ways. First, White researchers receive tenure 
for cross-cultural programs of research when minority researchers see tenure denied.  
Second, White researchers obtain more funding for cross-cultural research than minority 
researchers.  Third, White researchers publish cross-cultural research more easily than 
their racial and ethnic minority colleagues.  Parham states that this double standard has 
led to a paternalistic and pernicious legitimizing of cross-cultural studies by Whites.  
Since White researchers were (and are) in many ways themselves the newcomers to 
cross-cultural studies, they are clearly unqualified to bestow legitimacy in the area.  The 
long history of unethical exploitation and mistreatment of minority scholars, minority 
groups, and cross-cultural studies as a scholarly discipline is therefore a touchstone for 
arguments against White participation in racial and ethnic minority studies.  
The issue of professional turf or ownership of multicultural issues also appeared 
in several symposium presentations and the articles that followed.  Related to the points 
in the preceding paragraph, one argument against White researcher participation in 
multicultural studies is the fact that Whites, as a dominant group, have for too long ruled 
academia and been the determining voice for what constitutes legitimate and credible 
scholarship.  Another rationale for a position against White participation in cross-cultural 
research is the fact that Whites lack the personal experience of a minority racial identity 
and consequently have less of a stake in how such research impacts minority 
communities (Pedersen, 1993).    
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Yet if multicultural research is to be the exclusive territory of racial and ethnic 
minority researchers, several problems arise.  First, Whites would remain at risk for 
continued unawareness of how race influences their own biases, assumptions, and 
interpretations of research (Helms, 1993).  Second, it is difficult to simultaneously argue 
that cultural issues should be considered important and be at the fore of awareness for all 
people while also taking the position that culture belongs exclusively to those who are 
oppressed (Pedersen, 1993).  Third, without White participation racial and ethnic 
minorities would be in the position of having to carry the burden of experiencing daily 
racial oppression on the one hand and also having to be the exclusive educators and 
diplomats of race and ethnicity on the other.  In other words, not only would racial 
minorities suffer from inequities caused by racism, it would become their exclusive job to 
explain its nuances to an ignorant White audience.  For example, Helms presentation 
referenced her own status as a Black woman who is also one of the leading experts on 
White racial identity (Mio & Iwamasa, 1993).  Atkinson’s (1993) distinction between 
research and theory offers a possible solution.  According to Atkinson, theory generates 
hypotheses whereas research tests them and informs their evolution.  Thus, one solution 
to the question of professional turf is that theories of racial minority psychology should 
be generated only by individuals who are members of a racial minority group.  
Participation in the research that tests these theories, however, could be open to all 
researchers.   
The example of Helms’s model of White Racial Identity Development begs a 
more detailed discussion of the implications underlying Atkinson’s solution.  If it is not 
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acceptable for racial majority scholars to generate theories related to minority racial 
identities, why should Janet Helms work not also be denounced since she as a Black 
female is generating identity development theory for Whites?  It is the author’s position 
that Atkinson’s solution of dominant group research participation but no theory 
generation need not necessarily be bidirectional.  One of the key characteristics of 
privilege is that it is most often unconscious or denied by those who enjoy it.  
Accordingly, minority researchers may (ironically) have a better vantage point and 
greater salience of majority identity development than members of those groups 
themselves.  Further, dominant group members enjoying social privilege have less 
personal stake in investigating, understanding, and dismantling their privilege as 
compared to members of minority groups.   Accordingly, minority researchers may have 
more personal motivation in highlighting majority identity constructs than majority 
identified individuals themselves. Lastly, power distribution between dominant and 
oppressed groups is by definition asymmetric.  Placing a safeguard upon privileged 
researchers theorizing about minorities and not the reverse is a similarly asymmetric but 
also corrective balance to broader inequities in social power.   
There are also threats to multicultural psychology’s existence and impact as a 
political project if Whites are not allowed to participate in cross-cultural research.  
Indeed, in some ways the experience of White participation in cross-cultural scholarship 
provides several important advantages over a White exclusion position.  First, while 
historical injustices must be remembered, future ethical White participation in cross-
cultural psychology provides an opportunity for both majority and minority groups to 
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reach common intellectual understanding and political unity.  Second, a dominant group 
member may subjectively experience oneself as a “minority” when attending conferences 
at which the majority of attendees are social minorities.  Such inversion is a unique 
experiential learning opportunity from which the dominant group researcher may grow.  
Third, excising dominant group participation from this research simultaneously means a 
form of safety at the high price of permanently censuring would-be allies.  Thus from the 
standpoint of practical political force and unity, Whites not only should participate in 
cross-cultural and diversity research, they must.   While White researchers have 
historically been an abusive problem in cross-cultural research, it is also the case that 
now more than ever there is an opportunity for Whites to be a constructive force and ally 
group that speaks with, rather than for, scholars of color.  Participation by Whites will 
therefore be important in the maintenance and advancement of psychology as a social 
justice project.   
On balance then, the symposium researchers by and large agreed that Whites 
should participate but only if their participation meets certain standards.  Stated 
differently, the participants’ discussion focused on the dangers of incompetent and 
pernicious White participation in cross-cultural research rather than White participation 
itself.  Symposium presenters made several recommendations for making White 
participation virtuous.  These recommendations included an increased awareness for 
White researchers of their White racial identity, that Whites be aware of historical 
injustices towards people of color, and more acceptance of qualitative research in the 
field at large.  Also recommended was proactive reporting of the racial makeup of cross-
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cultural research teams, treating White only research teams as a research limitation 
explicitly discussed in publications, and closer collaboration between White researchers 
and spokespeople for communities of color.  A final recommendation was to replace 
guidelines with enforceable mandates for the inclusion of multicultural training 
coursework in psychology curricula (Donald R. Atkinson, 1993; Casas & San Miguel, 
1993; Mio & Iwamasa, 1993; Parham, 1993; D. W. Sue, 1993).   
Lessons to be drawn.  The preceding paragraphs raise the concept of 
multicultural competency and what principles or standards should be included in theories 
that govern its pedagogy and practice.  The symposium and its resulting articles 
demonstrate that one essential component to any model of multicultural competency is a 
set of standards concerning research and scholarship.  At a minimum the content of the 
research/scholarship area of MCC should require that a psychologist (a) understand the 
pernicious history of dominant group participation in cross-cultural studies, (b) explain 
and account for the ways dominant group identities impact research design and outcome, 
and (c) utilize multicultural research skills throughout the research process starting with 
racial makeup of the research team itself through the reporting of final results.   
Identity Development Models for Other Oppression Statuses 
Within the time period when racial identity models were being generated, similar 
models arose focusing on other dimensions of oppression identity development.  For 
example, Kim (1981)  developed a model for Asian American racial identity 
development. Phinney (1989) created a model of ethnic identity development as distinctly 
separate from the issue of race. In the realm of sexuality most models have focused on 
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minority lesbian and gay identity development such as that by Cass (1979).  According to 
Chen (2005) “Other aspects of identity, namely religion, gender, and socioeconomic 
class, have not been considered in the same type of developmental manner as race, 
ethnicity, and sexuality have been” (p. 28).  Nevertheless, there do exist models for 
gender development such as that by Downing and Roush (1985).  There have also been 
investigations of disability status’s impact on identity development (Corbin, 1999; Grant, 
1997; Weeber, 2005).  
Similarities in the oppression adjustment patterns among the different racial and 
ethnic groups mentioned above led scholars to investigate the possibility of a general 
model of cultural identity development that might accurately conceptualize the 
experiences of members of all such groups.  Such a model would use cultural oppression 
instead of specific races or ethnicities (e.g., Black or Hispanic) as its grouping variable 
and thereby include and unify many more groups than prior models.  Scholars Atkinson, 
Morten, and Sue (1989; 1998) put forth their Minority Identity Development Model 
(MID) which would later be adapted by D.W. Sue and D. Sue (1990, 1999) to become 
their five stage Cultural Identity Development Model (C/DIM).  Applicable also to White 
identity development, the stages are (a) conformity, (b) dissonance, (c) resistance and 
immersion, (d) introspection, and (e) integrative awareness.  The C/DIM is intended as a 
conceptual framework to aid therapists’ understanding of culturally different clients' 
behaviors and attitudes.  Each stage explores the struggle experienced by oppressed 
people seeking to understand themselves in terms of the dominant culture, their own 
culture, and any antagonistic relationship qualities between the two.  Additionally, within 
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each developmental level, four level-specific attitudes and beliefs are addressed that may 
aid therapist understanding of minority clients.  These attitudes and beliefs focus upon (a) 
self, (b) others of the same minority, (c) others of another minority, and (d) majority 
individuals.  
The sweeping and inclusive focus of the C/DIM evokes the discussion of classical 
theories of development with which this chapter opened.  Though inclusive of many 
discrete identity statuses, it omits interactions among oppression statuses.  This is ironic 
given that the creation of the C/DIM and other models in this section were themselves 
generated in reaction to hegemonic limitations in the mainstream developmental models 
that preceded them. In other words, many of these models are vulnerable to the same 
structural weaknesses they had hoped to solve.  
Silencing Internal Minorities: Critiquing Discrete Approaches to Identity  
Some scholars point to the fact that many multicultural studies do not address 
how various identities may be experienced simultaneously (Enns, Sinacore, Ancis, & 
Phillips, 2004).  Indeed there is only burgeoning research investigating the interaction of 
two or more of these same statuses.  The results of another PsycInfo search conducted in 
May, 2011 demonstrate the limited amount of scholarship in this area respective to single 
status research.  A search for “multiple oppression” yields only 78 results, “racial 
identity” and “sexual identity” yields 66 results, “racial identity” and “disability” yields 
22 results, and so on.  Thus, searching the literature on racial identity or disabilities 
(single, discrete categories) will yield thousands of results, whereas if we want to know 
about racial identity and disabilities our results drop to double digits.  While the 
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experience of an individual with both statuses is partially explained by research on single 
statuses, this author is in agreement with the contention of numerous scholars that such 
research ignores the important interactions among these identity dimensions (Bograd, 
Sokoloff, & Pratt, 2005; G. A. Chen, 2005; Reynolds & Pope, 1991; Ward, 2004). 
Scholars critique single dimensional models of development as too limited in their 
ability to ever meet the ambitious goal of subsuming and amplifying the voices of all 
people despite the idealistic and benevolent aspirations of the models’ creators. These 
critiques are paralleled in the dramatic history of various equal rights movements which 
have also focused on a single grouping variable (e.g., women’s rights, gay rights, Black 
rights, and so forth).  Throughout the histories of social justice efforts, there have been 
subgroups with an additional oppression status within these larger “group movements” 
that have felt neglected and left out.  These subgroups sometimes formed their own equal 
rights movements.  King (1988) offers a prototypical example which arose from Black 
women’s sense that the civil rights movement failed to address and ameliorate sexism 
within Black culture.  Similarly, it was felt that second wave feminism failed to address 
racism within the women’s rights movement.  Therefore, Black women were caught in a 
double bind being asked to dismiss their gender identity for the sake of Black rights on 
the one hand and to dismiss their racial identity for the sake of women’s rights on the 
other.  King states that the resulting sense of frustration and invisibility in reaction to the 
sexism and racism within these larger two movements led to the Black feminist 
(sometimes known as the womanist) movement in the 1970s  
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A more concrete example is found in contemporary efforts to protect those 
affected by domestic violence.  Shelter programs often fail to account for barriers to 
safety beyond gender (e.g., race, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic status).  The 
result is unequal access to protection for all domestic violence victims.  For instance, 
lesbian women may avoid seeking help at many women’s shelters because they feel 
invisible in a world where all perpetrators are called “male.”  Likewise, “some women of 
color do not want to involve the police when they are abused because they fear the 
historical and continuing maltreatment of men of color by the criminal justice system” 
(Bograd et al., 2005, p. 25). These two examples demonstrate that identity group efforts 
can help confront the between group oppressions felt by everyone with a particular group 
status.  Yet there is always the danger that, when the focus is on between group 
oppressions, dimensions of within group oppression and hostility can all too easily be 
ignored or even exacerbated.   
King (1988) also theorizes that these various dimensions of identity are not 
additive per se but instead interact in different ways to create a unique experience.  Thus, 
to be a Black woman is an experience that cannot be fully explained by piecing together 
information from women’s studies and African American studies.  To draw an analogy to 
chemistry, describing a person in these compartmentalized ways is akin to imagining that 
we can understand water by studying the separate properties of hydrogen and oxygen.  
While knowledge of its atomic components is important, water remains a qualitatively 
different molecule with distinct characteristics (an identity) very different from the sum 
of its atomic parts.   
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Using the above analogy as a foundation, we might further assert that the way one 
dimension is experienced changes as a function of what other dimensional statuses one 
holds.  Thus, male privilege is not absolute.  The experience of one’s male privilege may 
indeed change depending upon whether one is a White Jewish male, a Black male, or a 
Korean gay male just as even the tiniest changes to a molecule’s atomic components may 
radically alter its behavior and properties.  Krents (1972) poignantly illustrates this 
assertion.  Krents, one of the first blind graduates of Harvard Law School, recounts a 
personal narrative from his childhood in which he tries to participate in a schoolyard 
battle of the sexes. 
"We don't want you," said the entire army of the boys.  
I stood there in stunned disbelief.  
"Why not?" I asked angrily, "I'm a boy."  
"Yes, but you're blind," said the large recruit.      
“Only some," 2 I said defensively. 
"You are blind," he repeated. The way he said it made me flinch. 
“I’m a boy first and blind second," I said quietly.  
“No, you're not, you're a blind boy." For some reason, the entire Army of the 
Boys found this very amusing, and raucous laughter reverberated through the 
playground.  
"Blind boy, blind boy, blind boy," they chanted. 
                                                 
2
 At this time in his life, Krents retained some usable vision, hence his assertion of “only” partial blindness.  
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I stumbled down the hill with my broken masculinity dragging behind me. 
I walked slowly across the playground to the opposite hill. I was busy 
rationalizing my change in allegiance as I went. It was okay with me if the boys 
didn't want me actually I liked girls better than I liked boys I always had. Besides, 
I was hardly in a position where I could do anything else. 
"What do you want?" asked Cynthia. She was bigger than I was, and her 
loud voice scared me just a bit, 
"I've come to fight for you," I informed her. 
"Fight for us," she exclaimed, "you're a boy, you can't fight for us." 
"Yeah, I am," I said, and for some reason, I added, "I’m ashamed of being 
a member of the male sex." 
"Get off this hill quick," Cynthia yelled at me. 
"I may be a boy, but I'm blind," I said, still holding my ground. 
"You're still a boy,” Cynthia said. 
"That's just what I told them,” I said sadly, indicating the other army. 
As I slowly started down that hill, I wanted to die. (pp. 80-81). 
Such an anecdote adds a new dimension to the argument by McIntosh (1990) that, 
while our own oppression is often clear to us, we often remain ignorant of our areas of 
privilege.  There is a poetic and perhaps grotesque irony that the girls who reject Krents 
for being male are themselves unaware of their own ability privilege (i.e., their 
sightedness).  More important, a new dimension is added: to engage the subject of 
diversity with an exclusive attention to single between group statuses makes unavailable 
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to us the important interactions one status has on another in both the realms of privilege 
and oppression.  The amount of Krents’s male privilege is reduced as a consequence of 
another oppression status variable outside the clearly dubious dichotomy of this 
childhood game—his blindness. His peers are quick to remind him that they (and the 
world) will never allow him to experience male privilege without it being greatly 
diminished as a function of his blindness.  Indeed, he does not even qualify as a boy; he is 
a blind boy.  We therefore cannot conceptualize his development using a model of 
disability development and a model of male development since, as his fellow children 
made clear, these are not two parallel and separate processes for him.  They are not 
compartmental and additive but simultaneous and interactive, one greatly affecting the 
other. This is undoubtedly also true for any of a potentially infinite number of 
oppression-privilege interactions.  It is to these same interactions the womanist scholars 
and activists rightly draw our attention (Combahee River Collective, 2000).  This is 
something Krents and womanists understand well but that the other children do not 
because they, and too often multicultural psychology studies, do not examine interactions 
between and among the identity variables which simultaneously impact each person.   
The preceding paragraphs in this section highlight yet another content area that 
should be included in a theory of multicultural competence: the ways in which identity 
statuses interact within the same person.   
Multidimensional Theories and Research 
The 1980s and 1990s saw increasing scholarly and political attention to the 
importance of multiple oppressions and their interactions similar to those illustrated in the 
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narrative above.  Beginning with the emergence of biracial and womanist critical 
theories, there now exists a burgeoning theoretical, empirical, and narrative literature 
examining ever more complex multiple identities within psychology and other academic 
disciplines.   
The study by Hussain (2005) entitled “South Asian disabled women: Negotiating 
identities” serves as a prototypical example of these new developments.  Responding to 
the absence of investigation into South Asian populations within the disability and gender 
literature, Hussain uses qualitative methods to analyze interviews conducted on Muslim 
and Sikh disabled, British women, their siblings, and parents.  Following her analysis 
Hussain concludes that these three identities are negotiated simultaneously.  She therefore 
argues against singular identity conceptualizations or any hierarchy of oppressions or 
identities.  She calls upon fellow scholars to turn discourse concerning oppression 
towards the ways in which these identities occur in relation to each other rather than 
continuing debates of oppressions’ impact in isolation from one another.   
Another example of intersectional investigation is Martinez’s (2002) use of semi-
structured interviewing techniques in a study of six low SES Puerto Rican women 
diagnosed with depression.  Feminist, narrative, and other theories guided data analysis to 
discover what factors these women believed helped to maintain their depression.  In 
Corporate fogs and Mestiza visions, Ayala (2005) conducted an ethnographic study of 
the experience of students facing class, ethnic, racial, and college generational (i.e., first 
generation student) oppressions at a small liberal arts college to highlight factors 
contributing to minority student persistence and retention.  Gold (2004) used quantitative 
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analysis of interview data to investigate the relationship between experiences of sexism 
and anti-Semitism among Canadian Jewish women and their scores on a measure of 
depression.  Her results found that many experiences of anti-Semitism were related to 
higher depression scores while many experiences of sexism were not.  
Ward (2004) examined sexism in an LGBT HIV/AIDS resource center serving 
the Latino population in Los Angeles.  After gathering observational data over a period of 
nine months, the author concluded that ranking of oppressions at the organizational (or 
meso) level left lesbians of color with a sense that some forms of oppression were more 
relevant than others.  Specifically, Ward found that men, who represented a powerful 
force within the organization, saw sexuality and race as more important or relevant than 
issues of sex and gender discrimination.  Consequently, lesbian members often felt 
disempowered and invisible.  Thus, even in an organization addressing the multiple 
oppressions of race and sexuality, women “…faced cultural solidarity in a queer 
environment yet at the cost of an internal struggle with sexism” (p. 86).  
An example of recent theoretical contributions include a womanist analysis of 
internalized oppression among Black females (A. J. Thomas, Speight, Witherspoon, & 
Chin, 2005).  Thomas et al. explore healthy and unhealthy responses to internalized 
multiple status oppression and its related influences on identity. First, four prominent 
stereotypes of Black females are presented and explained to the reader: Jezebel, Sapphire, 
Mammy, and the more contemporary Superwoman.  Building upon this explanation 
Thomas et al. present the implications these four stereotypes have for psychological 
functioning and their influence on Black women’s interpersonal relationships, 
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particularly in professional and vocational contexts. They conclude with several 
recommendations on ways to alleviate distress caused by internalized oppression. 
The Problem of Perpetually Increasing Group Specificity 
The literature reviewed thus far poses an important theoretical question to the 
researcher.  Given that single group status inquiries erase other important dimensions of 
identity, how should the field of multicultural psychology proceed? One solution to the 
erasure of some groups by examining others is to simply synthesize the two into a new 
more specific group and conduct research on this new population. This is exactly the 
afore-mentioned solution found by Black women in the 1970s to the same concern in 
political terms.  If civil rights groups erase gender and feminist groups erase race, a new 
womanist group for Black women should be formed.  The same is true in psychology.  If 
the disability literature ignores first generation South African college students, we simply 
need to fill this gap in the literature by conducting research on this population.   
While this solution does examine the interactions among various statuses, it 
retains the same flaws as single dimensional research.  The only difference is its use of 
more specific grouping variables.  For example, studies on Black women may be 
criticized by Black disabled women as ignoring their disability identity.  Indeed, what of 
Black disabled women in same sex relationships or Black disabled women in same sex 
relationships in Western Canada?  Thus, a new dimension of identity can always be 
deemed missing until we arrive at individual differences.  This is in no way meant to 
diminish the value of studies such as Hussain’s (2005) investigation of Muslim and Sikh 
disabled British women.  Such work is indispensible as gaps in the literature continue to 
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emerge.  Rather, the point is offered only to highlight that defining groups in a more 
nuanced way is only a partial solution to identity erasure and has its own potential for 
internal conflict within the new intersectionally defined group.  According to Ward 
(2004), “Even within queer multicultural feminist theory, the tension between efforts not 
to create a hierarchy of oppressions and the highly contextual sense of urgency that 
individuals often feel with respect to one or more forms of oppression (and not others) is 
evident and difficult to avoid” (p. 84).   
The models for approaching multicultural counseling outlined in chapter 3 
illustrate a clinical solution to this challenging scholastic problem.  The authors in chapter 
3 reject approaching diversity through studying specific populations and using the 
discovered normative characteristics for that group as a baseline for clinical work.  
Rather, the scholars seek to explore the nuances of overlapping identities within the client 
with as much attention to the client’s idiosyncratic experience as possible.  This approach 
certainly has its own very challenging limitations which will also be discussed in chapter 
3.  However, the idiosyncratically focused approach to social identity serves as an 
alternative to the approach used in the studies above; where identity complexity is 
responded to with a simple increase in grouping variable specificity. 
(Re)defining “Culture” in Multicultural Psychology 
Race as a privileged oppression in multicultural psychology.  The examples of 
intersectional oppression research cited above are often motivated by the absence of 
multicultural literature investigating multiple identities.   One possible reason for this 
absence is that issues of race and ethnicity remain at the fore of multicultural research.  
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Results of Diamond’s (2005) qualitative study in which interviews were conducted with 
prominent diversity educators in psychology support this claim.  Several participants in 
her study reported that in diversity curricula sexism and racism are given top status, 
followed by heterosexism, and virtually no attention to other oppression statuses.  It was 
the position of several participants in her study that race and ethnic issues are the 
privileged among the oppressed in both diversity research and training .   
In the same study, Diamond cites a review of diversity literature which confirms 
that racial and ethnic categories are the most broadly studied within psychology diversity 
education.  As a result other sociodemographic categories are eclipsed to the point of 
receiving little attention at all. One example is Olkin’s (2002) review of resource lists for 
diversity educators within psychology which found that race and ethnicity were 
invariably central.  Disability on the other hand was either ignored entirely or taught from 
an ablest position.  Diamond also cites Carr and Sloan (2003) as an example of scholars 
who voice a sense of neglect of non-racial minority groups in current multiculturalism. 
Mohr (2002) argues that diversity education too often highlights only populations which 
are widely accepted as multicultural or diverse.  For example, racial minorities are often 
seen as diverse whereas women are not.  Accordingly, individuals who identify with 
frequently excluded categories such as disability or religious minority status may feel 
invisible, marginalized, and that their concerns are less worthy of attention than racially 
and ethnically defined groups. A more recent study by Pieterse, Evans, Risner-Butner, 
Collins, and Mason (2009) conducted a content analysis of syllabi for 54 multicultural 
counseling courses from a sample of CACREP accredited masters level and APA 
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accredited doctoral level counseling and counseling psychology programs across the 
United States.  Their analysis found that 87% of the sampled syllabi explicitly included 
racial identity in their content.  LGBT issues were also strongly represented, with 72% of 
syllabi explicitly including at least one day devoted to the topic.  Other identities received 
far less attention.   Only 31% of syllabi explicitly included at least one class day devoted 
to women, 29% at least one day devoted to people with disabilities, 26% at least one day 
for the elderly, and 22% at least one day focusing on social class.   
From the studies cited above it is clear that while other identities are included in 
multicultural research, racial and ethnic identities receive the lion’s share of attention.  
The reasons for this disparity are very complex and fall along conceptual, historical, 
political, and practical dimensions which will be discussed as an ongoing theme 
throughout this narrative.  The following section will offer a preliminary exploration of 
the issue.     
Can culture be defined broadly without silencing race and ethnicity?  One 
partial impetus for the multicultural movement was the need to “de-pathologize” certain 
racial or ethnic cultural behaviors.  For example, members of cultures who reported 
seeing dead relatives during mourning were sometimes diagnosed as psychotic even 
when such “hallucinations” were culturally normative.  Practices such as this cause some 
scholars to view the history of twentieth century psychology as hegemonic and 
destructive (D. W. Sue & D. Sue, 2008).   
One contemporary parallel to the above theoretical debate concerns whether or 
not the definition of multiculturalism should expand to include other oppressed groups.  
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This section will explore this super-ordinate controversy in depth because the ultimate 
position taken (i.e., inclusive, exclusive, synthesized, or generating a new term) is the 
starting place from which all other issues within multicultural psychology are derived.  D. 
W. Sue and D. Sue (2008) identify three factors around which such debates focus.  The 
first is that racial minorities often believe that including other groups allows avoidance of 
the discomfort the racially privileged experience when confronting race related issues.  
Second, ultimate expansion of those included in the term “multicultural” threatens to 
make the concept so diffuse as to conceptually render all differences “individual 
differences” thereby erasing real oppression systems based on sociodemographic 
categories. Finally, philosophical questions exist over whether some groups (i.e., people 
with disabilities, gender) constitute distinct overall cultures.  Each of these will be 
discussed in turn. 
Explaining the first factor, D. W. Sue and D. Sue (2008) state that, when other 
identities are added to race within the multicultural discourse, these statuses take on an 
equalizing effect among one another.  As race is an exceptionally charged topic for 
Whites, confronting racism is tremendously uncomfortable.  One defense against this 
negative affect is to steer the discourse towards a discussion which does not isolate race.  
Thus, a White female may attempt to turn the discussion towards sexual oppression when 
a conversation turns to the topic of racism in the United States to ease her own discomfort 
around her racial privilege.  If this happened in a multicultural course which 
predominantly addressed race and ethnicity, sexism could not as easily be appropriated to 
ease discomfort of White sexual minorities in the class.   
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Yet, by the same principal, one might argue for inclusive definitions of 
multiculturalism and diversity on the grounds that focusing exclusively on race allows 
members of racial and ethnic minorities to avoid the examination of confronting 
privileges of their own.  These might include ability status, sexual orientation, or sex and 
gender. The anthology title All the Women Are White, and All the Blacks Are Men, But 
Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women's Studies (Hull, Bell-Scott, & Smith, 1982) 
illustrates how even those who experience racial oppression sometimes also believe that 
other oppressions statuses are essential to diversity education.  
Another point of contention against expanded multiculturalism is the belief that 
certain groups do not constitute distinct cultures such as women or people with 
disabilities. According to political philosopher Parekh (2006).the concept of culture 
centers around a distinct, self-reproducing cluster of beliefs and practices.  According to 
Parekh, race and ethnicity are the hub for these clusters and constitute a culture’s unique 
identity.   Feminist scholar Philips (2007) concedes that there is no truly global culture of 
women since expressions and experiences of gender vary across cultural groups.   
Thus, it could be argued that multicultural courses should focus only on race and 
ethnicity, and others should be designed for the psychology of women, queer psychology, 
or other populations.  However, as was demonstrated in the discussion of Black 
womanisms earlier, to focus only on race and ethnicity will disenfranchise a great number 
of individuals who suffer from oppressions within all racial and ethnic groups.   
In response, some authors have argued that, for the purposes of multicultural 
psychology, the construct of culture itself must be redefined to go beyond its traditional 
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definition which focuses on beliefs, customs, social behaviors, and geographic origins.  
One such example comes from Harlem (2003) who argues that within multicultural 
psychology culture should apply to any group that is disenfranchised.  Culture could 
therefore include both populations whose disenfranchisement is based upon shared group 
beliefs or other factors such as shared physiological characteristics beyond race such as 
physical disabilities.  Thus, groups worthy of study in multiculturalism within Harlem’s 
framework would include any factor placing one in a subjugated position within a social 
hierarchy.   
As stated in the opening sentences of this chapter, the APA’s current official 
position since 1993 is that the term culture, from a theoretical standpoint, includes 
statuses beyond race and ethnicity such as gender, socioeconomic status, ability status, 
and so forth.  Yet, the authors operationalize culture as a construct pertaining to race and 
ethnicity for the remainder of the document (APA Office of Ethnic Minority Affairs, 
1993). This is echoed by D. W. Sue and D. Sue (2008) in their textbook for multicultural 
training Counseling the culturally diverse where they take the same approach, stating 
“While this text is focused more on racial and ethnic minorities [italics added], we also 
believe in the inclusive definition of multiculturalism” .   
Both of these statements leave their authors vulnerable to accusations of 
speciousness.  To simply move forward with a race and ethnicity focused agenda by 
aligning with an expanded definition of culture in word but not action only threatens the 
credibility of anyone seeking to build broad coalitions against social oppression.  Some 
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could infer that these scholars agree with expanded definitions of culture only insofar as 
it offers them a defense against the critics of restricted multiculturalism.  
Giving a nod to inclusivity only to immediately re-center focus onto race is 
vulnerable to more than accusations of self-servitude.  Some scholars describe it as a 
hindering force against the realization of multiculturalism’s social justice goals because it 
invites a hierarchy of oppressions.  In other words, it leads to a privileging of race and 
ethnicity over concerns about gender, disability, and so forth.  Diamond (2005) reported 
that one anonymous interview subject in her qualitative study thought that coalitions 
among the oppressed are necessary, but unless they accommodate other voices, groups 
must compete among one another for the same resources.   Another subject felt that the 
challenge in multiculturalism was to hold more than one oppression status 
simultaneously. One anonymous professor in Diamond’s study stated that:  
The way forward in diversity education is to collectively make a response towards 
the orthodoxy of psychology, so that it's not solely and totally like a multicultural 
course that involves culture and ethnicity or a course that runs solely on the notion 
about gay and lesbians or a course solely about disability. But at the same time, I 
would argue that the movements in each of these areas are important to have, 
because they offer a particular position and a voice towards the oppression of 
those groups. I'm not saying that those groups mustn't exist. I think they must 
exist along side or in conjunction with or together with. The solitary isolated 




To review, it is clear from the literature examined thus far that over the past fifty 
years there is a movement in psychology as a scholarly and professional discipline to 
attend to areas of human difference.  These areas include race, ethnicity, gender, and 
many other social variables.  Multiculturalism has served as a space for researching and 
understanding how psychological theories vary for different racial and ethnic 
populations.  It has also offered a space for collective political action in psychological 
organizations to give voice to cultural differences and to construct policies that sensitize 
the profession at large to these same differences.   It is also clear that the area of study 
called multiculturalism is currently under pressure from many groups to expand its 
traditional focus on race and ethnicity to give voice to all social identities including 
gender, age status, ability status, and so forth.  There is push-back from some scholars to 
protect the longstanding race and ethnicity emphasis of the multiculturalism movement 
while at the same time acknowledging the importance of these other social identities.  
On a conceptual level, it is this author’s considered position that it is impossible 
for multiculturalism to provide a unique space for groups that are defined by race and 
ethnic identity and simultaneously honor all other social identities at large.  There are 
only two unsatisfying compromises that would accommodate both political agendas.  The 
first is to treat race and ethnicity as the prototype and central construct for discussions of 
culture and to include other identities in a subordinate manner.  The second is to equalize 
all social identities in which case there is no longer a unique space for discussion about 
race and ethnicity.  Neither one of these solutions seems just.  Accordingly, a solution 
acceptable to both sides must be crafted.  
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In the chapters to come, the author will construct a position on how the field 
should approach this challenging paradox.  Two criteria will be used to determine the 
success of any satisfactory solution.  First, the field at large must offer a space for 
discussions of human difference which center around race and ethnicity.  This is not to 
say that other identities could not be included in such a space, but that on some level race 
and ethnicity are unique concepts which deserve their own attention as much as any other 
social identity status.  Racial and ethnic scholarly inquiries should not have their space 
threatened by other identity agendas.  This leads to the second criterion for a solution.  A 
space must also be crafted to discuss race and ethnicity alongside all other social 
identities.  Since other human identities are the targets of much hatred, oppression, and 
misunderstanding, there is no moral reason in the view of this author that race and 
ethnicity should dominate the general discourse on human diversity in psychology at 
large.   
The solution will be crafted in a two step process.  First, a theory of culture will 
be offered which explores semantic nuances of the word culture.  Second, this theory of 
culture will serve as a platform to offer a new theory of identity justice in psychology.  
Both of these steps will occur sequentially in chapter 4 and chapter 5.   
Summary   
This chapter achieved several goals.  First, it offered a broad introduction to the 
topic of multicultural psychology centering on the genesis of various identity 
development models.  Positions were taken on several key questions.  First, privileged 
researchers do have a place in the study of oppression provided their work is conducted 
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in a culturally competent and sensitive manner.  Second, privileged identities constitute 
unique social groups, and their study poses both important opportunities but also dangers 
to a social justice-oriented psychology.  Third, single and even multiple identity grouping 
variables will always minimize the internal subgroups for any population until individual 
differences are reached.  Finally, the chapter introduced a central tension within the 
multicultural psychology which will serve as a theme throughout this document.  
Namely, can psychologists offer a space to discuss racial and ethnic groups as distinct 
identity constructs while simultaneously honoring other oppressed social identities.  If 
not, what is a satisfactory solution?   
The discussion of these many issues also led to the genesis of several criteria for a 
successful theory of multicultural competence.  Thus far, the author has identified the 
following components for a comprehensive model of MCC.  First, the theory must offer 
guidelines for competent conduct of multicultural research and scholarship which include 
an awareness of the historically hegemonic behavior of racially privileged psychologists.  
Second, a comprehensive theory of MCC must offer a framework for conceptualizing the 
social self as an overlapping constellation of multiple privileged and/or oppressed social 
identities.  Third, the theory must highlight the limitations of using group norms and how 
reductionist approaches to social identity endangers and renders invisible any group’s 
internal minorities.  Each of the chapters to follow will continue to augment and distill 
this core set of MCC criteria.    
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Chapter 2. Discrete Status Models of MCC 
Little Indian, Sioux or Crow,   
Little frosty Eskimo,   
Little Turk or Japanee,   
O! don’t you wish that you were me?   
   
 
You have seen the scarlet trees           
And the lions over seas;   
You have eaten ostrich eggs,   
And turned the turtles off their legs.   
   
 
Such a life is very fine,   
But it’s not so nice as mine:    
You must often, as you trod,   
Have wearied, not to be abroad.   
   
 
You have curious things to eat,   
I am fed on proper meat;   
You must dwell beyond the foam,    
But I am safe and live at home.   
   
 
Little Indian, Sioux or Crow,   
Little frosty Eskimo,   
Little Turk or Japanee,   
O! don’t you wish that you were me?    
 
The verses above are from a collection of children’s poems by Robert Louis 
Stevenson (1923) entitled A Child’s Garden of Verses.  For the majority of the twentieth 
century, psychological scholarship mirrored the sentiments expressed in the poem above.  
Behavioral psychology was shaped in the wake of a eugenics oriented nineteenth century 
scientific epistemology.  Psychologists measured non-European cultures against 
Eurocentric norms.  Differences were conceptualized as disadvantages and deficits rather 
than equally viable alternatives to the European norm (D. W. Sue & D. Sue, 2008).  
Currently, counselors and psychologists are encouraged to move away from this sort of 
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deficit orientation towards cultural difference.  Indeed, an ever stronger link is being 
made between multicultural competence and general ethical standards of research and 
practice (Watson, Herlihy, & Pierce, 2006).  
The preceding chapter explored the ways psychology is rewriting Stevenson’s 
poem by developing a multicultural orientation to the field in general.  In the current 
chapter, the focus will narrow to examine the evolution of a small area within 
multicultural psychology.  Specifically, it will outline the development of those 
theoretical models which define and guide applied psychological practice with socially 
diverse populations.  First, the concept of multicultural counseling competence (MCC) 
will be introduced by exploring the historical and professional climate that sparked calls 
for formal cross-cultural counseling guidelines in the 1970s.  Second, the chapter will 
discuss what the author will term discrete models of MCC.  These models draw heavily 
from a knowledge, awareness, and skills (KA&S) conceptualization of MCC.  The 
KA&S approach contrasts with models introduced in the next chapter which take a more 
overlapping, intersectional approach to conceptualizing diversity.  Third, the chapter will 
introduce and thoroughly examine the evolution and most recent form of Derald Wing 
Sue’s approach to MCC (D. W. Sue, 2001; D. W. Sue, Arredondo, & McDavis, 1992; D. 
W.  Sue et al., 1982).  The strengths and limitations of the D. W. Sue model will be 
discussed which will yield the three primary areas of investigation for the remainder of 
this dissertation.  In short, the purpose of this chapter is to identify the unanswered 
questions of KA&S models and to determine how these limitations may guide the 
development of future models of MCC.     
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A Call for Multicultural Counseling Competence 
Trimble (2003) identifies several key factors that support the relevance of a 
multicultural orientation in counseling psychology.  In the 1960s, ethnic minority 
psychologists became increasingly vocal about the restricted range of population samples 
driving the development of psychological theories.  For example, critics condemned 
generating inferences to all humans from laboratory studies with data derived from only 
some humans (i.e., White college students).  Trimble points out that counseling theories 
developed by and for Whites may not resonate with racial or ethnic minorities.  
Therefore, theories should be actively tested across groups instead of being assumed to 
have universal applicability.  Additionally, new group specific theories should also be 
developed. Finally, Trimble points to the fact that the ethnic and cultural demography of 
the United States will continue to shift massively over the next century with a particular 
increase in the prominence of Latinos. For all of these reasons “incorporating ethnic and 
cultural issues into the curriculum is not a matter of political correctness. It is a matter of 
scientific and professional responsibility” (p. xii).  
Ridley and Kleiner (2003) offer a concise overview of the history and major 
themes in the generation and evolution of explicit formal models of MCC.   Two key 
incidents precede the first publicized model.  At the 1973 conference on professional 
training in Vail, Colorado, a resolution was passed that it is unethical for psychologists to 
provide services to culturally diverse groups unless the psychologist is competent to do 
so.  Consequently, the resolution called for graduate programs to explicitly include 
cultural content in their training curricula.  In 1977 D. W. Sue and D. Sue published 
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“Barriers to effective cross-cultural counseling” which identified several key ways 
cultural miscommunication can hamper effective treatment.  One important example is 
when values underpinning counseling interventions conflict with the cultural values of 
individuals from minority groups.  Such value conflicts easily lead to misunderstanding 
cultural messages between therapist and client and were hypothesized to be a partial 
explanation of higher early termination rates for racial and ethnic minority clients.  The 
conference resolution and 1977 publication provided important momentum for the 
generation of MCC standards and competency models which continue to evolve to the 
present day.  
Models of MCC 
This section will outline the evolution of specific MCC models.  The author 
follows Mollen, Ridley, and Hill’s (2003) classification of models into two tiers: primary 
and secondary.  The primary tier consists of two models which together are the most 
elaborate and have had the greatest influence on the field to date.  Conversely, the 
secondary tier consists of eight models which, while important, are less complex and 
have had less influence on the field than those in the primary tier.  
Primary Model 1: D. W. Sue et al. (1982) 
Several scholars identify the publication by D. W. Sue et al. (1982) entitled 
“Position paper: Cross-cultural counseling competencies” as the landmark moment at 
which formal theories of MCC  first came into being (Ridley & Kleiner, 2003; Stebnicki 
& Cubero, 2008; Watson et al., 2006).  As we will see in later sections, the three 
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competencies it outlines continue to form the core of operationalized competency 
standards, measures, and training models of MCC.  
The article opens by challenging the 1970s status quo: A universal approach to 
counseling is adequate for treating all cultural groups.  The authors argue that psychology 
misunderstands minority ethnic groups by (a) either ignoring them entirely or interpreting 
their differences as stemming from genetic and/or cultural inferiority, (b) ignoring clashes 
between the linear scientific method and culturally different meaning systems, and (c) 
failing to notice when ethnic/racial factors are related to impediments to counseling.  The 
authors state that it is inevitable that therapists will work with culturally different clients 
given that the United States is a linguistically and culturally pluralistic society.  
Therefore, all therapists (not just a select few multicultural specialists) should gain skills 
in working with clients culturally different from themselves. Further, D. W. Sue et al. 
(1982) state that including culture as an explicit variable will help, not hinder, 
determining which psychological phenomena are universal and which are culture bound.  
Finally, D. W. Sue et al. state that an exclusively individualist orientation to treatment 
ignores social adversities to which minorities are uniquely vulnerable such as racism, 
oppression, and discrimination.  Therapists should therefore be aware that distress in 
minority populations may have causes that stem more from living in a hostile social 
environment than clients’ individual differences.   
D. W. Sue et al. (1982) then offer a definition of cross-cultural counseling: “any 
counseling relationship in which two or more of the participants differ with respect to 
cultural background, values, and lifestyle” (p. 47).  This is an extremely broad definition.  
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The authors explicitly include the following dyads as distinctly cross-cultural (a) majority 
group counselor and minority group client, (b) counselor and client are both from 
different minority groups (e.g., Black/Asian, Mexican/Philippine), (c) minority group 
therapist and majority group client, and (d) ethnically and racially similar client and 
therapist differing in some other area such as sexual orientation, sex, gender, age, and so 
forth.  D. W. Sue et al. state that therapists must understand the relative importance each 
of these variables has in affecting the counseling relationship.  Ultimately, the similarities 
or dissimilarities in worldview between therapist and client are the key determinants for 
discussing cross-cultural issues.   
At this point D. W. Sue et al. (1982) recommend the adoption of a core set of 
minimal cross-cultural counseling competencies in three areas: (a) beliefs/attitudes, (b) 
“knowledges [sic]” (p. 49), and (c) skills.  The specific content of each of these areas is 
summarized in Table 2.1.  Note that the competencies concerning two of the four 
beliefs/attitudes characteristics expressly use the word awareness.  It is for this reason 
that these three core competency areas evolved from being called “beliefs/attitudes, 
knowledges, and skills” to “knowledge, awareness, and skills.” Thus, for the remainder 
of the document these three core competencies are abbreviated as KA&S.   
D. W. Sue et al. (1982) conclude with a call to action by outlining four specific 
recommendations.  First, the principles and guidelines within the publication should 
receive formal endorsement.  Second, the paper should be widely disseminated. Third, 
the process to integrate the paper’s MCC standards into APA accreditation rules should 




Sue et al.’s (1982) Characteristics of the Culturally Skilled Counselor 
Competence Counselor Characteristics 
Beliefs and  (a) is aware of their cultural heritage and respects cultural differences 
Attitudes (b) is aware of own biases/values and how these can affect minority clients 
 (c) is comfortable with counselor-client differences in race and beliefs 
 (d) is sensitive to refer a minority client to a member of their own race and 
culture as appropriate.   
Knowledges  (a) understands how minorities are treated by the USA’s socio/political 
system 
 (b) possesses specific knowledge about the groups with which one works 
 (c) has knowledge of the generic characteristics of counseling / therapy 
 (d) is aware of various institutional barriers hindering minority use of 
mental health treatment 
Skills (a) able to generate a wide variety of (non)verbal responses 
 (b) can accurately and appropriately send/receive (non)verbal messages 
 (c) appropriately exercises institutional intervention skills on behalf of 
client 
Note: The above is summarized from D. W. Sue et al. (1982). 
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development of MCC standards and monitor the implementation of said standards.   
Implications and critique. The specific content of the MCC guidelines listed 
above represent a turning point for the profession towards greater social inclusivity.  Yet 
they also contain the seeds of many of the controversies surrounding MCC that continue 
to this day.   
D. W. Sue et al. (1982) offer an incredibly broad definition of cross-cultural 
counseling.  They make explicit inclusion of all possible social diversity in counseling 
dyads including minority group therapist with dominant group client and included 
gender, sexual orientation, and other social identities as constituting a legitimate cross-
cultural interaction.  It is therefore accurate to say that from the beginning of their 
formalized operation, attempts have been made to include all social identities in models 
of cross-cultural competence.  After a thorough examination of the article and model 
above, it is also fair to say that from the very beginning race and ethnicity have been 
emphasized over other social identities and become the prototype for culture even when 
culture is broadly defined.  Like the “Guidelines on multicultural education, training, 
research, practice, and organizational change for psychologists” (APA, 2003) discussed 
in chapter 1, D. W. Sue et al. adhere to a theoretically broad definition of culture and a 
restricted practical or operationalized definition emphasizing racial and .ethnic minority 
identities.   
This is evidenced by several factors beginning with the authors’ exclusive use of 
race and ethnicity diversity statistics and conflicts in the rationale for creating MCC 
guidelines at the beginning of the article.  If all social identities are part of cross-cultural 
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counseling, the authors might have included specific attention to them in their rationale 
for cross-cultural competence.  The authors also emphasize race and ethnic minority 
identities in the eleven characteristics of cross-culturally skilled counselors.  To truly 
match their broad definition of cultural competence, specific language changes could be 
made to include the “minority therapist-majority client” and “race and ethnic similar but 
otherwise socially different” dyads they use to define cross-cultural counseling.  The 
disconnection between the theoretical and operational definition of all things “cross-
cultural” has continued to play out in future models of MCC and is discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter.  
The majority of the counselor characteristics outlined in Table 2.1 is laudable and 
offer important direction for the counseling professional.  This author can find no flaw 
with therapists having knowledge of sociopolitical systems, institutional barriers, 
awareness of one’s own biases, and so forth.  Indeed, the skill of acting as an institutional 
advocate when appropriate is tremendously important for a wide range of clients 
unfamiliar with the nuances of mental health treatment systems.  This is not only an 
important skill for providers in large bureaucracies (e.g., Veteran’s Health Care 
Administration) but also individuals working in private practice where clients may have 
tremendous challenges in finding transportation, navigating health insurance 
reimbursement, and so forth.   
Nevertheless, four guidelines have mixed implications, some of which are very 
problematic.  In the beliefs and attitudes domain D. W. Sue et al. (1982) state that the 
counselor should be aware of her or his limits in cross-cultural competence and refer a 
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client to a member of their own race and culture as appropriate.  This is positive for many 
reasons. It is impossible for any human being to be fully competent to work with 
members of all social groups.  Thus, the option to refer when one feels out of their 
cultural depth allows therapists to grow in select areas of competence with populations 
with which they work most and to supplement their incompetence with a network of 
potential referrals for social groups with which they work rarely.  However, as stated in 
the imaginary “Ron” case example that opened this document, the option to refer is 
vulnerable to appropriation by counselors who do not wish to gain competence with all 
groups because of their own belief systems and biases.   
It certainly does not seem appropriate for any therapist who is actively struggling 
with intense racial bias to work with a racially different client (including persons of color 
working with Whites).  However, it also does not seem appropriate for therapists to be 
able to refer out whenever they are faced with clients who challenge their worldviews and 
beliefs.  It seems unlikely that one will ever grow in an area of cultural incompetence or 
discomfort if one can easily avoid certain groups.  Indeed, numerous authors argue that 
direct cross-cultural interaction is an extremely important part of the MCC developmental 
process (Alexander, Kruczek, & Ponterotto, 2005; Baggerly, 2006; M. N. Coleman, 
2006; Diaz-Lázaro & Cohen, 2001; Roysircar, Gard, Hubbell, & Ortega, 2005).  Without 
further explanation, this “option to refer” clause can all to easily be used as an excuse to 
systematically avoid certain populations. Thus, the option to refer is positive in that it 
allows for client protection against therapist areas of cultural incompetence.  It is also 
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dangerous because it leaves an opening for therapists to remain unchallenged in their 
cultural growth edges.  
Three other characteristics map on to a single theme: group specific knowledge 
and interventions.   In the area of knowledges [sic], D. W. Sue et al. (1982) state that one 
characteristic of a good cross-cultural counselor is her or his possession of specific 
information and knowledge about the group with which he or she works.  In the skills 
domain the authors also state that an ability to generate a wide range of verbal and 
nonverbal responses and to send and receive verbal and nonverbal messages are both 
requisite characteristics of good cross-cultural counselors.   As in the paragraph above, 
the implications are mixed.   
While there is strong contention on the degree to which social identity and culture 
shapes each individual, this author has found no serious position against the idea that 
each person is on some level a product of their social and cultural milieu.  Thus, it is 
entirely reasonable to hold that if we are to understand the individuals we treat, we must 
on some level understand and be knowledgeable of the groups they represent.  One 
important aspect of those groups is their set of normative practices in communication 
style (e.g., amount of eye-contact), greeting rituals (e.g., handshakes, bowing), amount of 
directness in communication (e.g., frequent poetic euphemisms or straight to the point).  
Additionally, it is important we understand the nuanced ways those same groups 
represent individuals (e.g., portrayals of women, children, or sexual minorities in a 
particular religious doctrine or collection of fine art).      
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It is this author’s explicit position that counselors should indeed have a wide 
range of general knowledge about many different social identities.  However, great care 
must be taken when determining the interventions or communication style based on the 
therapists knowledge of cultural norms.  Assuming that there is (or should be) a good fit 
between an individual’s normative experience and their culture’s normative practices is 
cultural determinism.  In other words, overemphasizing cultural norms becomes a form 
of stereotyping.  Treating individuals as purely cultural products is just as problematic as 
ignoring culture altogether.  Both damage rapport and invalidate the client’s identity 
which is an interaction of both their socio-cultural context and their idiosyncratic 
experience (Colemen, Norton, Miranda, & McCubbin, 2003; Neville & Mobley, 2001).  
Therefore, it is also this author’s position that therapists should never assume that it is 
proper and sensitive to communicate with individuals by drawing only primarily from 
their knowledge of the social groups to which those individuals belong.  To be clear, D. 
W. Sue et al. (1982) in no way explicitly enjoin that therapists engage in cultural 
determinism or stereotyping. They only state that therapists should have knowledge of 
cultures and be able to accurately generate, send, and receive a wide range of verbal and 
nonverbal responses.  This author is in complete agreement.  Additionally, the 1982 
publication is only the first attempt to formalize these standards.  It is only natural that 
the 1982 model be general and underdeveloped when compared to later models.  
Therefore, the sections to come will offer close attention to the evolution of the place 
culture specific knowledge holds in MCC.  To be deemed successful, any good model of 
MCC that incorporates culture specific knowledge and skills should offer guidance on 
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negotiating its potential risks and benefits.  We now turn to the next steps in the MCC 
evolutionary process.  
Generation of Secondary Models 
Nineteen years would pass before the publication of the second primary model of 
MCC: the Multiple Dimensions of Cultural Competence (MDCC) by D. W. Sue (2001).  
Mollen et al. (2003) identify eight secondary models of MCC: seven that emerged before 
D. W. Sue’s MDCC model and one that was published in tandem.  While individually 
none of these models has been as frequently cited or impactful as the two primary models 
discussed in this chapter, Mollen et al. are of the opinion that these eight models added an 
important level of nuance to the multicultural competency conversation.  Together they 
help to inform and at times challenge the ways MCC is conceptualized.   The seven 
secondary models published before D. W. Sue (2001) are summarized in Table 2.2.  The 
eighth model is the multicultural counseling competency assessment and planning model 
or MCCAP (Toporek & Reza, 2001).  The MCCAP is a direct outgrowth of D. W. Sue et 
al. (1992) and is a complex geometrical model wherein Toporek and Reza attempt to 
explore the interactions among several dimensions of MCC including contexts of MCC, 
modes of change, process for assessment and planning, and multicultural standards.  The 
MCCAP was published in the same year as D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC and addresses 
many of the same issues as the MDCC.  However, since the MDCC is one of the two 
primary models of MCC and has had a greater impact than the MCCAP, a more in depth 
analysis of the MCCAP is uncalled for by the goals of this project.    
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Table 2.2   
Secondary Models of MCC    
Source Model Structure  Key Concepts 
Carney and 
Kahn (1984) 
Counselors grow in KA&S in each of five developmental 
stages.  Counselors have a core set of characteristics and set of 
training needs within each stage.  
Counselor characteristics within each stage:  
(a) limited cultural knowledge 
(b) recognizes ethnocentric attitudes  
(c) experiences internal conflict re: privilege and guilt 
(d) develops identity as cross-cultural change agent  
(e) promotes cultural equity and plurality. 
Cross (1988) Competence exists in one of six stages. Model was originally 
conceived for organizations but can be applied to individuals.  
Stages: (a) destructiveness, (b) incapacity, (c) 
blindness, (d) precompetence, (e) basic competence, 
and (f) advanced competence.  
Bennett 
(1993) 
Counselors move through six stages, the first three stages are 
ethnocentric and the last three are ethnorelativistic.  
Ethnocentrism stages: denial, defense, and 
minimization. Ethnorelativism stages: acceptance, 




Table 2.2, cont. 
Source Model Structure  Key Concepts 
Campenha-
Bacote (1994) 
MCC is a process of culturally responsive 
assessment and intervention.  
Process has four components: (a) awareness, (b) knowledge, (c) 




Cox, and Daly 
(1997) 
MCC interventions involve eight components in 
both tiers of a two tiered process. Tier one = 
therapist’s personal study of cultures and tier two 
= direct or indirect client interventions. Focuses 
on African American clients.  
“…(a) know self, (b) acknowledge cultural differences, (c) 
know other cultures, (d) identify and value differences, (e) 
identify and avoid stereotypes, (f) empathize with persons from 
other cultures, (g) adapt rather than adopt, and (h) acquire 
recovery skills” (Mollen et al., 2003, p. 29).  
Lopez (1997) MCC is a process.  Therapist recognizes their own 
cultural perspective and the client’s cultural 
perspective and moves between the two.  
Principles of psychotherapy and cross-cultural psychotherapy 
are distinct but overlapping.  MCC must focus on the cultural 
perspective of both client and therapist.  
Castro (1993) Uses the term capacity to describe MCC which he 
argues falls along six different levels ranging from 
-3 to + 3.   
(-3) destructiveness, (-2) incapacity, (-1) blindness, (1) 
sensitivity and openness, (2) competence, and (3) proficiency 
(an ideal state of lifelong cultural learning and commitment).  
Note: The above concepts are summarized from Mollen, Ridley, and Hill (2003). 
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Discussion.  There are several important themes that emerge from an examination 
of the seven secondary models published before 2001.  These themes demonstrate how 
the issues and concepts underpinning MCC took shape over the two decades following  
D. W. Sue et al. (1982).  One identifiable trend is that scholars have attempted to treat 
multicultural competence as a developmental process (Bennett, 1993; Carney & Kahn, 
1984; Castro, 1993; T. Cross, 1988).  Accordingly, they propose varying numbers of 
stages and descriptions for counselor characteristics and (in the case of Carney and Kahn) 
training needs for each stage.  All four of these models conceptualize the final stage of 
MCC development as a point in which counselors are characterized by a non-judgmental 
culturally aware attitude in which clinicians have advanced skills for interacting with 
other cultures.  It is important to draw attention to the soft but present political mandate 
in Bennet (1993) whose final stage of MCC development is ethnorelativism.  As was 
discussed in chapter 1 and will be explored more thoroughly in chapter 6, an overly 
relativistic stance towards cultural diversity is deeply threatening to internal minorities 
within cultural and social groups (Baber, 2008; Foucault, 1978; Fowers & Richardson, 
1996; Okin, Cohen, Howard, & Nussbaum, 1999; Parekh, 2006; Phillips, 2007).   
Other models offer a different approach to conceptualizing MCC. Beckett et al. 
(1997) and Lopez and Watkins (1997) are the most abstract.  Beckett et al. view MCC as 
a cluster of multiple complex characteristics that are non-linear in their development.  
Lopez and Watkins argue that true MCC involves the counselor’s ability to facilitate 
dialogue involving multiple cultural perspectives including her or his own.  Campenha-
Bacote (1994) offers a contrasting, more concrete model which treats MCC as the 
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successful negotiation of a two step process of culturally sensitive assessment and 
subsequent intervention.  
These seven models also demonstrate to some degree the emergence of MCC in 
other disciplines including social work (Beckett et al., 1997), physical healthcare 
(Campenha-Bacote, 1994), and organizational policy (T. Cross, 1988). Further, Becket et 
al.’s choice to design a model for working with the African American population reveals 
the emergence of a sub-area in MCC investigating interventions targeted at very specific 
populations.  Indeed, several of the models explicitly rely on group specific knowledge 
(Beckett et al., 1997; Carney & Kahn, 1984; Castro, 1993).  However, authors also began 
to address the dangers of cultural stereotyping and enjoin counselors to use group specific 
knowledge judiciously (Campenha-Bacote, 1994; Castro, 1993; Lopez & Watkins, 1997).  
For example, Campenha-Bacote states that an important MCC skill is the ability to 
conduct a successful cultural assessment which helps counselors avoid culturally 
stereotyping their clients.  
Overall then, the secondary models of MCC demonstrate a variety of aspects in 
the MCC dialogue that emerged following D. W. Sue et al.’s (1982) publication.  The 
authors (a) offer a variety of conceptualizations of MCC, (b) take up different positions 
on what constitutes the final phase of MCC developmental processes, (c) represent 
multiple helping profession disciplines, and (d) continue to rely on group specific 
knowledge in a variety of ways while beginning to address methods for honoring within 
group differences.  
Primary Model 2: D. W. Sue (2001) 
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In 2001 D. W. Sue published a major contribution in The Counseling Psychologist 
entitled “Multidimensional facets of cultural competence.” The article proposes a new 
model of MCC called Multiple Dimensions of Cultural Competence (MDCC).  Mollen et 
al. (2003) identify the MDCC as the most important and impactful model of MCC since 
1982 and consequently classify it as the only other primary model of MCC.   The article’s 
main thrust is the presentation of MDCC’s theoretical components.  D.W. Sue also 
includes (a) a presentation and synthesis of developments in multicultural training, 
measurement, and competency between 1982 and 2001, (b) an explicit stance on the role 
psychologists should play in politics and change in society at large, and (c) two case 
examples of how the MDCC can be applied.   
D. W. Sue (2001) begins by discussing four major reasons underpinning 
resistance to multicultural approaches to psychology: (a) continued belief in universal 
psychological laws, (b) covert monoculturalist policies in psychology and academia, (c) 
contestation among scholars on how MCC should be defined, and (d) a lack of a multi-
faceted conceptual framework for culture.  Regarding the last point, D. W. Sue states that 
guidelines for MCC had not yet offered a framework for integrating various dimensions 
of culture.  For example, while there are guidelines on specific group characteristics (e.g., 
Asian Americans) and guidelines to apply culturally responsive interventions to several 
levels of society (e.g., individuals, institutions), there was no theory in 2001 that 
integrated both of these dimensions.  Accordingly, D. W. Sue proceeds to offer a model 
which integrates three dimensions of multicultural competence: (a) specific racial and 
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cultural group perspectives, (b) components of cultural competence, and (c) foci of 
cultural competence.    A conceptual sketch of the model is offered in Figure 2.1.  
Dimension 1: Race and culture specific.  D. W. Sue (2001) discusses the race 
and culture specific dimension of MCC.   He first offers a tripartite model of identity in 
which each person is posited to have (a) universal human characteristics (e.g., needs 
oxygen to live, can use symbols), (b) group specific characteristics (e.g., shared 
experiences of racial identity, sexual orientation), and (c) individual differences (e.g., 
unique genetic map, idiosyncratic set of life experiences).  Expanding on the second part 
D. W. Sue states that each person (a) can belong to multiple cultural groups (including 
gender, disability, and so forth), (b) that the salience of one cultural group identity may 
be greater than another, and (c) that the salience of a group identity may shift as a 
function of situation or social context.  He continues with the example of an elderly, 
Latino, gay male as a demonstration of four different identity groups being inhabited by 
the same person.  Accordingly, D. W. Sue argues that psychological theories must 
account for these cultural group perspectives and warns that “failure to do so may skew 
research findings and lead to biased conclusions about human behavior that are culture 
bound, class bound, and gender bound” (p. 794).   
D. W. Sue (2001) goes on to say that psychology has emphasized the universal 
and individual levels of identity at the expense of the cultural and group level and offers 
several reasons this has been the case.  First, Western culture privileges the individual 
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Figure 2.1. D.W. Sue’s (2001) Multiple Dimensions of Cultural Competence.  From “Multidimensional facets of cultural 
competence,” by  D. W. Sue, 2001, The Counseling Psychologist, 29, p. 792.  Copyright 2001 by The Division of Counseling 
Psychology of the American Counseling Association. Reprinted with permission. 
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identity, often viewing the individual as the atomic component of a society.  Second, the 
universal is privileged through the emphasis on a logical positivist orientation to 
knowledge which uses the scientific method to discover universal laws to explain the 
mind.  Third, the group level, and particularly any oppressed group, is normally avoided 
in social conversation because it is uncomfortable and stirs powerful emotional reactions.  
Additionally, when issues of group identity have been studied it has often been from a 
deficit perspective.  Thus, the MDCC seeks to legitimize the important role group 
identity and identities hold alongside the individual and universal aspects of the human 
psyche.  
Expanding on the concept of group identity, D. W. Sue (2001) returns to the 
perennial question of defining culture in theories of MCC.  He states that scholars who 
would seek a restricted definition of culture emphasizing race and ethnicity view it as 
essential to place race first lest it be occluded by other group identities.  As discussed in 
chapter 1, D. W. Sue points out that the challenge is not that other group identities are not 
important.  Rather, it is that including other identity groups in the definition of culture 
makes it easy to avoid uncomfortable discussions concerning race which defeats the very 
purpose of multicultural competency in the first place.  Accordingly, D. W. Sue states 
that “enhancing multicultural understanding and sensitivity means balancing our 
understanding of the sociopolitical forces that dilute the importance of race and our need 
to acknowledge the existence of other group identities related to culture, ethnicity, social 
class, gender, and sexual orientation” (D. W. Sue et al., 1999, p. 792).   It is ironic such a 
balanced aspiration is followed only a few pages later with a race-first operational 
71 
  
definition of culture in the MDCC.  “Because group identities such as race and ethnicity 
have historically occupied a tangential role in psychology, the focus of my model on 
cultural competence operates from a group perspective that is race based” (p. 795).   
The discussion of this first dimension ends with D. W. Sue (2001) taking the 
position that knowledge of racial identity based group norms is a fundamental criterion 
for multicultural competence.   As shown in Figure 2.1, he identifies five specific groups: 
Latino Americans, Asian Americans, African Americans, Native Americans, and 
European Americans.  He argues that different cultures define helping relationships 
differently and that what constitutes normality, mental health, and mature psychological 
functioning can vary tremendously from the Western European norm.  It follows then that 
counseling members of non-European groups using Western European paradigms may be 
antagonistic to non-European clients’ worldview. Further, he cites several studies and 
offers examples of how client perception of therapist competence varies not just between 
Western European and minority groups, but among different minority groups themselves 
(e.g., Latino Americans, Asian Americans, and so forth).   Accordingly, a multiculturally 
competent therapist should know and be sensitive to the plurality of culturally different 
interpretations of helping relationships and mental health.  He calls for further group 
specific research to deepen the available knowledge base in this area.  
Dimension 2: Components of MCC.  D. W. Sue (2001) cites the opinion of 
Helms and Richardson (1997) that the position paper by D. W. Sue et al. (1982) stands as 
a landmark in the development of MCC standards.  The reader will recall that this first 
attempt at offering MCC guidelines had only three components: attitudes and beliefs, 
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knowledges [sic], and skills.   D. W. Sue (2001) then reviews the wide influence of the 
1982 KA&S solution, citing numerous publications showing that the KA&S approach 
had come to form the core of most measures and many proposed training models of 
MCC.   Nonetheless, D. W. Sue (2001) also reviews a wide range of alternative 
definitions of cultural competence by citing eight other publications which attempt to 
define components of MCC.  These eight definitions range from awareness of one’s 
personal culturally based assumptions (Pope-Davis & Ottavi, 1994) through approaches 
which seek to determine universal healing conditions moderated through the lens of 
culture (Fischer, Jome, & Atkinson, 1998).  D. W. Sue also cites other researchers who 
have found potential for adding (a) racial identity development and (b) a multicultural 
relationship factor to the 1982 attitudes and beliefs, knowledges [sic], and skills solution.  
Despite acknowledging these many alternative approaches and potential additions to the 
components of MCC, D. W. Sue ultimately chooses to retain only the original three 
factors for the 2001 MDCC model.  He adds the caveat that “research may ultimately 
identify other factors underlying cultural competence that may alter the MDCC” (p. 800).   
D. W. Sue (2001) then takes a position on answering two questions: (a) Why is 
MCC desirable? (b) What specific outcomes are sought as it is implemented?  He states 
that the ultimate goal of MCC is to provide relevant mental health treatment to all 
populations.  This is desirable because it aligns with the principles of democracy and 
egalitarianism: “inclusion, fairness, collaboration, cooperation, and equal access and 
opportunity” (D. W. Sue, 2001, p. 801).  D. W. Sue states that meeting the goal of 
providing relevant treatment requires more than reactive individual helping strategies.  It 
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is necessary for psychologists to actively push for systemic changes that will result in 
both greater access to mental health services and create social relief from the oppression 
that contributes to minority group psychological suffering.  In other words, D. W. Sue 
takes the bold step of fusing multiculturally competent psychological practice with a 
political mandate to advocate on multiple levels for the rights of minority groups.  This 
leads to the following new definition of MCC:  
Cultural competence is the ability to engage in actions or create conditions that 
maximize the optimal development of client and client systems. Multicultural 
counseling competence is defined as the counselor’s acquisition of awareness, 
knowledge, and skills needed to function effectively in a pluralistic democratic 
society (ability to communicate, interact, negotiate, and intervene on behalf of 
clients from diverse backgrounds), and on an organizational/societal level, 
advocating effectively to develop new theories, practices, policies, and 
organizational structures that are more responsive to all groups.   
Dimension 3: Foci of cultural competence.  Building on this new definition D. 
W. Sue (2001) explains the third dimension of MCC in which counselors are now 
required to obtain knowledge, awareness, and skills for work with clients form the five 
racial and ethnic groups in more than just a one-on-one therapeutic context.  The focus of 
intervention is expanded to also include the professional, organizational, and societal 
levels.  He argues that it does no good for any individual therapist to try to employ a 
culturally sensitive approach to treatment if there are institutionally based policies that 
thwart a multicultural approach.  For example, if an Asian American client wanted to 
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bring family members into individual treatment but the therapy occurs in a setting which 
does not have physical space to accommodate such work, the competent response from 
an MDCC standpoint would be to push for the organization to create such a space.   D. 
W. Sue identifies major barriers of cultural competence and potential solutions for each 
of the four foci summarized in Table 2.3.  
Conclusions of D. W. Sue (2001).  Having offered a full explanation of the MDCC, D. 
W. Sue (2001) concludes by noting that, for the years between 1982 and 2001, MCC had 
generally been approached with an emphasis on the knowledge component by training 
programs, and that the areas of attitudes and culturally appropriate skills had been 
ignored. He highlights once again that professionals and educators must embrace the self-
awareness and skills components as equally important aspects of MCC and not consider 
themselves competent with only a superfluous intellectual knowledge of group 
characteristics.  Further, he reiterates the need for more active work by psychologists in 
reforming organizational and societal norms to affirm and support group diversity by 
changing ethical norms to accommodate more roles for the helping professional (e.g., 
working outside the office, advocating for clients, and so forth).  He also urges 
psychologists to embrace an active role in public policy and politics. Further, D. W. Sue 
makes the point that his model may be expanded in the future to include other cultural 
groups beyond race and ethnicity.  
Finally, D. W. Sue (2001) concludes by reinforcing his position that exclusively 
individual interventions of psychotherapy, from a cultural standpoint, are akin to treating 
only the identified patient in a family system.  Symptoms may be reduced temporarily,
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Table 2.3   
D. W. Sue’s (2001) Barriers and Solutions to Competence Within the Four Foci 
Focus Level Barrier Possible Solutions 
Individual Biases, prejudices, and misinformation from 
discrimination 
(a) Use many sources about groups, (b) spend time with “healthy” 
people from different cultures, (c) use facts and experiential 
understanding of a group’s reality, (d) be vigilant w/those around 
you (e) programs provide experiential training.  
Professional Culture-bound definitions of psychology and 
ethnocentric standards of practice and ethics.  
Expand ethics and standards to include multiple perspectives. 
Organizational Monocultural policies, practices, programs, and 
structures. 
Use system interventions to develop inclusive, multicultural 
organizational structures.   
Societal Invisible ethnocentric monoculturalism, power to 
define reality from a singular perspective, and a 
biased interpretation of history favoring one group 
over another.  
(a) Deconstruct myths of a meritocratic society, (b) consider it a 
personal and professional responsibility to influence legislation 
and public policy, (c) affirmative action and bilingual education.  
76 
  
but will likely reemerge in perpetuum until the family system itself receives treatment. 
Likewise, D. W. Sue is firm in his view that truly multiculturally competent professionals 
are not just reactive symptom relievers, but believe in and actively advocate for systems 
change in both the profession of psychology and in society at large.  
Implications and Critique of the MDCC 
The MDCC is without a doubt one of the most important contributions to the 
multicultural competence literature.  Its impact is difficult to overstate.  D. W. Sue (2001) 
systematically identifies and responds to the limitations of the D. W. Sue et al. (1982) 
model by offering a next step in its evolution in which he gives explicit attention to three 
dimensions of competence in a single, flexible theory of MCC.  This author could not 
agree more with the spirit of many of its core principles, especially (a) expanding 
personal awareness of bias, (b) expanding the role of the psychologist by adjusting ethical 
guidelines, and (c) making work towards systemic changes a component of MCC.   
The MDCC is also not without its limitations.  Mollen et al.  (2003) identify 
several concerns with D. W. Sue’s 2001 article.  First, it is unclear whether cultural 
competence is a distinct, identical, or overlapping construct when juxtaposed with 
multicultural counseling competence.  While it is this author’s interpretation that D. W. 
Sue intended MCC to conceptually subsume cultural competence, there is not enough 
clarity in D. W. Sue’s writing to support this interpretation.  Thus, more clarity is needed.  
Second, Mollen et al. point out that some of the language D. W. Sue uses is circular in his 
definition of competence.  For example, he uses the phrase “function effectively” in his 
definition of MCC.  Since it is axiomatic that competence in any area, by definition, 
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requires effective functioning, a slight reworking of this sort of language would 
strengthen D. W. Sue’s model.  Third, Mollen et al. point out that D. W. Sue’s model is 
overly simplistic in its tripartite conception of personal identity.  While it is certainly true 
that each person has aspects of identity that are unique, universal, and group-based it is 
not clear how this conceptualization can best inform the therapy process since all three of 
these identity dimensions are extremely permeable and overlapping in the context of in 
vivo psychotherapy.  For example, it is unclear how the five racial groups would guide a 
psychologist working with a multiracial client.   
My own critique of the negative aspects of this model is threefold.  First, it 
perpetuates a broad theoretical definition of culture followed by a systematic privileging 
of race and ethnicity in its functional treatment of competence.  Second, it espouses 
cultural relativism with no explicit limits.  For example, there is no discussion of how 
unbounded cultural relativism leaves the internal minorities of all racial and cultural 
groups vulnerable to intracultural biases (e.g., homophobia, ableism, sexism).  Finally, 
the model offers no guidance on how clinicians might assist clients in navigating cultural 
conflicts that occur intrapersonally.  This is especially important when synthesis of two 
group based identities within the same person is not possible.  Together, these three 
concerns constitute the core of this dissertation.  Offering solutions is the contribution of 
this project and will be the central purpose of chapters 4, 5, and 6 respectively.  We turn 
now to a discussion of each one in turn.   
Concern 1: Inclusive in spirit but restrictive in practice – a race first 
approach.  D. W. Sue states first that culture does include a wide range of components 
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outside of race and ethnicity.  Yet D. W. Sue also notes that race is easily diluted when 
culture is defined broadly.  He cites Carter (1995) and his own personal experiences 
when he observes that one way this dilution manifests in verbal discussions of race is that 
the conversation can quickly be turned to other (perhaps more comfortable) identities 
such as gender or socioeconomic status.  Consequently, D. W. Sue states that a careful 
balance is needed between including all identities in a definition of culture while also 
offering a protected space for issues of race to be brought to the fore.   
It is therefore unclear how the reader should interpret D. W. Sue’s exclusive 
attention to the five race and ethnic categories in the cultural dimension of his model 
reproduced in Figure 2.1.  It is possible that his solution to balancing inclusion and racial 
attention is to simply focus on race and, by using race as the prototype, assumes that 
inferences can be drawn to other identities.  It is also possible that his position is that race 
and ethnicity are exceptional identities and more important than these other identities.  
Another possibility is simple pragmatism.  Perhaps D. W. Sue believes that as a matter of 
political and personal etiquette he should speak only to those oppressed identities with 
which he identifies personally and thereby make polite space for other groups to speak 
for themselves.  There is no way to know without further clarification from D. W. Sue 
himself.  Whatever his motivations, this model fails to achieve the balance among a broad 
set of identities D. W. Sue calls for on p. 792.  Mollen et al. (2003) observe  
There are limitations to Sue's choice to focus his model on a race-based group 
perspective. The historical neglect of group identity is not itself an adequate 
rationale for an exclusively race-based model of cultural competence. The 
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development of a comprehensive model in any discipline should be based on the 
consideration of all the relevant variables, not simply those of interest to the 
author. In addition, people do not always fit neatly into one of the five race-based 
groups in Sue's model. It is unclear how the model should be used when the 
individual, organization, or society of interest spans more than one of the five 
race-based groups.  
This author could not agree more with the statement above.  Indeed, this specific 
article is an example that, at least for D. W. Sue, the psychology of multiculturalism is 
first and foremost the psychology of race and ethnicity.  The other identities D. W. Sue 
states are so important are not treated as equals to race and ethnicity in the 2001 
formulation of this model.  Instead, they become a de facto footnote.  “Although the 
model emphasizes racial and ethnic minority groups, it is potentially useful in the study 
of other marginalized groups as well.  For example, gender, sexual orientation, and 
ability/disability may be substituted for a racial and cultural minority group dimension” 
(p. 816).  In the opinion of this author, this sentiment simply does not constitute a 
balanced approach to honoring all identities on the one hand and protecting race on the 
other.  Taking a step further, I would argue they amount to a privileging of race and 
ethnicity in the multicultural counseling discourse.  
It is this author’s position, therefore, that a successful contemporary model of 
MCC must embody consistency between its theoretical and positional definition of 
culture, and the identities it selects for its model.  In other words, if culture is to be 
defined broadly, than a discussion of all identities (including race and ethnicity) must be 
80 
  
used in the diagrams, discussion, and examples illustrating the model.  There is an 
alternative solution.  Strong arguments can be made for a restricted definition of culture 
that specifically addressed race and ethnicity first and foremost with separate but 
overlapping guidelines for other identities such as sexual minorities, people with 
disabilities, and so on.  What I reject is the status quo: an expanded definition of culture 
in the abstract followed by a restricted treatment of culture in models of MCC.  This 
inconsistency amounts to the sense that some oppressed identities are more important or 
more vulnerable than others.   I believe that, until there is a way to link up the treatment 
of culture as an abstract term and culture in the context of MCC, there will be in-fighting 
among oppressed groups.  This can only be detrimental to the solidarity and lasting 
alterations in the field for which D. W. Sue advocates so strongly. This author will draw 
upon the work of political philosopher Parekh and others to craft his own solution to the 
question of how best to strike the balance between race and other identities when defining 
culture in chapters 4 and 5.   
Concern 2: Unbounded cultural relativism is dangerous.  In many ways the 
addition of a Focus Dimension of MCC (e.g., individual, societal, organizational) is 
simultaneously the MDCC’s greatest strength and weakness.  This author is in full 
agreement with D. W. Sue (2001) that psychologists must advocate for adjustments to the 
institutionalized policies of organizations, professions, and society at large which 
systematically antagonize and oppress many sociodemographic groups.  His rationale is 
elegant: failure to implement systemic oriented multicultural interventions constitutes a 
failure in psychology’s responsibility to social justice and relegates psychology to an 
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exclusively reactive position towards social violence.  It is undoubtedly true that unless 
psychology works towards systemic change it will always treat symptoms of oppression 
but never oppression’s root causes.  Concerns arise, however, with the apparent 
unawareness of the dangerous implications of creating a mandate for psychologists to 
become advocates for all groups on all four foci without incorporating any explicit limits 
on cultural relativism.  Psychologists should endorse a mandate for organizational and 
societal multicultural interventions, but not the mandate offered by D. W. Sue (2001).  
Without explicit boundaries, D. W. Sue’s position will be shown to have implications that 
are outright dangerous and ultimately serve to work against the sort of social justice D. 
W. Sue himself endorses.  
Returning to D. W. Sue’s (2001) definition of MCC, he states that multicultural 
competence requires psychologists to promote client systems and develop systems which 
are responsive to all groups.  Yet, the article lacks clarity on what should constitute 
responsiveness.  It is therefore not true to say that this definition is a wholesale 
endorsement of all cultural practices and beliefs.  To clarify then, this author does not 
make the accusation that D. W. Sue is endorsing all groups and all practices.  The 
problem is not where D. W. Sue draws lines on what groups are included and what 
constituent beliefs and practices deserve endorsement and advocacy from psychologists.  
The problem is that he does not draw them at all.   
For sake of illustration, let us imagine an unfavorable aspect of the broad 
definition of culture put by forth D. W. Sue and many other multicultural psychology 
scholars (APA, 2003; Colemen et al., 2003; Liu, 2005; Pedersen, 1991; Pope-Davis, Liu, 
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Toporek, & Brittan-Powell, 2001; D. W. Sue, 2001; D. W. Sue & D. Sue, 2008).  Since 
culture can include many groups and aspects of identity, it may be argued that even 
groups psychologists should never support would constitute “cultures” in a definition as 
unbounded as D. W. Sue’s (2001).  These would be groups which, by definition, oppose 
the rights or existence of other groups (e.g., neo-Nazis) or who pose danger to vulnerable 
populations (e.g., pederasts).  Such examples are so egregious it can reasonably be taken 
for granted that they are excluded from advocacy within multiculturalism both in 
psychology and other fields.  Nevertheless, Fowers and Richardson (1996, p. 615) use the 
examples of Serbian Nationalism, Rwandan ethnic cleansing, German Nazism, 
involuntary virginity testing in Turkey, and female circumcision to effectively and 
controversially interrogate the limits of a multicultural orientation to psychology 
(Barongan et al., 1997; Ekstrom, 1997; Fowers & Richardson, 1997; Gaubatz, 1997; Teo 
& Febbraro, 1997; Yanchar & Slife, 1997) .   
At least in the case of extreme examples, psychologists will not and should not 
advocate on systemic levels for “all groups” nor all group-based systems of their clients.  
Indeed, in the case of groups which are absolutist, radical, or incorporate hatred into their 
identity, psychologists should as a rule work towards system responsiveness that is 
antithetical to such groups.  Thus, the term “responsive” in Sue’s definition is in need of 
further clarification  This author agrees that we should work towards responsive systems 
to all groups, but that those responses should at times be negative, not affirming.   
It is easy to exclude hate groups from advocacy and to denounce them.  The 
question becomes harder when we begin to examine the specific practices and beliefs of 
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other groups.  If multicultural competence requires facilitation of group systems that 
respond to all groups, these include majority populations as well.  Thus, without a formal 
check the following logical extensions are possible from Sue’s (2001) model.  A 
multiculturally competent psychologist is one who advocates for more responsive 
systems for all groups.  Therefore, multiculturally competent psychologists advocate for 
systems that are responsive to the LGBT population.  Conservative religious groups also 
constitute a cultural group when culture is broadly defined.  Therefore, multiculturally 
competent therapists advocate for systems that are responsive to conservative religious 
groups, even if these groups hold doctrines that homosexual behavior is morally 
unacceptable and should be treated as a form of mental illness.   
This is not at all to say that conservative religious interpretations from any faith 
are necessarily on a par with hate groups; though in some extreme cases the comparison 
may be well founded.  It is also not to say that there could not be a pluralistic solution.  
Surely societies and organizations can make space for both conservative religious group 
identities and the LGBT population.  However, it seems less likely that the system could 
accommodate policies, internal structures, and leadership which simultaneously respond 
in an affirming way to conservative religious values and LGBT identities.  At some point, 
the two would have to become mutually exclusive.  To illustrate the tension differently: 
Should the APA accredit a religiously-oriented clinical psychology doctoral program 
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which openly denounces the LGBT population as deviant and immoral?
3
  If multicultural 
competence includes creating responsive systems for all groups, the answer would not be 
a simple “no,” some form of minimal synthesis would be required.  Extreme cultural 
relativism is challenging and can become the reverse gestalt of cultural absolutism.   
Therefore, some third alternative is needed.  
It is therefore this author’s explicit position that affirmation and advocacy for 
systems to respond positively to all groups is not only impossible, it is undesirable.  
Therefore, multicultural competence must not carry an embedded self-authenticating 
political mandate to do so.  Consequently, a successful theory of multicultural 
competence must incorporate the tools to make comparisons between various groups’ 
systems of beliefs and practices.  At times when the core values of such groups are 
incompatible, it is important and necessary that psychologists begin to develop 
responsible guidelines for determining which group’s practices should be supported and 
which should not.  Political philosophy offers us a burgeoning ethical toolkit to allow a 
constructive conversation on how to responsibly make such comparisons and judgments 
without recreating rampant cultural hegemony and absolutism.   
Chapter 6 of this project will explore one theory of intercultural evaluation and 
examine how psychology might incorporate such principles into a new dimension of 
MCC.  As will be explored more fully, political multicultural philosophy is not the 
                                                 
3
 The introduction to part II of this dissertation will highlight the controversial events at the National 
Multicultural Conference and Summit in 2006 when students from Regent University’s APA accredited, 
religiously affiliated clinical psychology program) presented research on conversion therapy for LGBT 
identified clients.   
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wholesale endorsement of the beliefs and practices of all groups in any given society. 
Rather, it is about finding pluralistic solutions that are not completely relativistic.  The 
dominant and privileged culture should not be the exclusive yardstick by which all others 
are measured (Kymlicka, 2002; Parekh, 2006; Phillips, 2007).  Political multiculturalism 
is about rejecting the idea that the majority or privileged groups are always right.  It does 
not follow, however, that the minority culture is always right either.  Nor is it true that 
comparisons should not be made between cultural practices.  Ultimately comparisons 
must be made and lines must be drawn between sets of beliefs and practices.  A nuanced 
multicultural orientation would embody the simultaneous evaluation of different groups, 
majority and minority alike.  It simply does so in a way which systematically guards 
against the endorsement of majority and privileged group practices and beliefs.   
Concern 3: Intracultural oppression and conflicting intrapersonal identities.  
Throughout his article, D. W. Sue (2001) discusses the ways in which certain value 
systems that have permeated twentieth century psychology are “culture bound.”  D. W. 
Sue proposes deconstructing these value systems.  Yet the monumental task of replacing 
the current culturally enshrined values and replacing them with a hybrid or plurality of 
other cultural systems is not necessarily a better solution.  The alternative sets of “culture 
bound” values that D. W. Sue defends are likely themselves filled with their own internal 
biases and prejudices for within group minorities (Baber, 2008; Okin et al., 1999; Parekh, 
2006; Phillips, 2007).  Without some mechanism for intercultural evaluation or limiting 
group rights, psychology stands to simply replace one form of oppressive system (inter-
group oppression) with another (intragroup oppression).   
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The focus level of competence needs further clarification because the MDCC 
does not adequately explain the relationship between helping the client as an individual 
and helping the group(s) of which the client is a member.    The concern is in two parts.  
First, at the systems level of the Focus Dimension the MDCC does not adequately 
account for the internal oppressions of any culture.  Second, at the individual level the 
model does not offer any guidelines on how the therapist should assist clients when there 
is a collision among multiple social identities within the same person.  Each will be 
discussed in turn.  
The therapist is not helping the client directly when advocating or intervening on 
systems levels.  Rather, he or she is helping the client’s culture or social group.  It is true 
that this often helps the client indirectly.  Interventions may include intervening at the 
organizational level to make sure LGBT reading materials are represented in the waiting 
area or advocating against torture on the societal level.   Yet in the case of a client who is 
an internally oppressed minority of a given culture, systems interventions that advocate 
for said culture can often serve to actually antagonize the individual in question.    Surely 
psychologists will not support any group that seeks legal exceptions so that it may engage 
in practices such as female genital mutilation or physically beating one’s spouse, no 
matter how culturally grounded such practices may be.    
The current form of the MDCC is inadequate because, while it convincingly 
enjoins psychologists to advocate for groups, it fails to acknowledge the tension between 
individual and group rights.  Uncritical advocacy for groups on systems levels endangers 
individual rights within those groups (Baber, 2008; Parekh, 2006; Phillips, 2007). If 
87 
  
psychologists are to advocate for cultural and social groups, they must do so in a way that 
responsibly protects the individuals within those groups.   
D. W. Sue (2001) mentions the importance of many group identities in his 
tripartite model of self.  However, the MDCC is race focused and ultimately offers the 
clinician little guidance on how to understand individuals as embodying multiple, 
mutually influencing, intersecting identities. On the individual level we misunderstand 
the concept of self if we imagine that human beings are best viewed through any 
particular group lens.  Individuals may exist anywhere on the normal curve in terms of 
how they experience any or all of their group identities.  D. W. Sue mentions the 
possibility of salience shifting from one group identity to another depending on context.  
For example, a Deaf woman may experience her gender as most salient among other 
Deaf people but could experience her disability as more salient among hearing women.  
Yet the idea of shifting salience is, while necessary, an ultimately insufficient approach.  
One could easily imagine both gender and disability identities being salient at the same 
time, or neither one feeling salient.  Social identities become incredibly complex and 
nuanced when we view individuals as the hub at which social identities intersect.  
For example, let us consider a first generation Iranian American woman with a 
graduate degree who presents with depressive symptoms. She states that she is torn 
between pursuing her dream of a career in public policy and her duties as a conservative 
Muslim to marry, have children, and live a private life without work.  Using the MDCC 
as a model of competence, it is unclear how the therapist should proceed in a culturally 
competent manner.  All of her identities salient in this context and knowledge, awareness, 
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and skills related to each is not sufficient to help the client come to a resolution.  Four 
solutions seem possible: (a) the client chooses her career identity over her religious 
identity and rejects becoming a homemaker, (b) the client rejects her vocational identity 
and chooses not to work, (c) the client compromises by altering some aspect of either her 
vocational and/or religious identities, or (d) the client makes no decision and continues in 
a state of existential tension. As in the example for Concern 2 with the LGBT population 
and conservative religious values, it seems impossible to simultaneously support all of 
this client’s group identities. At some point a compromise will have to be made among at 
least some of them.  Thus, some form of meta-cultural competence seems necessary in 
such cases.  
Thus, we can identify two more components necessary in a successful theory of 
multicultural competence: (a) a complex language for exploring interactions that arise 
among group identities within the individual and (b) guiding principles for assisting when 
mutually incompatible intrapersonal group identity conflicts arise.  The latter concern is 
embedded in the bounded pluralism stance explained in chapter 6 whereas the former will 
be explained using social psychology scholarship on identity theory.   
 Contextualizing the three concerns.  The three critical areas of concern 
identified in this chapter are not the only criticism that has been made of contemporary 
MCC models.  In 1996 a revised version of standards for the operationalization of MCC 
were published (Arredondo, Toporek, Brown, & Jones, 1996) which offered a large list 
of behaviors designed to correspond with a KA&S theory of MCC.  Weinrach and 
Thomas (2002) would go on to offer a critique of these same standards that was largely 
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negative.  They would later summarize their critique in five main points (K. R. Thomas & 
Weinrach, 2004).  First, they questioned whether any competency standards could justly 
be imposed upon the counseling profession.  Second, they questioned the empirical 
validity of the standards because there is no evidence that the standards’ behavioral 
recommendations are in any way related to more efficacious counseling outcomes.  
Third, they argued that because of this lack of empirical support, counselors engaging in 
the behaviors outlined by the standards may internalize a false sense of competence in 
work with diverse populations.  Fourth, they argued that the competencies were largely 
focused on a socio-racial definition of culture that excluded other oppressed social 
identities such as disability or gender.  Last, they argued that the operationalized 
competencies could open new ethical dilemmas.  Namely, professionals who have 
achieved the competencies’ benchmarks may nevertheless remain unskilled at working 
with a wide range of particular diverse client populations.   In other words, professionals 
could meet competency standards in theory but remain functionally incompetent in 
practice.  These criticisms led to a larger debate in the January, 2004 issue of the Journal 
of Mental Health Counseling (Arredondo & Toporek, 2004; H. L. K. Coleman, 2004; 
Patterson, 2004; K. R. Thomas & Weinrach, 2004; Vontress & Jackson, 2004; Weinrach 
& Thomas, 2004).   
Arredondo et al.’s (1996) operationalized standards directly stem from the KA&S 
approach first outlined by Sue et al. (1982).  Given the direct link between them, one may 
fairly ask why this current project centralizes the areas of identity group hierarchy in 
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definitions of culture, moral relativism, and multiple identities but eschews the other 
ethical, empirical, and philosophical questions raised in Weinrach and Thompson (2002).   
It is this author’s goal to deconstruct some of the moral and political assumptions 
and positions upon which articles such as Arredondo et al.’s (1996) are built.  That is why 
this chapter has tended to focus less on articles such as Arredondo et al. (1996) and more 
on articles such as D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC.  It is upon works such as the latter that 
implementation strategies such as the former are built.  It is my view that there are likely 
multiple correct and incorrect behavioral solutions that would constitute competence 
when working with diverse populations.  Accordingly, such attempts at specificity are 
often cumbersome and unwieldy and so contributions such as the AMCD 
operationalization standards favor the prescriptive over the persuasive.  Moreover the 
behaviors of MCC are not, in the view of this author, in as much need of attention as is 
the vision of social justice upon which the proposed behaviors are predicated.  I believe 
that currently, our vision of justice is in need of improvement.   
To summarize, this project is intended to be a moral rather than empirical inquiry.  
Weinrach and Thomas  (2002) are right to question the adoption of any set of 
competencies before they are proven to have clinical efficacy.  However, questions of 
implementation, in the view of this author, should follow resolutions on the moral 
principles underpinning policy decisions.  In other words, I would first seek answers to 
the moral and conceptual problems of contemporary MCC theories rather than problems 
related to their practical implementation.  This is because even if the standards did lead to 
better counseling outcomes, the three criticisms offered in this chapter would still remain 
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unaddressed.  Accordingly, empirical criticism of the implementation or efficacy of MCC 
theories are not addressed in this project.  This project seeks to revise and expand upon 
the limitations of the more abstract MDCC and inquires as to what political position our 
field is taking in such theories.  Once such revision occurs, the next step in this line of 
research would be to address the question of whether or not such a revised model of 
MCC should be operationalized in the way of Arredondo et al.’s (1996) publication.  
Given that the focus of this project is to create such a revision, a discussion of if and how 
models such as the MDCC should be operationalized, must wait for another day.  
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the historical context for the development of formal 
models of MCC and examined the evolution of these models between the early 1980s and 
2000s.  A thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the two primary models 
of MCC was offered.  Three important areas of concern arise from the analysis of D. W. 
Sue’s (2001) MDCC.  First, his model privileges race and ethnicity over other oppressed 
identities.  Second, there is no discussion of what limits (if any) must be imposed on 
cultural relativism.  Third, the model inadequately explains multiple social identities 
within the same person and offers no guidance on how conflict among them should be 
approached.   
The goal of this dissertation is to transform D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC into a 
more contemporary model that addresses these three concerns.  Chapters 4 through 6 of 
this project will draw from a variety of sources to systematically address each of the three 
concerns outlined above and explain the alterations to the MDCC that should follow.  
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First, however, chapter 3 will review the ways multicultural psychology has already 
begun to explore these same concerns over the past decade.     
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Chapter 3. Multiplicity and Multicultural Counseling 
The issue of multiple social identities and multiple group memberships 
raises some difficult questions. For example, how many times have women of 
color been asked, "Which is more oppressive, sexism or racism?" This is an 
impossible question to answer. Women of color must negotiate multiple 
oppressions daily. Some may feel that issues of racism far outweigh the impact of 
sexism. If one adds other sources of social oppression, such as able-ism, class, 
homophobia, or anti-Semitism, one can get exhausted quite easily. On a pragmatic 
level, when attending major conventions, how do therapists or counselors identify 
which programs to attend and where they feel most supported? (Funderburk & 
Fukuyama, 2001, p. 9) 
 
The sentiments above echo the third concern related to current MCC guidelines 
stated in the previous chapter.  Counseling psychology has yet to reach a consensus on 
how to approach and understand multiple group membership and the consequent multiple 
social identities within each person.  Nevertheless, there is a wide-ranging extant 
literature within counseling psychology that has brought these complexities to light and 
continues to search for more satisfying answers.  
The author has identified two threads in the multicultural psychology literature 
that remain to be discussed in this project before answers can be offered to the three 
questions outlined in chapter 2.  The first theme is the general internal critique of 
multicultural psychology in response to multiplicity which will be defined as the multiple 
social identities that exist within the same person.  Works in this area generally focus on 
ways psychologists may better understand, study, and attend to the complexities and 
ambiguities of multiple social group identities within a single person.  Many other terms 
are used to describe the general notion of intrapersonal social group multiplicity.  
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Examples include orthogonal (Oetting & Beauvais, 1990), ecological (Colemen et al., 
2003), multiple oppressions (Reynolds & Pope, 1991), and intersectionality (Cole, 2009).    
The second theme arises from scholarship that comments on the rhetoric and 
purpose of multicultural psychology from an external vantage point.  Works in this 
category highlight the ways in which multicultural psychology aligns with and departs 
from other politically and socially-oriented psychology projects such as feminist and 
social justice psychologies.  Authors within this second theme often explore whether 
multicultural psychology can be integrated with another project like feminism 
(Silverstein, 2006).  Other authors seek to transcend two or more projects altogether by 
offering a new theory which subsumes both.  One example of this latter goal is the article 
“Beyond feminism and multiculturalism: Locating difference and the politics of location” 
by  Anthias (2002) .  Consequently, this second theme will be called critical 
functionality.   
The overall purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, it offers the reader an 
overview of the strengths and weaknesses of integrating multiplicity into the 
multicultural psychology discourse.  As will be demonstrated, the issues of multiplicity 
and critical functionality discussed by authors in this chapter have yet to yield a formal 
and accepted theory of MCC.  Therefore, the second purpose of this chapter is to offer the 
reader a final rationale for the necessity of the answers outlined in chapters 4-6 of this 
dissertation.   
This chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section reviews Teaching and 
social justice: Integrating multicultural and feminist theories in the classroom (Enns & 
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Sinacore, 2005b) which explores the theme of critical functionality in multicultural and 
feminist education.  The second reviews and discusses a range of articles that give rise to 
the two themes discussed above.  The third section reviews Inclusive cultural empathy: 
Making relationships central in counseling and psychotherapy (Pedersen, Crethar, & 
Carlson, 2008) which tries to operationalize multiplicity in a new model of multicultural 
counseling.  The chapter concludes with a final synthesis of the works reviewed in this 
chapter and a restatement of the need for further development of their themes.   
Enns and Sinacore: Integrating Feminism and Multiculturalism  
In 1998 a working conference entitled “Advancing Together: Centralizing 
Feminism and Multiculturalism in Counseling Psychology” was sponsored by APA 
Division 17’s Section for the Advancement of Women.  One of the ten conference 
working groups focused on pedagogy.  That initial meeting eventually led to the 
publication of Teaching and social justice: Integrating multicultural and feminist theories 
in the classroom edited by Enns and Sinacore (2005b).  As the title suggests, the primary 
task of the text is to find ways of integrating feminist and multicultural theories into a 
new hybrid of the two they call multicultural feminist.  The authors offer a theoretical 
foundation and rationale for implementing multicultural feminist pedagogy in psychology 
along with practical guidelines on how to do so.   
The book contains eleven chapters grouped into two parts.  Part I (chapters 1 
through 6) focuses on the theoretical aspects of multiculturalism, feminism, and 
pedagogy as they relate to the larger issue of social justice.  Definitions are offered 
alongside a comparative review of theories and training methods from fields as diverse as 
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critical studies, queer studies, multicultural education, and of course multicultural 
psychology.  The second part (chapters 7 through 10) reviews the application of feminist 
and multicultural pedagogy.  Chapter 11 offers personal reflections from the authors of 
how their own personal identities impact their role as multicultural feminist educators.   
This dissertation is about multicultural competency as a theoretical construct and 
is not largely focused on the pedagogy and training of MCC.  Consequently, the section 
that follows will focus on the overview of the key conclusions from chapters one through 
six since these are the chapters with the most relevant material for the questions at hand 
in this particular project.  Following this review, the author will discuss its implications 
for the challenges facing contemporary MCC theory.  Ultimately, Enns and Sinacore 
(2005b) offer the reader a larger theoretical context for understanding the ways 
multiculturalism’s and feminism’s respective evolutionary trajectories give rise to the 
three areas of concern discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation.   
Theoretical foundation.  In the first chapter of the text, Enns and Forrest (2005b) 
identify several important traditions of social justice-oriented pedagogy: multicultural, 
critical, and feminist.   The authors yoke critical and multicultural traditions together and 
distinguish them from feminist traditions in areas of content, process, and goals.    
Multiculturalism tends to prioritize matters of race, ethnicity, and culture in its 
content.  The goal of multicultural and critical pedagogy is conscientization which is 
defined as both developing an awareness of oppression and a commitment to eliminating 
said oppression (Freire, 1970; Weiler, 1991).  Successful critical pedagogy transforms 
students from tenuous social and economic circumstances into empowered leaders who 
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work against oppression.   Accordingly, teachers treat students’ personal lives as 
important in the classroom and teach students skills relevant to their lives instead of 
focusing on abstract knowledge.  The teacher encourages participatory dialogue between 
him/herself and students thereby rejecting so-called “banking” education strategies of 
simply transferring knowledge from teacher to student.  Participation in social action, 
self-reflection, and challenging traditional knowledge is highly encouraged.   
Feminism, by contrast, centralizes gender in discussions of power, patriarchy, and 
intersecting oppressions.  Feminist pedagogy has the slightly different goal of 
consciousness-raising at its foundation.  Enns and Forrest (2005b) cite Fisher’s (1981) 
two part definition of consciousness-raising: (1) engendering self-definition and 
understanding how self-definitions of oppressed groups become marginalized and (2) 
including emotion alongside reason to understand liberation and oppression experiences.  
To achieve this goal, educators may restructure power in the classroom (e.g., replace 
teacher grading with self or peer evaluation, student led discussions), encourage personal 
growth by integrating rational and emotional learning, focusing on multiple intersecting 
oppressions beyond gender, and connecting social action to the ideas learned in the 
classroom.   
Enns and Forrest (2005b) point out that there is tremendous common ground 
between each of these traditions.  Both feminist pedagogy and multicultural pedagogy 
draw from interdisciplinary scholarship, centralize marginal identities in course content, 
and challenge traditional definitions of knowledge and education.  Both seek to steer the 
student-teacher relationship towards collaboration and emphasize experiential learning.  
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Finally, both traditions treat changing societal power structures, empowering groups, and 
creating social activists as important outcomes of education.   
Enns and Forrest (2005b) finish the chapter with a discussion of how these two 
approaches may be integrated.  The authors state that some integration has already 
occurred in works variously described as situational pedagogy, pedagogies of 
positionality, and borderland pedagogy.  The common theme among such works is their 
focus on exploring the intersection of power relationships for the same person.  Authors 
attend to the ways each individual is simultaneously situated or positioned at a complex 
intersection of social structures in which they are at once both privileged and oppressed.  
The authors note that “identity statuses shift across contexts, and the intersections of 
these differences become the major focus of attention in the classroom as students and 
teachers seek to create complex yet incomplete or partial models of oppression, reality, 
and empowerment” (p. 20).  Enns and Forrest therefore identify exploring the intersection 
among identities as the primary goal of borderland pedagogy.  Thus, one possible 
solution to the problem of including multiple statuses in MCC could be to centralize the 
themes of positionality or power among statuses rather than the concept of culture itself.  
Yet, the consequence of focusing on such an ambiguous, contested, and unclear 
subject is that its answers are partial and inconclusive.  The authors acknowledge this but 
also express hope that embracing such complexity will help build a foundation that will 
strengthen alliances between social movements that do not often collaborate with one 
another.  The authors state that in multicultural feminist pedagogy:  
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Educators and students should not feel compelled to choose one identity over 
others or to claim a feminist or multicultural identity. Instead, their efforts to 
occupy multiple places, to explore contradictions and ambiguities within and 
between perspectives and identities, and to explore flexible ways of integrating or 
foregrounding various aspects of their identities are facilitated (Enns & Forrest, 
2005b, p. 22).   
Chapters 2 and 3 discuss feminism in depth with a focus on second wave 
feminism in chapter 2 and contemporary feminism in chapter 3.  Enns and Sinacore 
(2005a) identify four traditions within second wave feminism: liberal feminist theory, 
cultural feminist theory, radical feminism, and socialist feminism.  Each of these theories 
has its own mechanisms for addressing inequities in patriarchic societies and prioritizes 
different goals for social change.  For example, cultural feminist theory posits that 
women constitute a unique culture which is positioned to use intuitive, relational forms of 
knowledge to help change the world. Cultural feminists promote social change using 
relationally based decision making and increasing communal roles.  While these four 
traditions are an important first step, chapter 3 points out that second wave feminisms 
have been criticized for ignoring and even downplaying the internal variance among 
women including race, sexual orientation, generational status, and so forth (Sinacore & 
Enns, 2005a).   
Sinacore and Enns (2005a) therefore review six diversity feminisms in chapter 3 
which include postmodern feminism, women-of-color (e.g., Black and Chicana 
feminisms or womanisms), antiracist feminism, lesbian or queer feminism, third-wave 
100 
  
feminism, and global feminism.  In many ways these theories are a reaction to the middle 
class, White, heterosexual focus of the second wave.  For example, during the second 
wave some feminists viewed issues related to lesbians as a distraction or “lavender 
herring” that would detract from building power for the liberation of women as a whole.  
Consequently, lesbian feminism seeks to recentralize lesbians as a unique group of its 
own that should not be defined only in contrast to straight women or gay men.  Similarly, 
women-of-color feminism has critiqued the White-normative focus of second wave 
feminism and lesbian feminism alike.  All six of these movements in their own way have 
pointed out the blank spots and invisible internal minorities ignored by both the second 
wave and contemporary social justice movements.  The intense focus on intersectional 
and marginal identities within and across groups situates these theories as more 
compatible with multiculturalism than second wave theories.  
In chapter 4, Ali and Ancis (2005) review five approaches to multicultural 
education at the K-12 and higher education levels: (a) exceptional and culturally 
different, (b) human relations, (c) single studies, (d) multicultural education, and (e) 
multicultural and social reconstruction.  All five approaches are similar in that they seek 
to respond to inequities in the education system.  However, they are distinguished by the 
place on which the focus of change falls on a continuum anchored by seeking to change 
students on the one side and focusing on societal and institutional change on the other.  
An example focused on trying to change students is the culturally different approach in 
which at risk students are placed in special programs to help them integrate into the 
mainstream and succeed in existing educational and social systems.  Strategies might 
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include ESL programs, targeting knowledge gaps, or increasing interpersonal interaction 
in learning.  On the opposite side is the example of multicultural and social 
reconstructionist education.  Here the focus is not on changing students to fit society but 
on changing society and education institutions to better fit a diverse student body.  
Strategies focus on educating students about their life circumstances and how to respond 
constructively to social injustice with the goal of empowering students to enact change in 
the world at large.  The authors conclude by noting that each of these approaches is 
compatible with many of the principles underpinning the multicultural and feminist 
pedagogies reviewed in chapters 2-4.   
In chapter 5 Ancis and Ali (2005) round out the sweeping review of feminist and 
multicultural pedagogy literature by exploring multicultural counseling training 
approaches.  The authors draw from their own interpretation of the literature alongside 
the work of Carter and Qureshi (1995) to arrive at four broad categories of multicultural 
counseling training: (a) universal, (b) ubiquitous, (c) culture specific, and (d) race-based.  
These four approaches are largely distinguished by how broadly they define the term 
culture, the goals of training, the relative emphasis on an individual’s context, and the 
content and process of training.  For example, race-based approaches define culture 
narrowly to focus almost exclusively on race and ethnicity.  Training goals tend to center 
on increasing awareness of power disparities organized around race with the goal of 
engendering movement towards higher levels of racial identity development.  In contrast, 
ubiquitous approaches define culture broadly to include race and many other social 
identities.  Content focuses on the ways power disparities shift depending on both 
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individual identity variables but also the context in which those variables exist from one 
moment to the next.  The goal of a ubiquitous approach is to increase a trainee’s 
knowledge, awareness, and skills of how to work appropriately with a wide range of 
cultural groups.  Ancis and Ali argue that each of these approaches has merit but that 
each carries such significant omissions as to make any one of them inadequate on its 
own.  This is particularly true of the issue of intersectionality which none of these 
approaches fully address, especially the race-based approach.  Therefore, the authors 
reinforce the position that the only way to move beyond the limitations of the positions 
taken in each multicultural counseling training method is to integrate them into a broader 
approach that simultaneously addresses both intersectional and single group power 
dynamics.   
Finally, Sinacore and Enns (2005b) approach chapter 6 as a final discussion of all 
three traditions reviewed in chapters 2-5: feminist pedagogy, multicultural and critical 
pedagogy, and multicultural counseling training.  Each of these approaches share the 
common goal of empowering traditionally marginalized groups and identities.  The 
authors then summarize six key dimensions in how approaches within and between these 
traditions are distinguished.  First, the approaches often start their discussion in different 
places along two dimensions: (a) the centralization of either culture or gender (e.g., 
feminism versus multiculturalism) and (b) the relative emphasis of either oppression of 
groups as an aggregate or the exploration of oppression as it relates to complex individual 
identities.  Other key dimensions that distinguish these theories are (a) their relative focus 
of change on either social structure or individual empowerment, (b) the degree to which 
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they endorse or challenge traditional forms of knowledge, (c) their relative emphasis on 
either single or multiple dimensions of oppression, and (d) the degree to which self-
reflection emphasizes either internalizing awareness of social power systems or 
awareness of one’s personal beliefs and attitudes.   Table 3.1 offers a visual presentation 
of these six dimensions.  
In examining all of the similarities and differences among the many theoretical 
approaches to diversity pedagogy, Sinacore and Enns offer a description of where an 
integrated multicultural feminist pedagogy approach would fall along these six 
dimensions.  Multicultural feminist pedagogy would integrate the first two dimensions by 
(a) simultaneously centralizing both gender and culture and (b) exploring large group and 
complex individual identities.  Further, a multicultural feminist approach would lean 
towards challenging how knowledge is created and legitimized, explore multiple 
intersecting identities, engender change in social structures, and increase awareness of 
large scale issues of power.  
Discussion.  Enns and Sinacore’s (2005b) work is a model of the critical 
functionality theme identified in the introduction to this chapter and explored more fully 
in the next section.  They seek to transform multicultural pedagogy and feminist 
pedagogy by examining both from multiple vantage points using resources from several 
scholarly disciplines.  Their work, like Pedersen et al. (2008), is not a theory of MCC.  
Instead, the chapters discussed above explore the evolution of multiculturalism and 
feminism as they have been applied to education and training.  
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Table 3.1    
Six Dimensions of Contrast within and among Multicultural, Feminist, and Multicultural Counseling Pedagogies  
Dimension Emphases  Contrasting emphases   
Group of Emphasis Gender Culture and Ethnicity  
Breadth of Focus Complex individual identities Large groups  
Process of 
Empowerment 





Increasing access to existing knowledge Deconstrcting how knowledge is legitimized   
Privilege and 
Oppression 
Oppression of discrete groups and single 
statuses  
Complex intersections of privilege and oppression  
Awareness Increasing awareness of personal attitudes 
and beliefs  
Increasing awareness of broad systems of power 
and privilege 
 
Note: The above concepts are summarized from Sinacore and Enns (2005b). 
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Nevertheless, Enns and Sinacore’s (2005b) text is an abundant resource for discussing 
MCC in light of the evolution of multicultural and feminist philosophies over the past 
forty years.  Their hybrid approach helps to frame the concerns outlined in chapter 2 
about contemporary MCC theory, provides avenues for responding to the limitations of 
current MCC theory, and offers a historical frame for understanding the development of 
MCC and its potential next steps.   
Both feminist and multicultural theories have undergone parallel transformations 
over the past several decades related to multiplicity.  The chapters above illustrate that, 
while it is true that multicultural and feminist theories have challenged hegemonic power 
structures, both movements have also recreated hegemony and obscured identities within 
their own ranks.  In examining the critique of MCC in chapter 2 of this project, it appears 
that the evolution of MCC theory has run a parallel course.  Specifically, MCC theories 
such as D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC are positive in that they encourage greater attention to 
a range of oppressed groups and multiple levels of social context.  Yet like second wave 
feminist education or single studies approaches to multicultural education, the MDCC 
also (a) obscures the internal diversity within groups and individuals and (b) recreates 
power imbalances by emphasizing some oppressed groups or identities more than others.  
Ultimately Enns and Sinacore (2005b) solve the limitations of diversity pedagogy by 
endorsing an approach that is a hybrid of the resources found in both multicultural and 
feminist theories.  The question remains open as to how MCC theories may take a similar 
next step.   
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In considering MCC through the six dimensions outlined in Table 3.1, a model of 
MCC such as the MDCC (D. W. Sue, 2001) would require several changes to qualify as 
multicultural feminist.  First, it would need to expand explicitly beyond race and ethnicity 
to include other social groups in the model itself.  As demonstrated in chapter 2 this is not 
the case.  Second, the MDCC would need to increase its focus on complex intersections 
of identities at the individual level of the model.  Similarly, attention would also have to 
be paid to within group differences at the systems levels of intervention.  This would be a 
more dramatic change since the model takes a more discrete approach towards cultural 
groups and identities and uses the concept of shifting salience from one to the next rather 
than examining how they interact simultaneously.  However, it should also be 
acknowledged that the MDCC already aligns with multicultural feminist principles in its 
emphasis on personal awareness of one’s own attitudes and large systems of power and 
empowering individuals within current systems while also challenging the systems 
themselves.  The MDCC, like second wave feminist theories or early multicultural 
education strategies, is therefore not in need of replacement as much as innovation.   
Such innovation and evolutionary changes are already taking place.  Pedersen et 
al.’s (2008) ICE framework (reviewed later this chapter) is certainly an example of 
encouraging a multiplicity focused conceptualization of difference but there are also 
others.  Hays (2008) identifies several key social identities such as age, disability, and 
creates the acronym ADDRESSING for understanding work with diverse groups.  She 
then uses the acronym as a tool for clinicians to conceptualize each client as a person who 
exists at the intersection of at least ten different social identities.  Brown (2009) discusses 
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Hays framework and other developments in multicultural psychotherapy.  Brown 
concludes that the benchmarks for cultural competence are “no longer met by reading and 
memorizing the rules from the handbook of psychotherapy with the Other [sic.]. 
Although some etic cultural knowledge can be helpful, we are beginning to see it as being 
as potentially misleading as it is informative” (p. 346).  The movement towards shifting 
multicultural competence towards intersectionality is also taking place in other 
professions which provide psychotherapy such as social work (Ben-Ari & Strier, 2010).  
There is also greater attention to intersectionality as it relates to the research methods of 
psychology in general (Cole, 2009).   
The new Handbook of Multicultural Counseling Competencies (Cornish, Schreier, 
Nadkarni, Metzger, & Rodolfa, 2010) is perhaps the most recent and comprehensive 
update to the general treatment of MCC in the field at large.  The text is organized into 
sixteen chapters each focusing on one particular area of diversity such as race, 
immigration, and ethnicity.  Throughout the text there is an increased focus on an 
expanded definition of culture to include many groups (e.g., chapters include topics such 
as disability, men, and body size).   Each chapter often includes case examples where 
counselors are asked to hypothesize about the ways the chapter’s chosen identity group 
may intersect with other identities.  Finally, the chapters offer a list of competencies for 
working with people from a given group at four levels of professional practice: 
practicum, internship, new professional, and advanced professional.  Nevertheless, the 
text holds at its core the KA&S paradigm reviewed in chapter 2 with all the same 
problems therein including no attention to relativism or how attention to race and 
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ethnicity could be protected in such an expanded definition of culture.  There is no 
systematic theory of identity that is used to ground the discussion of intersectionality.  
Finally, the text does not offer an expansion or update to the KA&S approach to diversity 
in light of these complexities but instead attempts to stretch existing KA&S approaches 
to fit new identity statuses.   
In summary, multicultural competency seems to be on the same trajectory as 
second wave feminisms and seems in need of its own next step.  As has been shown, 
some works in multicultural psychology and multicultural counseling have already begun 
addressing multiplicity and have pointed out the limitations of current MCC theory.  Yet 
unlike multicultural and feminist education, there has yet been no formally updated 
model of MCC that has responded to the limitations of KA&S approaches.  In short, it 
appears that MCC theory must catch up to some of the critiques and observations that 
have been noted in the multicultural psychology and multicultural counseling literature.   
Emergent Themes: Multiplicity and Critical Functionality 
This section reviews a range of articles and chapters addressing the general theme 
of multiplicity in counseling psychology.  The first set of works respond to multiplicity in 
ways compatable with mainstream MP and we may characterize these responses as a 
form of internal critique.   The remaining works reviewed in this section use a contrasting 
approach.  They critique the purpose of multicultural psychology itself from an external 
standpoint and often seek solutions outside of MP’s mainstream theoretical and 




Internal critique.  In their 1991 article “The Complexities of Diversity: 
Exploring Multiple Oppressions” Reynolds and Pope noted a “frequent dichotomization 
or segmenting of human identities” (p. 174) throughout the multicultural psychology and 
racial identity development literature of the 1970s and 1980s.  They argued that, since 
many people within the United States have multiple social identities and are sometimes 
members of more than one oppressed group, such segmentation is both “inaccurate and 
limiting” (p. 174).  The authors state that an alternative to conceptualizing identity 
development as two separate processes for gender and race, an individual may experience 
development in both of these identities simultaneously with one identity influencing the 
development of another.  In other words, the authors argue that there is good reason to 
conceptualize racial identity and gender identity development as processes which may 
not be entirely distinct and separate.   Rather, their development may be simultaneous or 
sequential, mutually influential or distinct depending on individual context.   
Reynolds and Pope (1991) also use the examples of biracial and bisexual 
individuals as identities which defy the typical linear models of unidimentional identity 
development which usually articulate only one outcome as most mature, advanced, or 
acceptable.  Accordingly, their position is that counseling and psychology at large must 
embrace a new approach to their epistemology in which multiple solutions to conflict 
among identities may be considered healthy.  Such an approach in their view would help 
to challenge the status quo of research, practice, and training.  Accordingly, they offer the 
Multidimensional Identity Model illustrated in Figure 3.1.  In this model all four potential 
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outcomes are considered healthy as a function of context, reference group, and personal 
needs.  The dashed lines indicate that movement among all four is possible.  
This article is a milestone in the literature since it constitutes one of the first 
challenges to linear, unidimensional, and segmented identity models using what this 
author has chosen to call multiplicity.  Reynolds and Pope (1991) conclude by urging  
 
Figure 3.1. Reynolds and Pope’s (1991) Multidimensional Identity Model.  From “The 
Complexities of Diversity: Exploring Multiple Oppressions,” by  A. L. Reynolds and R. 
L. Pope, 1991, Journal of Counseling & Development, 70, p. 179.  Copyright 1991 by 




practitioners and researchers alike to find new research paradigms and mental health 
models that allow for multiple healthy outcomes and offer flexible, creative ways to 
integrate more than one oppressed identity.  This article is a touchstone for the theme of 
multiplicity and a subtheme we may call pluralist identity development where multiple 
healthy outcomes replace linear, dichotomous approaches.   
Other authors continue to explore the concept of multiplicity.  Davenport and 
Yurich (1991) noted that “politically, the two groups [civil rights’ and women’s 
movements] do not often work actively together, and at an educational level, courses and 
textbooks addressing multicultural issues often do no more than pay lip service to gender 
issues and vice versa” (p. 64).   Accordingly, Davenport and Yurich sought to explore the 
intersections of gender and race by offering a discussion of gender roles within African 
American and Mexican American populations.  The authors end by urging psychologists 
to move beyond a preference for single lenses and instead attend to the ways many social 
contexts interact for the same person.  Similarly, Fukuyama, Ferguson, Perez, DeBord, 
and Bieschke (2000) state that “one of the primary limitations of recognizing only single 
identities is that individuals who embrace multiple identities are often invisible members 
within specific social reference groups” (p. 45).   Fukuyama et al. go on to present a 
review of scholarship on LGBT populations within Native, Latin, African, and Asian 
American populations.  An important theme throughout their chapter is Fukuyama et al.’s 
attention to the simultaneous invisibility and segmenting of identities LGBT people of 
color may experience when their sexual or racial identity is ignored, suppressed, or 
covered in different social contexts. 
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A related article appears seventeen years later by Wester (2008) which continues 
studying intersections of culture and gender in a review of how male gender role conflict 
intersects with sexuality and other social identities including Hispanic American, African 
American, Asian American, and sexual orientation (e.g., gay, bisexual, men who have 
sex with men).   Wester’s article seeks to expand on the  “Guidelines on multicultural 
education, training, research, practice, and organizational change for psychologists” 
(APA, 2003).  He first explores gender role conflict in each of these groups using a 
knowledge, awareness, and skills (KA&S) framework after which he synthesizes the 
entire discussion into general KA&S recommendations for clinicians working with men 
from any combination of these groups.   It is noteworthy that Wester’s piece focuses on 
the GRC of men, a group typically privileged in any culture, as a group worthy of 
specific multicultural competency paralleling authors such as Liu (2005).   
Bowman and King (2003) discuss how MCC relates to women of color.  The 
authors review the ways this population experiences a double bind in which they are 
asked to compartmentalize their racial and gender identities.  Women of color face the 
subordination of gender concerns should they choose to enter debates about racial issues.  
Bowman and King describe how, in discussions about race, women of color may often 
feel the need to downplay concerns about sexism within racial minority groups for the 
greater good.   The alternative is equally uncomfortable.  Women of color may join with 
White feminists in work that may not reflect women of colors’ ethnic communities.  
Consequently, Bowman and King state that women of color are offered models for 
debating race or gender separately but find no good model for debating concerns about 
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race and gender simultaneously.  In their view, this allows unique stereotypes combining 
race and gender (e.g., the promiscuous Latina, the single African American mother 
receiving welfare) to go unquestioned by White and racial minority communities alike.  
The authors then offer a brief review of literature demonstrating that women of color 
frequently think in terms of multiple identities rather than shifting from one singular 
salient identity to the next.  Thus, the term womanist rather than feminist is often 
preferred because it better integrates a racial and gender hybrid identity.  The chapter 
concludes with a list of competencies for working with women of color based on a  
KA&S model (D. W. Sue et al., 1992) of MCC  blended with feminist principles.   
Ridley, Mendoza, Kanitz, Angermeier, and Zenk (1994) also speak to multiplicity 
in a discussion of how best to operationalize the construct of cultural sensitivity.  Ridley 
et al. offer their own philosophical presuppositions grounding their theoretical approach 
before creating a new model of cultural sensitivity.  The first of these suppositions is that 
cultural sensitivity, as a psychological construct, should be conceived as the ideographic 
meaning each client derives from her or his own multiple group identities since cultural 
norms may or may not be relevant to individuals.  This is because of both the vast within 
group variance for any social group and the fact that clients belong to multiple groups 
simultaneously.   “Clients are not merely representatives of a single culture. They 
participate in aspects of different cultural groups, with each cultural facet overlapping in 
a unique way to create a blend that is unique to the individual” (p. 128).  Accordingly, 
Ridley et al. urge counselors to acquire normative data about different cultures and social 
groups.  At the same time, they admonish counselors to never take an a priori cultural 
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conception of their individual clients noting that cultural information is useful but not 
sufficient when understanding the cultural experience of each unique person.  They 
therefore recommend a stance of open naiveté and caution with regard to understanding a 
client’s culture until a counselor can explore with the client her or his own unique 
experience of her or his many cultural groups.  Such a stance empowers counselors to 
simultaneously honor the individuals they serve while also being sensitive to those 
individuals’ cultural contexts when formulating subsequent counseling behaviors.  Note 
that the notion of multiple groups forming a single unique cultural lens is quite different 
from other more segmented treatments of multiplicity discussed in chapter 2 which 
described salience shifting from one identity to another rather than attending to the 
composite created by all of them at once (D. W. Sue, 2001; D. W. Sue & D. Sue, 2008).  
Ridley et al.’s overall conclusion is that cultural sensitivity requires a fairly idiosyncratic 
approach to the many social roles and contexts relevant to each person at the individual 
level.  
The July 2001 issue of The Counseling Psychologist offered five articles related 
to a variety of multicultural psychology issues (Abreu, 2001; Ancis & Szymanski, 2001; 
Dorland & Fischer, 2001; B. S. K. Kim, Atkinson, & Umemoto, 2001; Whaley, 2001).  
Neville and Mobley (2001) synthesized these five articles into a contextual model of 
multicultural counseling processes shown in Figure 3.2.  While at first glance this may 
seem an alternate but similar approach to multicultural counseling competency as D. W. 
Sue’s (2001) MDCC, Neville and Mohley place greater emphasis on the intersections and 
mutually influencing nature of each system level (e.g., macro, exo, and so forth) and each 
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social group and identity (e.g., sexuality, race, gender).  The MDCC places greater 
emphasis on conceiving appropriate interventions to each system level and each salient 
identity rather than the intersections of all of them.  Indeed, Neville and Mohley highlight 
the complexity of Multicultural Psychology involving “the interface between multiple 
systems and multiple social locations” (p. 484).  It is also noteworthy that Neville and 
Mohley recommend that counseling training programs become aware to the ways they 
perpetuate high SES, White, male cultural norms  They recommend programs do more to 
support trainees’ many cultural identities. 
Colemen et al. (2003) offer “An ecological perspective on cultural identity 
development.”  Using the example of multiracial individuals, the authors discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of mainstream racial and cultural identity development models.  
Here, cultural identity is treated broadly to include gender, sexual orientation, and so 
forth.  Drawing from Bronfenbrenner (1979), Colemen et al. explain that ecological 
approaches conceptualize the context of human development as one involving multiple, 
interlocking social systems.  These systems range in level of proximity to the individual 
from immediate (e.g., microsystems of family and friends) to distal (e.g., macrosystems 
including regional history).  Ecological perspectives approach cultural identity 
development by integrating the ways individuals perceive themselves and their 
experience of being perceived by others across five levels of social ecology (e.g., self, 
micro, meso, exo, and macro systems).   
Ecological methods examine both how interlocking social systems organize and 




Figure 3.2. Neville and Mobley’s (2001) Ecological model of multicultural counseling 
psychology processes.  From “Social identities in contexts: An ecological model of multicultural 
counseling psychology processes,” by H. A. Neville & M. Mobley, 2001, The Counseling 
Psychologist, 29, p. 475.  Copyright 2001 by The Division of Counseling Psychology of the 
American Psychological Association.  Reprinted with permission.
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multiple contexts.  The authors state that such nuances are unavailable within linear 
approaches to cultural identity.  While linear approaches rightly ask “how factors such as 
race or gender cause an individual's sense of self as a member of a group” (p. 40), linear 
perspectives often focus on the macrosystem of society at large.  They do not offer in-
depth information on how cultural identities are influenced and given different meaning 
within more immediate levels of social ecology such as one’s microsystem  (e.g., family) 
or mesosystem (e.g., specific church parish, specific school).  These systems are much 
more variable than the social history of an entire nation or region.  Accordingly, the 
meaning ascribed to cultural identities may vary proportionately within these smaller 
systems.  Colemen et al. therefore take the position that cultural identity development 
theories should expand from a linear exosystemic focus to a comprehensive ecological 
perspective focusing on all five levels of social ecology.   
Colemen, et al. (2003)  identify three potential benefits of shifting from linear 
positivism to an ecological stance.  First, an ecological stance would encourage scholars 
to move beyond group labels that too often do not represent all group members.  Second, 
members of in-between identity statuses (e.g., biracial, intersex, and so forth) are more 
empowered to set their own parameters of identity better when open-ended and 
phenomenological research methods are used.  Last, an emic perspective would also more 
accurately capture in-between identities instead of reifying them into an overly simplistic 
“other” category of identity.  Accordingly, Colemen et al. recommend that researchers 
move beyond the positivist search for generalizable truths about cultural groups.  Instead, 
they advocate an ecological approach blending constructivism, positivism, and critical 
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theory which would offer the broadest possible lens through which cultural identity can 
be understood across its many contexts.  They conclude by arguing that while their article 
focuses on race and ethnicity, their case supporting a move towards constructivism would 
also apply to ecological approaches in researching other cultural identities (e.g., gender, 
sexual orientation, and so forth).  Taken together, Neville and Mobley (2001) and 
Colemen et al. (2003) both respond to multiplicity with an ecological framework that 
examines the nuanced interactions between an individual’s many social identities and the 
many levels of social context for each person.  
External critique.  Funderburk and Fukuyama (2001) explore the relationship 
between feminism, multiculturalism, and spirituality.  The authors discuss the ways all 
three movements converge in efforts to increase awareness of worldviews and beliefs, the 
structures that create and house these beliefs, and the transformation of oppression and 
suffering.  Each field has its own unique mechanisms for doing so, many of which 
overlap (e.g., consciousness-raising, cultural sensitivity, and turning to power that 
transcends political and social structures).  However, each field has its own internal 
biases illuminated by the intersectional example of a lesbian of color.  Feminism has a 
history of racism, multiculturalism a history of resisting intersectionality, and spirituality 
a history of patriarchy and homophobia.  Consequently, it is difficult to know where one 
belongs when no matter which group one joins there is always a risk of bias against or 
occlusion of at least one identity.  Funderburk and Fukuyama conclude by challenging 
their colleagues to continue finding new strategies which can help connect spiritual, 
feminist, and multicultural projects.      
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Similarly, McDowell and Fang (2007) examine the relationship between critical, 
feminist, and multicultural research traditions as they relate to family therapy.  They 
synthesize their findings into a new stance for the study of families which they call 
critical multicultural research (CMR).   The key features of CMR are (a) amplifying 
marginal voices within and between groups, (b) interrogating the politics of knowledge 
creation and legitimization, (c) ensuring that research participants benefit from CMR 
projects, (d) creating culturally mixed research teams (e.g., researchers who do and do 
not identify as members of a group being studied), (e) maintaining awareness of 
researchers own biases and worldview, and (f) using diverse research strategies (e.g., 
qualitative, mixed methods).  The authors posit that families are best understood when 
researchers can simultaneously examine the interlocking power structures in which each 
person is located.  Each person is part of many identity groups which sometimes oppose 
one another morally and politically.  Therefore, researchers should investigate the nature 
of power relationships between these many social groups.  In their view, such an 
approach would offer a corrective research agenda for family studies.  However, the 
authors also acknowledge that studies with all of these features are limited in that they are 
(a) often impractical, (b) may themselves carry a covert social agenda, (c) carry risk to 
populations being studied, and (d) may ultimately not lead to lasting social change.    
Vera and Speight (2003) echo D. W. Sue (2001) when they argue for the inclusion 
of a social justice component in MCC.  For Vera and Speight a social justice orientation 
involves societal levels of intervention beyond just the one-on-one or group therapy 
intervention.  Specifically, they argue that counseling itself tends towards the reactive and 
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remedial as a force for social change.  Accordingly, they argue that psychologists must 
(a) expand their professional roles to include outreach, prevention, and community wide 
advocacy and (b) engage the communities they research more actively as stakeholders in 
research outcomes.  Their article seems to belong alongside other works seeking to 
transcend feminism and multiculturalism because Vera and Speight seem to argue that 
MCC should be subsumed under social justice whereas D. W. Sue (2001) seems to argue 
that societal, advocacy, and other meta-level interventions should be part of MCC itself.  
In other words, D. W. Sue’s article seems to expand MCC whereas Vera and Speight 
seek to transcend and subsume MCC within social justice psychology.  Both argue in 
favor of both systems and individual interventions, but Vera and Speight seem to argue 
that systems change is of greater importance to counseling competency than culturally 
sensitive individual or micro level interventions.   
Comstock et al. (2008) seek to join relational, social justice, and multicultural 
competencies within what they term relational cultural theory (RCT).  Here the authors 
draw from all three of these research areas to expand the KA&S approach to cross-
cultural counseling.  Starting with Miller (1976) the authors note that psychology 
historically decentralizes meaningful relationships as a key marker of mental health and 
maturity substituting instead markers like individuation, autonomy, and separation.  
Therefore, the goal of RCT is to reduce barriers to growth-fostering relationships which 
Comstock et al. assert are essential to human well-being.  RCT focusses on the ways 
social oppression impedes an individual’s ability to create and sustain positive 
relationships, taking a more relationship-centered view of life span development.   In this 
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way Comstock et al. see RCT as a relationship-focused compliment to and expansion of 
multicultural and social justice competencies in psychology.   Comstock et al.’s (2008) 
RCT would add to the knowledge and awareness dimensions of KA&S models of MCC.  
Specifically, RCT promotes an increased “awareness and knowledge of the ways in 
which cultural oppression, marginalization, and various forms of social injustice lead to 
feelings of isolation, shame, and humiliation among persons from devalued groups” (p. 
280).  The authors conclude with future directions for recentering relationship growth in 
multicultural and social justice training and community building in general.   
Discussion.  The articles above are not intended to serve as a comprehensive 
review of the theme of psychology literature exploring multiplicity. Indeed, these works 
were chosen from among many others too numerous to name here.  However, these 
works serve a valuable purpose in this chapter because each is a concise example of the 
different ways scholars have noticed and responded to multiplicity.  Taken together, they 
offer the reader a broad overview of the ways multiplicity has emerged as a key issue in 
multicultural psychology over the past two decades.   
As intersections of multiple identities become more prominent in multicultural 
psychology, at least four minor themes emerge in the choices scholars make in response 
to these complexities from vantage points internal to mainstream MP.  First, some 
authors choose to explore the intersection of two or more groups in greater detail 
(Bowman & King, 2003; Davenport & Yurich, 1991; Fukuyama et al., 2000; Wester, 
2008).  Second, there is a push for what we may call a pluralist approach to identity 
development which embraces multiple outcomes (Reynolds & Pope, 1991).  Third, a 
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theme emerges embracing an idiosyncratic approach to cultural sensitivity at the 
individual level (Ridley et al., 1994).  Fourth, a last minor theme emerges emphasizing 
the full range of social strata when exploring cultural identity (e.g., iso-systems through 
exo-systems) (Colemen et al., 2003; Neville & Mobley, 2001).  All of these responses to 
multiplicity add complexity to mainstream multicultural psychology concepts.  
A contrasting response to multiplicity is what this author has identified as critical 
functionality in which works explore the rationale for multicultural psychology itself, its 
limitations, and how to respond to them.  In short, works exploring the critical 
implications of multicultural psychology do so from a vantage point external to 
mainstream MP.  Within the theme of critical functionality there seem to be two sub-
themes.  In the first, authors seek to integrate multiculturalism with another theoretical 
area within psychology such as feminism or spirituality (Funderburk & Fukuyama, 2001; 
McDowell & Fang, 2007).  Alternatively, other authors would like to transcend 
multiculturalism and related theoretical areas such as feminism with a new broader 
approach to multiplicity such as social justice (Comstock et al., 2008; Vera & Speight, 
2003). These themes are summarized in Table 3.2.  
  In the final section of this chapter, the author has chosen a major work in 
applying multiplicity to multicultural counseling from within mainstream MP.  The 
implications of the work will be discussed in the context of the many themes reviewed in 
Table 3.2.   
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Table 3.2  
Emergent Themes in Response to Multiplicity   
Themes Sources 
I. Internal Change of MP  
a. Intersections of two or more groups Davenport and Yurich (1991), Bowman and King (2003), 
Wester (2008), Fukuyama et al. (2000) 
b. Pluralist Epistemology: Multiple healthy end stages in 
identity development  
Reynolds and Pope (1991) 
c. Idiosyncratic attention to intersections = sensitivity Ridley et al. (1994) 
d. Intersections of identity and context and ecological 
approaches 
Neville and Mobley (2001), Colemen et al. (2003) 
II. Critical Functionality: External Change of MP  
a. Integrating multiculturalism and another political 
approach such as feminism  
Funderburk and Fukuyama (2001), McDowell and Fang 
(2007)  
b. Subsuming MC within another approach Vera and Speight (2003), Comstock et al. (2008) 
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Inclusive Cultural Empathy: A Multicultural Theoretical Orientation 
Pedersen, Crethar, and Carlson (2008) sought a way to operationalize 
multiculturally competent treatment of individuals’ many group identities in a new 
theoretical orientation for counseling that subsumes and expands upon the KA&S 
approaches to MCC outlined in the previous chapter.  They called their approach 
Inclusive Cultural Empathy (ICE).  The authors believe that this theory can be combined 
with any of a number of cognitive, dynamic, or humanistic approaches to counseling.   
Defining terms.  
Divergent empathy.   The central concept for the ICE model is Pedersen et al.’s 
(2008) emphasis on expanding the definition of empathy to include more than just the 
internal psychological experience of one individual.  Pedersen et al. state that empathy 
has historically been a convergent term in the counseling literature.  In the works of 
theorists such as Carl Rogers empathy is conceived as one individual imagining the 
internal psychic experience of another individual.  In such work, contextual and cultural 
factors are often set aside since the goal is to imagine the exact emotional experience of 
the client.  In contrast, Pedersen et al.’s ICE model expands this imagining to include not 
only the individual’s internal thoughts and feelings but also the cultural context or 
contexts within which those thoughts and experiences occur.  For Pedersen et al. no 
clinician can accurately imagine a client’s reality unless the client’s context is included.  
For example, in many non-Western cultures the individual is conceptualized with great 
attention to where they fit in a large network of significant relationships including family.  
For Pedersen et al. counselors must try to include all the significant social relationships 
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each client has when conducting a counseling interview.  This goes far beyond the 
client’s relationship with the counselor.    
Culture.  Pedersen et al. (2008) do not offer an explicit and detailed definition or 
theory of culture other than clearly defining culture broadly to include race, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, gender, and other sociodemographic identities.  The authors also make 
frequent use of three important culture-related terms throughout their text.   First, the 
author’s define cross-cultural as “the comparison across cultures of one perspective with 
another. It primarily refers to ethnocultural comparisons” (p. 6).  Second, multicultural is 
defined broadly as “the multiple cultures in each context and even in each person, 
emphasizing not only the ethnic and national origins of our learned assumptions but also 
their age, gender, socioeconomic status, and other affiliation origins” (p. 6).  Finally, 
Pedersen et al. offer a new definition of culture-centered which to them means (a) 
making culture central to understanding context and (b) stands as an alternative to 
individualism when conceptualizing the process of counseling.   
Context.  Pedersen et al. (2008) define a person’s context as an experience or set 
of experiences that are repeated frequently or even daily.  These repeated experiences are 
posited to have a strong influence on shaping an individual’s perspective, particularly 
when they take the form of prejudice, oppression, and discrimination.    
Culture teacher.  This is a term used frequently in Pedersen et al. (2008) for 
which the authors never offer a clear, succinct definition.  From the many contexts in 
which the term is used, it appears that Pedersen et al. use the term culture teacher to refer 
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to any internalized personal relationship from which one learns norms and beliefs 
associated with the many groups Pedersen et al. include in their definition of culture.  
Cultural encapsulation.  This term refers to a state in which a person rigidly 
holds to one set of unexamined beliefs, endorses a singular unilateral view of reality, 
refuses to take other cultural views under consideration, and views different cultural 
practices as threatening (Pedersen et al., 2008).   
Inclusive.  For the purposes of ICE, inclusive refers to several concepts.  First, 
ICE posits that each client brings not only him/herself into the room but also a multitude 
of culture teachers.  Inclusivity means attending to the influence of these internalized 
relationships alongside the therapy relationship. Second, inclusive also refers to including 
many groups beyond race and ethnicity in the definition of culture. Last, inclusive refers 
to empathizing not just with a client’s emotion but the context within which the emotion 
occurs.    
Defining ICE.  Pedersen et al. (2008) build upon the definitions outlined above to 
define inclusive cultural empathy as “a revision of the conventional empathy concept 
applied to a culture-centered perspective of counseling” (p. 51). Pedersen et al. go on to 
identify two essential features of ICE.  First, ICE explicitly endorses a broad and 
inclusive definition of culture.   Counselors should consider the client’s culture teachers 
from a client’s ethnographic, demographic, status, and affiliation backgrounds.  The 
second essential feature of ICE is the position that truly empathic counseling 
relationships will invariably have positive and negative moments that continually shift.  
For Pedersen et al. this dynamic balance contributes to the quality of a counseling dyad 
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and represents an opportunity for assisting the client in reaching her/his goals.  “ICE is 
therefore the learned ability of counselors to accurately understand and respond 
appropriately to the client's comprehensive cultural context, both in its similarities and 
differences, which may include confrontation and conflict” (pp. 52-53).   
Pedersen et al. note that behavior is interpreted through the lens of each culture 
(e.g., smiling may mean different things depending on cultural reference group).  Since 
ICE embraces an inclusive definition of culture, the authors also note that a client’s 
cultural reference group may shift many times in the same interview (e.g., from 
emphasizing gender to age to other affiliations).  Accordingly, it is their position that 
counselors must be able to closely and accurately monitor which identity is most salient 
for a client at any given time.  Once the salient cultural identity is identified, a different 
interpretive lens for each identity will be required to accurately understand the client’s 
behavior.  Further, the same behavioral interpretations associated with a reference group 
may change over time for the same person since cultural groups themselves evolve and 
develop just as individuals do.  
Acquiring ICE.  Pedersen et al. (2008) describe the process by which clinicians 
can develop ICE.  Counselors must first develop affective acceptance which is defined as 
the emotional awareness of cultural assumptions, and that individuals are situated in a 
network of cultural memberships.  Second, counselors must acquire intellectual 
understanding of the specific similarities and differences in the counseling dyad on both 
personal but also cultural and context levels.  Last, counselors must be able to mobilize 
this affective awareness and intellectual understanding into appropriate interaction 
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which they define as collaboration across similarities and differences towards 
constructive change.  They summarize the process with the following equation: “affective 
acceptance + intellectual understanding + appropriate interaction = inclusive cultural 
empathy” (p. 54).  In many ways this is simply a different way of stating the equation 
knowledge + awareness + skills = multicultural competence.  The key difference lies 
between the fact that ICE is intended to be a generic model of counseling whereas 
multicultural competence is generally treated as a more restricted concept.   
Positions.  In addition to the definitions above, the authors state that the ICE 
model holds to eight assumptions which are drawn from D. W.  Sue, Ivey, and Pedersen, 
(1996): (a) We are both similar and different at the same time, (b) Culture is complex and 
not simple, (c) Behaviors by themselves are not meaningful, (d) Racism can be covert 
and unconscious, (e) We are all vulnerable to cultural encapsulation, (f) Inclusion is more 
likely to define a cultural context than exclusion, (g) Internal spiritual resources are 
important, and (h) Ambiguity, although inconvenient, has potentially positive value.   
These assumptions cluster around three broad positions on how best to work with 
diverse populations which will each be reviewed in turn.  First, as in the case of ethics, 
multicultural empathy is an aspirational goal towards which one strives but never fully 
achieves.  Pedersen et al. (2008) point out that it is not possible to learn about all of a 
client’s potential identities but it is nevertheless important that counselors strive to learn 
about as many as they can.  
Second, the goal of multicultural counseling is to strive for identifying differences 
and conflicts among culturally learned viewpoints without necessarily resolving them in 
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favor of a particular viewpoint.  Within the ICE model, Pedersen et al. call this goal of 
identification without resolution balance.  In ICE balance and understanding are the goal 
of counseling rather than problem-solving, symptom reduction, and so forth.  The authors 
offer examples of a therapist acting as a kind of culture broker where they offer a space 
for conflicts and cultural imbalances to be explored without necessarily offering a 
viewpoint of what a proper outcome should be.  These include times when therapy could 
be conducted with a third person in the room such as a therapist from the client’s own 
culture (Bolman, 1968).  Alternatively therapy could include a co-client from the primary 
client’s own culture who has already effectively solved problems similar to the primary 
client’s presenting concerns (Slack & Slack, 1976).  In such cases, the therapist is simply 
the catalyst which allows the change process to take place.  
The third position, stemming from the concept of balance, is that exclusive or 
convergent empathy should be rejected.  Instead, counselors should strive for inclusive 
empathy which mandates counselors to embrace the sense of dissonance related to 
differences between themselves and their clients.  This is in sharp contrast to traditional 
definitions of empathy which focus on emphasizing areas of similarity and shared 
emotional experiences while deemphasizing or excluding altogether areas which do not 
overlap.  Pedersen et al. argue that embracing complex and even chaotic dissonances in 
the counseling relationship safeguards against counselors consciously or unconsciously 
translating the client’s experience into the counselor’s own cultural frame of reference.   
Application.  The next six chapters (i.e., chapters 4 – 9) expand upon the three 
elements that allow counselors to develop ICE (affective acceptance, intellectual 
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understanding, and integral skills) with each element receiving two chapters of its own.  
A large portion of each chapter is pedagogical including experiential exercises that 
expand upon many concepts already reviewed in this dissertation.  Accordingly, only 
those areas that expand most on the points that distinguish the ICE model of multicultural 
counseling from other models will be reviewed here.  The final two chapters of the text 
will also be reviewed.  The penultimate chapter addresses applications of ICE that are 
empowering to clients (chapter 10) and the final chapter offers the Pedersen et al.’s 
conclusions about ICE and its place in the field of counseling in general (chapter 11).   
Affective Acceptance.  In the realm of affective acceptance Pedersen et al. review 
four approaches towards cultural difference in counseling: the universalist, the 
particularist, the ethnic-focused, and the both/and approach.  As their names suggest the 
universalist perspective emphasizes the commonalities among all human beings at the 
expense of individual and group-based differences.  Particularist approaches tend to focus 
primarily on individual differences and ignore the universal and the cultural specific.  
Ethnic-focused perspectives treat ethnicity as the key factor which explains variance in 
attitude, beliefs, and thoughts among groups of people.  While the authors acknowledge 
that this approach has been crucial in the development of multicultural psychology, they 
also note that ethnic-focused approaches are undesirable in their tendency to (a) 
homogenize groups that are in reality internally varied and (b) require an extraordinary 
amount of a priori knowledge from the counselor in order to be accurate and useful. 
Consequently, Pedersen et al. endorse the both/and approach.  Here counselors are 
encouraged to acquire knowledge about specific cultures balanced with a stance of not-
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knowing in an attempt to simultaneously try to engage an individual’s universal, culture-
specific, and individual differences simultaneously.  This is in sharp contrast to either-or 
approaches which tend to emphasize one or more of the three while de-emphasizing one 
or more of the others.  “The both/and approach combines the gentle, nonassumptive style 
of not-knowing with the informed, culturally sensitive style of the ethnic-focused 
approach” (p. 65).  
Related to adopting a both/and approach to diversity is Pedersen et al.’s (2008) 
support of an orthogonal or synergistic model of cultural identity (Oetting & Beauvais, 
1990).  For the purposes of counseling their view of culture is that it resides within the 
individual client who has multiple cultural identities simultaneously.  For Pedersen et al. 
cultural identity is not a zero sum construct in which emphasis on one identity need take 
away from another.  Instead culture resides within the client where intrapersonal and 
interpersonal variables intersect and change dynamically. Therefore, cultural identity will 
change as a function of evolving cultural roles over times and shifts in salience from one 
social role to another.  The entirety of cultural identity is synergistic and transcends the 
sum of experiences surrounding each singular cultural identity a client may have.  The 
interaction among these many identities constitutes a person’s cultural identity which 
itself “is also undergoing constant and unpredictable change” (p. 74).  While this 
complex treatment of culture may appear unwieldy, the authors argue that it serves to 
safeguard against an oversimplified approach to a client’s context.   
Several other key points are made in Pedersen et al.’s (2008) discussion of 
Affective Acceptance.  First, while their entire discussion of culture is broad and 
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inclusive, they also seem to posit a hierarchy of privilege (and by implication, a hierarchy 
of oppressions).  Pedersen et al. note that race, gender, and ability privilege tend to 
override or have greater impact than other forms of privilege (e.g., SES, religion, 
affective orientation).  To support this claim they cite the deeply ingrained institutional 
bias against women, people of color, and people with disabilities and the inability of 
people with these forms of oppression to “pass” in the way non-visibly oppressed 
identities can.  Second, Pedersen et al. argue that counselors should make an explicit 
effort to examine the way the client’s religious and spiritual beliefs are approached and 
integrated into treatment.  Their rationale for this is that counseling relationships are 
never without values, and therefore counselors should be consciously aware of their 
orientation towards others’ spirituality.   
Intellectual understanding.  The next step towards ICE is acquiring intellectual 
understanding of key cultural identities.  Pedersen et al. (2008) identify the following 
eleven cultural constructs as essential: race, language, religion and spirituality, gender, 
familial migration history, affectional orientation, age and cohort, physical and mental 
capacities, socioeconomic situation and history, education, and history of traumatic 
experience.  The majority of Pedersen et al.’s chapters 6 and 7 acts as a reference text 
offering the definition, primary characteristics, oppression mechanisms, and ways in 
which each of these eleven groups is situated in the socio-political system of the United 
States.   Specific attention is paid to explaining the institutional barriers against each of 
these groups receiving psychological treatment.  Since this information is available in 
many texts on multicultural counseling and psychology it will not be summarized here.   
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There are two key concepts that do differentiate Pedersen et al.’s (2008) treatment 
of the intellectual component of MCC: convergence and salience.  These two concepts 
serve as a uniting theme for both chapters 6 and 7.  Chapter 6 discusses convergence as a 
core culture identity for each person constituted by the intersection of these eleven 
identity variables.  While each person’s identity is partially contextualized along each of 
the eleven social statuses identified above, different life experiences may cause some to 
be more central than others.  Thus, while everyone has an identity related to race, gender, 
ability status, and so forth, some may identify with race and gender first and foremost.  
For others their history of trauma may be a primary identity in most contexts.  Pedersen 
et al. take the position that even two people who grew up in the same household with 
nearly all the same identity statuses (race, gender, and so forth) may rank order the 
importance of each status differently.  Pedersen et al. posit that the convergence of these 
identities is different for every person.   
Yet running parallel to this relatively stable core convergence of cultural identity 
is the equally important concept of salience, which may or may not be a reflection of 
someone’s core convergent identity.  A person’s awareness of any social status may shift 
from one context to the next with varying frequency.  For example, an African American 
woman working at a an elementary school with a high percentage of Black students and 
faculty may feel most aware of her age and education at work but more aware of race 
when shopping at a department store whose clientele and staff are mostly White.  Yet 
these shifts need not necessarily invalidate her sense that overall her convergent core 
identity is perhaps being a woman survivor of trauma.   Pedersen et al. state that 
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therapists should understand that shifts in salience may occur infrequently over the course 
of a year or multiple times in a single day and that in spite of these shifts a person may 
nevertheless have a stable core convergent cultural identity which itself may evolve over 
time.  Pedersen et al. conclude chapter 7 by noting that more visible oppressed identities 
such as race, gender, and some disabilities tend to be experienced as more salient than 
less visible oppressions.  Further, when oppressions are combined (e.g., Latino and Deaf) 
this may lead to a sense of having a “double tax” (p. 151) and may constitute a lesser 
total amount of relative privilege than those with only one salient oppression which is not 
visibly marked by society.   
Integral Skills.  The third and final component to develop ICE is mobilizing 
counselor affective acceptance and intellectual understanding into a set of integral skills.  
Pedersen et al. (2008), emphasize contextually accurate reflection as the central skill in 
cross-cultural counseling.  Accurate reflections emerge from a three step process.  First, 
the counselor must use their intellectual understanding to accurately (e.g., without 
stereotyping or judgment) reflect back to the client the client’s own thoughts and 
emotions.  Second, once accuracy is determined the therapist must find appropriate labels 
for the client’s thoughts and emotions in a way that is accessible to the client.  Last, the 
therapist then synthesizes the client’s emotional content and contextual facts into an 
overall pattern and uses this pattern to guide selection of appropriate intervention 
strategies.  Pedersen et al. emphasize individual empowerment when selecting 
interventions.  In their opinion, the most inclusive interventions allow the client to both 
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select the outcome for therapy and define the parameters within which it will be 
achieved.  
Pedersen et al. (2008) believe counselors must attend to a client’s inner dialogue 
which is posited to be the conversation among the client’s internalized culture teachers.  
They posit that each of these culture teachers is a form of self and that these multiple 
selves constitute a kind of inner family for each person.  Thus, in order to achieve the 
accurate reflecting described in the paragraph above, a counselor must be able to perceive 
and bring to the surface a client’s inner dialogue.  They recommend the Triad Training 
Model as a mechanism for becoming sensitive to client inner dialogue .   
In addition to the skills of accurate reflection and utilizing inner dialogue, 
Pedersen et al. discuss several other skills they view as integral to successful cross-
cultural counseling. These include (a) drawing distinctions between feelings and the 
meanings associated with them, (b) recovering from mistakes, (c) articulating problems 
from the client’s perspective, (d) recognizing clients’ resistance to the counseling 
process, and (e) overcoming defensiveness towards clients.   
ICE beyond the therapy dyad.  The final two chapters of Pedersen et al. (2008) 
serve to synthesize the nine chapters that preceded them by focusing on two questions.  
First, how can ICE be used with the ultimate goal of empowering clients both within and 
beyond the counseling dyad?  Second, in what ways can ICE contribute to a paradigm 
shift in counseling whereby multiculturalism becomes the center of any helping 
relationship?   
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In discussing increasing clients’ sense of empowerment, Pedersen et al. (2008) 
endorse several positions.  First, they note that in the United States, power generally 
refers to one’s ability to act independently from others’ influence or control.  However, in 
collectivistic societies power may mean an active choice to be influenced by a group.  
Therefore, Pedersen et al. endorse the educational model of counseling which can be 
adapted for both of these forms of empowerment.  In the educational model, clients are 
seen as basically healthy consumers wanting more information, and the counselor’s role 
is to offer new ways of learning.  Pedersen et al. then synthesize concepts discussed in 
earlier chapters as they relate to the themes of empowerment and educational models of 
counseling.  Specifically, they reiterate that a broad and inclusive definition of culture 
empowers individuals with salient identities that do not center on racial or ethnic 
oppression.  In their view, this should also guide counseling policy at large in both 
pedagogy and the institutions in which counseling takes place.  This would lead to the 
empowerment of many oppressed groups rather than a select few.  Ultimately, Pedersen 
et al. view ICE as a mechanism for helping people feel more powerful over their 
problems and by implication more powerful in their social context at large.  Pedersen et 
al. view the goal of counseling as helping clients to function in their own cultural context 
without the counselor’s assistance and that counselors should play a role in helping to 
shape contexts to be more inclusive and pluralistic by engaging in therapy in creative and 
flexible ways such as outside of an office in informal settings.   Also, therapists should 
broaden their professional role by advocating for clients in institutional and societal 
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systems following the American Counseling Association advocacy competencies (Lewis, 
Arnold, House, & Toporek, 2002; Ratts, Toporek, & Lewis, 2010).   
The final chapter addresses the ways psychology as a discipline is moving further 
away from a reductionist approach to reality towards a more ambiguous, complex, and 
contextualized view of the human psyche.  Pedersen et al. (2008) argue that 
multiculturalism challenges the universalist assumptions of many existing psychological 
and psychotherapeutic theories.   At the same time, when context and ambiguity are 
embraced, multiculturalism adds richness and flexibility to these existing models.  
Further, multiculturalism challenges the role of therapist as someone who works only 
with an individual in an office and demands that therapists embrace new roles as 
advocates for clients across individual, institutional, and societal systems.  For Pedersen 
et al. ICE challenges psychology to increase social justice, reexamine its roles and values, 
embrace pluralism, and centralize cultural context as a key component to psychotherapy.   
Critique.  
 Pedersen et al.’s (2008) Inclusive Cultural Empathy: Making relationships central 
in counseling and psychotherapy is one of the most comprehensive attempts to integrate 
an expanded definition of culture into a knowledge, awareness, and skills based model of 
multicultural counseling.  It is broad in scope and offers its readers concrete positions on 
many of the more contentious questions concerning multicultural psychology today.  At 
its core it is a theory of counseling which subsumes both multicultural psychotherapy and 
multicultural competency.  It is designed to be combinatorial with established theoretical 
schools of counseling (e.g., psycho dynamism, humanism, and behaviorism).  The 
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remainder of this section will explore some of the implications of this model and reveal 
some of the unanswered questions it offers. The discussion is organized within the 
framework of the concerns with KA&S approaches to MCC discussed in chapter 2.  
Solution 1: A complex theory of social identities.  One of the major concerns 
outlined in chapter 2 of this dissertation is the absence of a theory to help psychologists 
approach clients as individuals who simultaneously belong to many reference groups.  
ICE successfully centralizes the notion of multiple identities within the same person.  
Pedersen et al. (2008) use the framework of internalized culture teachers and an 
inclusively defined cultural context to ground therapists in the conceptualization of each 
person sitting at the nexus of potentially hundreds of social identities that constantly shift 
and evolve throughout the lifespan or even a single counseling interview.   
There are several benefits to this approach.  First, it constantly guards against 
therapists from using their acquired knowledge of different groups as a stereotype 
through which they understand a client’s behavior.  Instead, counselors are enjoined to 
look at the idiosyncratic meanings each client derives from their various group identities 
and the ways salience can shift among them.  Second, it helps encourage counselors to 
treat cultural membership as a fluid, synergistic, and dynamic part of an individual’s 
complex identity.  Exploring the ways different memberships overlap and encouraging 
counselors to approach cultural experience of the individual this way seems to this author 
to be more likely to reveal a client’s true personal experience of culture.  Counselors are 
thus encouraged to be what we might call idio-ethnographers akin to the auto-
ethnographic research methods in qualitative research (Chang, 2008).   
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Yet in the opinion of this author, the concepts of convergence and salience among 
internalized culture teachers are imprecise and inadequate tools for the proper 
conceptualization of multiple social identities.  While it is undoubtedly true that salience 
shifts from one to another, the authors do not ground their discussion in any systematic 
theory of multiple social identities other than to posit a stable convergence of the 
identities.  This is an excellent start and seems to this author to be a useful conceptual 
tool.  However, it is underdeveloped in detail and leaves open several important 
questions.  What is the difference between rapid shifts in identity salience and 
dissociative fragmented conscious state?  Similarly, the authors say that the voices of 
culture teachers may be more relevant to the client than that of the therapist. Clearly this 
is a metaphor for the influence of prior life history associated with certain identity 
groups, but it seems important to distinguish between hearing culture teachers as 
metaphor and the internal stimuli of psychosis.  Undoubtedly the authors believe that 
intersectionality is sharply different than these two forms of psychopathology, but how 
specifically?   In the opinion of this author, intersectionality needs more of a precise 
theory or language than simply acknowledging multiple roles and giving the therapist the 
impractical, if not impossible mandate to somehow read the clients psyche as its identity 
salience shifts from one group to the next.  In chapter 5 of this dissertation, this author 
will draw from Identity Theory to offer a more precise account of social identities 
(Burke, 2006; Burke & Stets, 2009).   
In sum, this author could not agree more that each person belongs to many social 
identities.  It is also clear that, in order for this awareness to be useful for pinning down 
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details of culture, a more precise theory for conceptualizing the difference between core 
identity, salient cultural identities, and the dynamic relationship between the two is 
necessary.   
Solution 2: A non-hierarchical but idiosyncratic approach to oppression.  The 
ICE model offers at least a partial answer to the problems of a hierarchical emphasis on 
race and ethnicity in the MDCC (D. W. Sue, 2001).   ICE fundamentally rejects the 
notion of a hierarchy of oppressions of cultural identities and advocates for a very broad 
definition of culture.  Indeed, Pedersen et al. (2008) characterize the focus on ethnicity, 
nationality, and the particular interests of a small set of groups in the multicultural 
psychology literature as “narrow” (p. 48 and p. 100).   
Yet defining culture to include such a wide number of groups also has limitations.  
One of the criticisms offered against a broad definition of culture is that the term culture 
might itself become so diffuse as to lose its meaning and eventually become synonymous 
with individual differences.  ICE seems to be vulnerable to this accusation as its 
treatment of culture is highly idiosyncratic.  Pedersen et al. (2008) often describe cultural 
context as taking the form of hundreds of internalized culture teachers which vary for 
each person.  This is different from treating culture as a relatively stable aggregate of 
social beliefs and practices.  In other words, Pedersen et al.’s approach seems to be more 
a theory of contextualized individual differences targeted at each client rather than a 
theory of multiculturalism targeted at the unique values, beliefs, and practices of large 
groups of people.  While the idiosyncratic experience of culture seems most relevant to 
the counseling dyad, one of the purposes of the multicultural movement in politics and 
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psychology is to focus on population oppressions and experiences.  This population focus 
is markedly absent from ICE.     
The consequence of such an idiosyncratic focus is that broad systems 
interventions on behalf of entire groups become a marginal concern.  One of the biggest 
strengths of the D. W. Sue (2001) MDCC is that it mandates psychology break out of its 
focus on individualized, dyadic advocacy and indirect impact on groups.  Instead, 
scholars such as D. W. Sue are of the opinion that psychologists must become active, 
direct advocates for groups on institutional and societal levels.  The ICE model offers a 
relatively brief discussion of systems advocacy centered on the client as individual.  ICE 
does not flesh out the ways advocating for an individual on larger systems levels differs 
from advocating for groups.   
Solution 3: The ongoing problem of moral relativism.  Chapter 2 identified the 
lack of a guiding framework for intracultural oppression and intrapersonal cultural 
identity conflicts as a significant absence in multicultural competency.  Pedersen et al.’s 
(2008) ICE model relies on the concept of balance to guide treatment decisions in such 
situations.   
ICE has a very particular position on what constitutes appropriate work with the 
fictional example of Ron which opened this dissertation.  The reader will recall that Ron 
is a gay, Asian American, Christian male struggling with career and sexual identity 
issues.  From an ICE perspective, the best approach for Ron is to work with him to 
explore the imbalances among his multiple salient identities which in his case are likely 
his religious, familial, ethnic, and sexual orientation identities.  Not only is the 
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counselor’s job to explore the dissonance among them without being obliged to offer a 
stance in favor of any identity in particular, the counselor should also remain open to the 
position that reducing the dissonance among them may not be the best goal for therapy.  
Here then we have the opposite extreme of some of the worst universalist tendencies of 
which psychology has historically been guilty.  It seems fair to say that in contemporary 
mainstream psychology, a therapist would be unlikely to tell Ron his sexuality is deviant 
and prescribe treatment for his “diagnosis” of homosexuality.  Yet it may be no better to 
simply explore the many tensions with Ron and allow him to find his own solution which 
could range from rejecting his sexual orientation entirely to simply embracing an 
unresolved, ambiguous self-contradictory identity.  While deciding absolutely what is 
right for clients seems inappropriate in contemporary practice so too does the avoidance 
of any opinion about resolving intrapersonal identity conflict.  Indeed many clients 
present asking for help and guidance in resolving such tensions.  Additionally, there are 
many studies confirming that among Asian populations a more directive style of 
psychotherapy may be expected and ultimately more efficacious (S. W-H. Chen & 
Davenport, 2005).  Thus, while balance may honor idiosyncrasy it may also be 
antagonistic to individuals from many groups that seek a more directive, prescriptive, and 
guiding style from a therapist.  In a way, the notion of balance without a mandate to 
resolve tensions among identities is itself a form of value encapsulation which may prove 
as much a deterrent for groups wanting direction as non-multiculturally oriented 
treatment approaches.  
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There is also no discussion of how counselors are to negotiate the moral 
challenges of within group oppressions when it comes to systems advocacy. While 
helping individuals with many complex identities come to their own conclusions seems 
like a pragmatic approach to intrapersonal identity conflict, simply reflecting back social 
imbalances to society at large does not seem like an efficacious or meaningful extension 
of Pedersen et al.’s (2008) model.  Thus, while ICE offers us at least some guidance on 
how individuals with internal conflict might be helped to find balance, it offers 
counselors no useful guidance on negotiating intergroup and intragroup moral conflicts 
on systems levels.  If therapists do take up D. W. Sue’s (2001) charge for group advocacy 
at the societal level, they will have to face tough questions on which groups to advocate 
for and why.  This is particularly true when psychologists expertise is sought by 
lawmakers and community advocacy groups on such charged dilemmas as gay marriage, 
sex education, immigration reform, and social welfare funding. Thus, for counselors to be 
successful at social advocacy, they must have at least some guiding principles for 
critiquing and coming to conclusions among these tensions.  ICE, nor any other model of 
multicultural counseling this author has been able to find, has yet provided such 
principles let alone acknowledge their necessity. 
In summary ICE offers the reader a non-hierarchical inclusive approach to 
oppression and social identity and takes the position of engendering balance in the face of 
intrapersonal cultural conflict.  However, this expanded theory of multicultural 
counseling does not adequately address intragroup oppression, the limits of cultural 
relativism, and ultimately does not synthesize these principles into a theory of group 
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advocacy.  Indeed, Pedersen et al. (2008) could be conceptualized as a pragmatic but 
ultimately individualist and relativistic approach to cultural complexity.   
Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was twofold.  First, the chapter offers a broad 
overview of some of the theoretical and political currents surrounding the concept of 
multiplicity since 1991.  Second, the chapter examined the extent to which multicultural 
psychology itself has addressed the concerns outlined in chapter 2 regarding hierarchies 
of oppressions, moral relativism, and multiple intrapersonal cultural identities.   
As has been shown, the concerns outlined in chapter 2 have indeed been noticed 
and taken up within the multicultural psychology literature.  Intragroup variance and 
intersecting identities for the same person are topics that receive a great deal of attention.  
There seems to be a growing emphasis on inclusive definitions of culture.  Racial and 
ethnic identities and groups now stand alongside groups such as gender, disability, age 
status, men, White identities, and even size (Cornish et al., 2010).  In other words, the 
field does indeed seem to be expanding its approach to multicultural counseling beyond 
an emphasis on race and ethnicity to include nearly any social identity, oppressed or 
privileged alike, that one can imagine.   
Yet the question of how to protect a space for each of these identities and to 
ensure that people remain attentive to race and ethnicity seems to have been dropped.  
The attention towards multiple social identities within the same person seems to have 
pushed the question towards the margin.  In other words, since people belong to many 
identities at once, there seems to be less pull for focusing on race and ethnicity as an 
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emphasis within multicultural competency and clinical multicultural psychology.  While 
it is true that people belong to many social identity groups, it appears that psychology 
now treats any of these as a cultural identity, leaving open the question of what culture 
really means.  Certainly in reviewing works such as Hays (2008), Pedersen et al. (2008), 
and Cornish et al. (2010) culture has become a very large tent that includes nearly any 
social identity or context the intersection of which becomes idiosyncratic.  In other 
words, the fears of some early multicultural scholars that expanding the definition of 
culture would eventually lead to individual differences seems to have become a reality.  
Additionally, there is little answer to how the field should respond to the limits of cultural 
relativism.   
Ultimately, while psychology has begun to notice and discuss the concerns 
outlined in chapter 2, it is clear from the review in the current chapter that the answers 
remain inadequate.  It must also be emphasized that works attending to multiplicity have 
been focused on pedagogy, broad theoretical concepts, and applied multicultural 
counseling approaches.  They have not yet altered existing approaches to multicultural 
counseling competency in a significant way.  In other words, multiplicity seems to have 
attempted to simply fit itself into existing theories of multicultural competency rather 
than offering a significant alteration, expansion, and evolution of those theories 
themselves.    
Accordingly, Part II of this dissertation will expand on the field’s extant resources 
for handling the concerns outlined in chapter 2 of this dissertation by drawing upon the 
literatures of political philosophy, social psychology, and anthropology.  Chapters 4-6 
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will systematically examine the question of finding an inclusive but non-idiosyncratic 
approach to culture, a theory of intercultural evaluation, and a more precise theory of 
social identity.      
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Part II. Preliminary Answers to Three Core Questions 
At this point, multiculturalists who have been champing at the bit will 
object that this is not what multiculturalism is all about. It is not about tribalism, 
corruption, or patronage systems either in the United States or elsewhere. It is 
certainly not about female genital mutilation, violence, or crime. It is about the 
rich mosaic of people of all different colors interacting peacefully while 
maintaining their traditions within cohesive ethnic communities. It is, above all, 
voluntary—not a matter of being "locked in" or "locked out" but about celebrating 
ethnic identity and diversity. It is, in other words, a fantasy. 
Therefore, before going any further, it is worth getting clear about what 
multiculturalism is. (Baber, 2008, p. 32-33) 
 
Controversy at the 2005 National Multicultural Conference and Summit  
The April, 2005 issue of the APA Division 17 Newsletter includes a special 
section entitled “Stronger Together: Increasing Understanding through Diverse 
Perspectives” .  In the introduction to this special section Happner  summarized some 
controversial events at the 2005 National Multicultural Conference and Summit (NMCS).  
Happner explained that despite many positive moments, the NMCS included a 
symposium on conversion therapy for the LGBT population which proved highly 
distressing.  The presentation was shocking not only to conference attendees but also to 
NMCS organizers since the actual content of the presentation on conversion therapy 
contradicted the content implied by its title (i.e., Clinical implications for managing the 
coming out process).  Emotions ran high in the aftermath of the presentation.  Feelings of 
betrayal and pain were expressed both at a Difficult Dialogue session and the NMCS’s 
closing Town Hall meeting.  These same expressions were received by some as (a) 
blaming the Summit Coordinators who were four people of color, (b) silencing of people 
of color, and (c) critical of people of color.  In short, a misleading title allowed the entry 
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of an offensive symposium which recreated a heterosexist trauma on LGBT attendees and 
allies.  The LGBT community’s consequent expression of pain left many people of color 
with a parallel experience: the recreation of racism.   
These events led Thomas Parham to write a piece summarizing his reactions to 
the events outlined above which he requested be republished in the newsletters of APA 
Divisions 17, 35, 44, and 45.  Parham  notes that 80-90 percent of the remarks at the 
NMCS’s Town Hall meeting focused on the offending conversion therapy symposium 
which had occurred the preceding evening.  Parham states that the proposal’s author 
showed “questionable professional practice” (p. 19) by submitting such a controversial 
proposal, failing to show up, and allowing two graduate students to defend his assertions 
in his stead.   
Parham (2005) uses the remainder of his piece to respond to three major concerns 
he had related to the “content and the process dynamics they [GLBT members] used at 
the summit town hall meeting to voice their concerns” (p. 19).  First, Parham states that 
the insistence by the GLBT community that the organizers should have retracted the 
conversion therapy symposium is misplaced.  Arguing that censorship is no answer, 
Parham states that the NMCS should be an open forum where each person has a right to 
have their opinion and viewpoint heard and respected no matter how much others may 
oppose such positions.  In Parham’s view, since the NMCS belongs to no one group, its 
organizers should not yield to any single division’s demands on the grounds of political 
correctness.   
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Second, Parham (2005) critiques the degree of emotional intensity taken by 
LGBT participants following the symposium.  He argues that to characterize the NMCS 
as unwelcoming and unsafe is both an exaggerated response to a single offending 
symposium.  Further, in Parham’s view such exaggerations dishonor the efforts made by 
NMCS organizers to ensure LGBT affirming content was included throughout the 
NMCS.  Additionally, Parham questions the credibility of claims of serious emotional 
injury since the leaders of the offending one-hour presentation were two unlicensed, un-
degreed graduate students.   
Finally, Parham (2005) expresses mixed reactions to the deferential and 
apologetic tone the NMCS organizers took during the Town Hall meeting.  On the one 
hand, Parham states that many empathized with the anger expressed by the LGBT 
attendees.  However, Parham states that he became angry for different reasons as he saw 
the organizers apologize when the organizers themselves had done nothing wrong.  
Parham characterizes the behavior at the Town Hall meeting as the “essence of a White 
supremacist ideology and a White privilege mentality” (p. 20) where individuals used 
verbal whips to invalidate a multicultural agenda.  “The summit organizers are not your 
‘slaves’! I'm sure it was no one's intent to communicate such a message, but this is how I 
perceived it, and I suspect others did as well” (p. 20).   Parham concludes by stating that 
to be successful future NMCS meetings will require (a) tolerance of different views, (b) 
less competition among NMCS’s constituent groups, (c) less of a mandate on political 
correctness, and (d) greater respect for the process.  
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Unsurprisingly, Parham’s piece itself engendered varied reactions in each of APA 
Division 17, 35, 44, and 45’s respective newsletters.  The Society for the Psychology of 
Women chose not to reprint Dr. Parham’s letter taking the position that it was not the best 
way to move toward unity and coalition building across all oppressions (The Presidents 
of Division 35, , 2005).  Additionally, the Division 35 response emphasized concern at 
any attempt to counterpoise racism and homophobia noting that oppression systems are 
not discrete.  The Division 44 response offered a surprised reaction to Dr. Parham’s piece 
and stated that it could give readers an inaccurate picture of the events at the NMCS final 
Town Hall meeting (Executive Committee of Division 44, , 2005).  The Division 44 
response also noted that it was not only White attendees who shared offended reactions at 
the Town Hall and that care should be taken not to reinforce LGBT issues as something 
predominantly related to Whites.  The Division 45 response noted that what Dr. Parham 
interpreted as White LGBT’s seizing control of the dialogue could also have been 
interpreted as “an opportunity for much needed exchange and sharing” .  Additionally, 
Division 45’s response noted that if the dialogue continued to be treated as White LGBT 
against People of Color an environment would be recreated wherein LGBT People of 
Color would unfairly have to choose sides.   
Discussion.  Part II of this project begins with a quote from Baber (2008) who 
believes that when multiculturalism is conceived as a harmonious cohesion of all 
different viewpoints and traditions it becomes nothing more than a fantasy.  The events of 
the 2005 NMCS and the discussions following illustrate just how fragile the cohesion 
across differing oppressed life experiences can be.  When experiences of injury collide, 
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and accusations of homophobia, racism, and other prejudice are made the very coalitions 
that meetings like the NMCS are designed to build seem all too tenuous.  It is to such 
moments that this project responds.   
Thomas Parham (2005) suggests that it would be shameful to exclude 
conservative Christian views opposing homosexuality from the NMCS on the grounds 
that (a) each individual has a right to be heard, (b) each view should be respected, (c) no 
one group should dictate inclusion/exclusion of summit material, and (d) airing different 
views constitutes a valuable learning opportunity.  Further, he argues that excluding 
Christian views which oppose homosexuality amounts to a shameful act of mandating 
political correctness instead of legitimate academic discourse.   
It seems inaccurate to characterize calls for excluding views hostile to LGBT 
identity as simply a matter of political correctness.  Such views and opinions lead to 
concrete policies such as denying LGBT People the chance to serve in the military openly 
or benefits to their partners if they work for the federal government.  These are mild in 
light of events in early 2010 when serious efforts were mounted in Uganda, with support 
of United States Christian organizations, to make homosexuality a capital offense 
(Gettleman, 2010).  In light of such realities, one sees that moral views hostile to LGBT 
identities are much more than a simple matter of opinion.  When these moral positions 
guide policy and law, they become a measurable and concrete matter of human dignity, 
worth, and at times survival.  Accordingly, opposition to their expression is a defense of 
the dignity and equal moral worth of LGBT identified people.    
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The NMCS 2005 controversies demonstrate why developing answers to the key 
concerns generated in chapters 1 through 3 is not just an abstract intellectual exercise.  As 
a professional and scholarly practice psychology must have guiding principles that can 
help us determine what moral positions and treatment approaches are or are not welcome 
at a diversity conference.   We must be able to determine when the threshold where 
respect for different opinions ends and tacit collusion with oppression begins.  Above all, 
we need to determine to what degree all opinions and views truly merit respect and what 
the consequences are if we choose to allow anything whatsoever to into our discourse.   It 
seems to this author that unless such positions can be taken, our only option will be a 
perennial “dialogue” which satisfies people’s desire to speak and be heard, but has little 
efficacy for generating moral principles, standards, and guidelines for guiding our 
professional and scholarly practice.  In other words, if we embrace all viewpoints as 
equally valid we will have indeed achieved nothing more than embracing the fantasy of 
which Baber is so rightly contemptuous.   
Without the ability to determine which viewpoints should and should not 
determine policy, the alliances between oppressed groups within our profession will 
indeed have little efficacy for social change.  Therefore, the answers to the questions 
posed in chapters 1 through 3 are much more than rhetorical.   The next three chapters 
will explore each in turn.  Chapter 4 will offer a position on what should be meant by the 
word culture in psychology.  Building on this definition, chapter 5 will begin by fleshing 
out differences between multicultural and recognition theories of politics in an attempt to 
offer a new concept for understanding work with diverse social identities.  Chapter 5 will 
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also discuss how an expanded model of self can be marshaled to offer practitioners and 
scholars alike a more precise language for discussing the multiple cultural and social 
identities within the same person.  Finally, chapter 6 will offer a position on why 
psychologists not only should but must have the tools for critiquing cultural beliefs and 
practices and explore one method of intercultural evaluation.  Throughout these chapters, 
the implications for transforming D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC will be reviewed.  In this 
way, a new more contemporary model for diversity competency, what this author shall 




Chapter 4. Pinning Down Culture: A Semantic Deconstruction 
Like most central concepts, such as democracy, citizenship, or liberal 
education, the concept of culture is embroiled in the politics of the discipline and 
receives different definitions in the context of distinct projects of social analysis. 
(Rosaldo, 2006, p. x) 
 
The wide ranging review of multicultural counseling competency and 
multicultural psychology literature throughout chapters 2 and 3 highlighted the varied 
meanings of “culture” within our field.  At times it seems that the prototypes of culture 
are national origin, beliefs, practices, customs, and so forth.  At other times culture would 
seem to include nearly every social identity whether oppressed or privileged.  
Additionally, some authors seem to use the term broadly and include a variety of 
meanings for culture within the same text (Pedersen, 1999; Pedersen et al., 2008).  This 
definitional variance and lack of precision is not only a challenge in contemporary 
psychology, but in a wide range of scholarly fields (J. R. Baldwin, Faulkner, Hecht, & 
Lindsley, 2006).  In addition to identifying the murky variance among definitions of 
culture within counseling psychology, chapter 2 reviewed compelling arguments both in 
favor of and against defining culture broadly.   
This chapter will take up a position on the first of this project’s three primary 
questions: How does one acknowledge all forms of oppression on the one hand while also 
not deluding the special concerns and variables associate with race and ethnicity on the 
other?  Most of all how does one not fall into the bramble in which our current theories 
find themselves, that is, defining culture broadly in theory only to systematically 
emphasize race and ethnicity in practice?  To answer these questions, the chapter will 
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first systematically deconstruct the word culture and identify its core meanings.  Second, 
the author will present an overview of Parekh’s (2006) theory of culture and explore its 
implications for multicultural psychologists.   
The chapter will conclude by synthesizing the themes of this discussion into a 
concrete position in support of a two part solution to the problem of inclusive versus 
exclusive definitions of culture.  It is this author’s position that the best solution for 
multicultural psychologists is to cease using culture as a term which encompasses all 
social identities.  In other words, psychology should first endorse a restricted and 
exclusive definition of culture in which the prototypical statuses would be race, ethnicity, 
and national origin.  The second part of this solution, consequently, is that psychology 
must create a new umbrella term that would include all social identities (including 
culture) when addressing broad issues of social justice and oppression.  The implications 
of this two part solution will be discussed alongside an analysis of its advantages and 
disadvantages.  
A Review of Culture’s Meaning Across Disciplines 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) created a landmark work in the examination of 
what exactly is meant by the word culture in their text Culture: A critical review of 
concepts and definitions.  This text is still considered by many to be a seminal moment in 
naming the contestation and debate concerning this term’s many nuances.  Kroeber and 
Kluckholm arrived at what they believed to be a definition of culture which encompassed 
six different themes they discovered in their review of over 150 definitions across 
disciplines.  This definition has since gained wide acceptance within the academy and has 
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long been admired for its rigorous foundation in both historical semantics (illustrated in 
Figure 4.1) and the meanings culture held 1952 across a wide range of contexts (J. 
Baldwin, Faulkner, Hecht, & Pickell, 2006).   Kroeber and Kluckhohn hoped that the 
following definition would assist in a convergence of culture’s many meanings and thus 
allow for a consensus on the term across disciplines.  
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior 
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of 
human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of 
culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and 
especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be 
considered as products of action, on the other’s action (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 
1952, p. 181).  
As the psychology literature demonstrates, the fifty years that followed Kroeber 
and Kluckhohn’s book would mean the opposite of their hope.  The meanings and 
definitions of culture have not only failed to converge across and within disciplines, they 
have become more numerous and contested.  This led Baldwin, Faulkner, Hecht, and 
Lindsley (2006) to offer Redefining Culture: Perspectives across the disciplines which 
represents a contemporary update to Kroeber and Kluckholm.  Baldwin et al. reviewed 
313 definitions of culture which resulted in seven primary themes which are summarized 
in Table 4.1.   
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Figure 4.1 Summary of culture’s historical meaning from Baldwin et al. (2006).  From 
“A Moving Target: The Illusive Definition of Culture” by J. R. Baldwin, S. L. Faulkner, 
and M. L. Hecht, 2006, Redefining Culture: Perspectives across the disciplines  (p. 5), 
edited by J. R. Baldwin, S. L. Faulkner, M. L. Hecht, and S. L. Lindsley, 2006. Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  Copyright 2006 by the Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. Reprinted with permission.  
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Table 4.1  
Baldwin et al.’s (2006) Themes for Definitions of Culture  
Theme Definitions Focusing Upon 
Structure / 
Pattern 
Culture as a system or framework of elements (e.g., symbols, beliefs, 
behavioral norms, political systems, language, but also an arbitrary 
structure created by researchers to group people together)  
Function Culture as a tool towards some end (e.g., survival, gaining shared sense 
of meaning/identity, controlling individuals and groups) 
Process The ongoing structure of culture. Culture is both a verb and a noun (e.g., 
transmitting ways of life, differentiating groups)   
Products Artifacts (e.g., art, architecture, historical records, technologies) 
Refinement Development of the mind,  study of perfection, moral progress (e.g., the 
civilized versus the savage) 
Power / 
Ideology 
Group based power (e.g., dominant/hegemonic culture, critical 
definitions, postmodern definitions)  
Group 
Membership 
Country of origin, identity groups (e.g., sexual/gender identity, political 
affiliation, avocation) socioeconomic status/class 
Note: The above is summarized from Baldwin et al.. (2006)  
 
Baldwin et al. (2006) depart significantly from Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) in 
their approach to synthesizing the seven definitional themes above.  Whereas Kroeber 
and Kluckholm eventually offered a single synthesized definition for culture, Baldwin et 
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al. reject the construction of a singular definition for culture.  Baldwin et al. believe that 
attempting to unite the diverse themes in contemporary definitions of the term would 
only lead to an inaccurate and inadequate conclusion.  Indeed, their choice of title for 
their third chapter, “The (In)Conclusion of the Matter: Shifting Signs and Models of 
Culture” aptly illustrates the term culture as an unfixed and ambiguous construct.  For 
Baldwin et al. culture has no singular definition but is instead a semantic vessel with each 
field filling it with a different meaning or set of meanings.  Culture is not a singular 
construct but is instead a language symbol with its meaning grouping around seven major 
themes.  These themes may overlap, cluster, or be mutually exclusive depending upon 
one’s viewpoint.  Baldwin et al. therefore offer scholars two choices for understanding 
culture.  First, scholars may satisfy themselves by simply recognizing culture’s seven 
identified themes and treat each theme as separate from the others.  However, Baldwin et 
al. believe this is as limited a framework for viewing culture as a two-dimensional 
photograph is for viewing three-dimensional space.  For Baldwin et al. the seven themes 
are constitutive and impossible to tease apart except in the abstract.  Baldwin et al. 
therefore offer a more complex alternative: a model of culture which accounts for and 
integrates all seven semantic themes.   
Accordingly, Baldwin et al. (2006) go on to offer a variety of three-dimensional 
models (i.e., holographic instead of photographic) illustrating the relationship among 
culture’s seven themes.   To start, they point out that while the themes are 
interpenetrating, they nonetheless seem to group together into three sets or clusters.  The 
first set includes the three themes of (a) structure, (b) function, and (c) process.  For 
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Baldwin et al. the themes in the first set are the broadest and can combine with all 
remaining themes.  In other words, these three themes give rise to the remaining four.  
The second set is comprised of power/ideology and group membership definitions. These 
are linked by virtue of their more contemporary status in scholarly literature, particularly 
in postmodern critical theory.  The themes of set two can also be combined with one 
another and the definitions in the first set and can even be treated as core themes giving 
rise to all others.  Last, the third set includes the themes of products and refinement. The 
themes of set three cannot combine with all definitions in the first two sets and overlap 
most with the themes in set one.  Further, the themes of product and refinement represent 
a more historical conception of culture reaching back prior to the 1950s (see culture’s 
historical meanings illustrated in Figure 4.1). 
There are several ways to model the relationship between sets.  The atom model, 
shown in Figure 4.2, treats set one as a sort of nucleus or center around which the themes 
from sets two and three revolve.   Baldwin et al. (2006) also offer a three-sided pyramid 
model in which all three sets are structurally linked but none is treated as central and a 
layered model in which each set is placed upon the other in an equal fashion.  Baldwin et 
al. ultimately do not endorse any of these three-dimensional models restating their 
position that culture is “…an empty sign that everyday actors—and social scientists—fill 
with meaning. Culture, as a signifier, can be understood only in the context of its use” (p. 





Figure 4.2.  Atom model of culture by Hecht, Baldwin, and Faulkner (2006).  From “The 
(In)Conclusion of the Matter: Shifting Signs and Models of Culture” by M. L. Hecht, J. 
R. Baldwin, and S. L. Faulkner, 2006, Redefining Culture: Perspectives across the 
disciplines  (p. 69), edited by J. R. Baldwin, S. L. Faulkner, M. L. Hecht, and S. L. 
Lindsley, 2006. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  Copyright 2006 by the 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Reprinted with permission. 
   
Locating Psychology’s Place in the Semantic Debate 
Baldwin et al.’s (2006) seven themes offer a rich and unique toolkit for 
deconstructing what culture has come to mean in the multicultural competency literature.  
This section will therefore frame the evolution of culture in MCC theories through the 
lens of Baldwin et al. 
Returning to the works reviewed in chapter 2, we can understand the rise of the 
entire multicultural psychology literature and subsequent MCC models as a response to 
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imbalances of social power.  In other words, the multicultural counseling movement can 
be understood as a response to the theme of power/ideology in American culture at large.  
Specifically, authors began to name the ways members of specific marginalized groups 
were systematically disenfranchised and dehumanized by psychology throughout most of 
the twentieth century (Jones, 1997; McFadden, 1976; D. W.  Sue et al., 1982; D. W. Sue 
& D. Sue, 1977; Wrenn, 1962).  This gave rise to models of MCC that focus on the theme 
of power/ideology as centered around the theme of group membership especially groups 
categorized by racial and ethnic status (Mollen et al., 2003; Ridley & Kleiner, 2003; D. 
W. Sue, 2001; D. W. Sue et al., 1992; D. W.  Sue et al., 1982).  Thus, we see that in MCC 
the first set of themes which link together for culture are power/ideology and group 
membership.  While Baldwin et al. (2006) also linked these themes, their review saw 
them as generally of secondary importance.  In the case of multicultural psychology, 
power/ideology and group membership form the core themes of culture around which all 
other themes revolve.   
The response MCC guidelines offer to the power imbalances centering on group 
membership consist of concrete guidelines for engaging with the themes of (a) process, 
(b) function, and (c) structure of a given culture.  It is thought that if counselors have 
knowledge, awareness, and corresponding skills designed to respond to the ways their 
clients’ culture is structured and functions differently from the counselor’s own, this will 
help correct the ideology/power disparities between the two groups.  Thus, the theoretical 
definition of culture for MCC rests primarily upon group membership, while the 
operational definition of culture centers upon the structural, functional, and process 
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aspects of culture.  This makes tremendous sense given psychology’s heavy reliance on 
behaviorism and logical positivism (Bishop, 2007; Rosenberg, 2008).  The structural and 
functional aspects of culture lend themselves particularly well to empirical study.  D. W. 
Sue et al. (1982) position paper is the perfect example of the empirically centered 
solution (i.e., knowledge, awareness, and skills) to an identified theoretical problem (i.e., 
power imbalance between groups).  It should also be noted that one of the great strengths 
of investigating and reporting results on the structure and function of minority cultures is 
that such results (a) dramatically illustrate power disparities between groups, (b) give rise 
to evidence of unconscious prejudice that is more difficult for privileged people to 
rationalize or reject than qualitative or anecdotal evidence, and (c) are very accessible in 
both pedagogical texts and in the classroom.    
Yet alongside these strengths, feminist, womanist, and other psychologists and 
scholars have aptly pointed to the enormous distance that can exist between structural 
norms for a social group as a whole and the ways those norms structure the lives of each 
individual within said group.  In other words, KA&S models of MCC tend to rely on 
group norms about values, behavioral expectations, and so forth to help make therapy 
more useful and relevant to individual members of those groups.  Yet at the individual 
level, the relevance of these group norms can vary so greatly that the knowledge, 
awareness, and skills of a group’s structure may have no relevant bearing on the 
individual client’s case.  Indeed, when intersecting identities are considered, the norms of 
some of a client’s group identities may prove antagonistic to the norms of other group 
identities within the same person.  Thus, while the group norm based MCC models are 
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highly efficient pedagogical tools, they offer little practical value unless great attention is 
paid to teaching students to integrate the many cultural group structures impacting a 
single person.  This is evidenced by chapters 13 through 26 of D. W. Sue and D. Sue’s 
(2008) Counseling the Culturally Diverse.  Each of these chapters offers information on 
specific populations such as African Americans, women, and persons with disabilities.  
At the end of each chapter, the reader is frequently reminded that it is ultimately up to 
them to use their judgment as to the relative fit between the information about a group 
contained in a chapter and the individuals with whom the reader works from each group.  
In terms of therapists of color, clients are aware of the ethnic difference, 
and bringing it up in a routine manner deals with the ‘elephant in the room.’  
However, therapists need to use their clinical judgment to determine when it 
might be contraindicated (p. 327).   
While this is an important starting point, even the best clinical judgment of fit will 
not help the counselor negotiate the ways multiple group structures impact each 
individual.  In other words, while discrete models of MCC are valid for the groups they 
describe, their validity with regard to individuals varies tremendously both as a function 
of within group diversity but also the interaction of one group identity with another.   
This is where the theorists in chapter 3 enter the dialogue and attempt to refocus 
attention on the validity (or lack thereof) of group membership characteristics as they 
relate to individuals within each group.  Whereas discrete models of MCC focus 
primarily on power imbalances and hegemonic ideologies between large identity 
categories, intersectional or expanded views of cultural competence attend to hegemony 
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both between and within each group (Anthias, 2002; Diamond, 2005; Enns & Forrest, 
2005a; McDowell & Fang, 2007; Reynolds & Pope, 1991; Vera, 2009).  Whereas the 
discrete competency models of chapter 2 easily give rise to concrete policy changes and 
specific ways to approach an entire population, the theories of chapter 3 offer an 
idiosyncratic approach to the diverse client that is simultaneously accurate but also 
vague.  Enns and Forrest (2005) state that teaching an integrated feminism and 
multicultural perspective involves facilitators “efforts to occupy multiple places, to 
explore contradictions and ambiguities within and between perspectives and identities, 
and to explore flexible ways of integrating or foregrounding various aspects of their 
identities” .   Such ambiguities are the reality of lived human experience, but they are not 
easily taught to trainees and they leave policy committees with few practical tools when 
planning outreach to entire groups.   
To review then, the works explored in chapters 2 and 3 both arise from the 
power/ideology theme of culture and center their discourse upon the group membership 
theme of culture.  Power/ideology and group membership are identified as set one for 
multicultural psychology’s definition of culture.  The theories in chapters 2 and 3 are best 
distinguished by their respective focus in the power/ideology theme.  Whereas discrete 
MCC models focus on oppression between groups, interactional models focus on 
oppression both between and within groups and even within the same person.  
Accordingly, the solutions arising from discrete models tend to be concrete, accessible, 
and population focused whereas interactional models yield idiosyncratic, murky, and 
complex solutions that more closely mirror the complexity of living with multiple social 
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identities.  In other words, discrete models seem most valid when designing policies for 
working with entire groups of people whereas interactional models seem to offer the most 
utility for working with individuals who belong to many groups.  Neither discrete nor 
interactional models spend a great deal of time discussing Baldwin et al.’s (2006) third 
set culture definition themes, refinement and products.  Multicultural psychology focuses 
most on refinement and products in discussions of the ways oppressed groups are denied 
access to the accumulation of both of these parts of culture.  Additionally, the theme of 
refinement also relates to the pathologizing or denigrating of value systems different from 
those of the dominant culture.   
Baldwin et al.’s (2006) themes also help frame the debate over how culture should 
be defined in multicultural psychology (i.e., race and ethnicity  foremost or all social 
identities equally represented).   Here again this seems to center both on the themes of 
group membership and power/ideology.  First, the debate concerns: What significantly 
constitutes a group from the standpoint of culture?  If we understand a membership 
within a cultural group as falling along lines of self-regenerating systems of beliefs, 
practices, and ways of life often linked to geographic location and unique social history, 
then ethnicity, race, national origin, and perhaps religion seem to be the prototypes of 
culture.  If one accepts this view, then a definition emphasizing these criteria is preferred.  
However, since the multicultural psychology movement arose from concerns about 
hegemony towards non-privileged identities, others have argued that any group that can 
be identified as systematically privileged or oppressed in the contemporary United States 
should be included in the word culture.  In this way, multicultural psychology not only 
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responds to power imbalance in the United States as a whole, multicultural psychology is 
itself trying to respond to its own internal ideologically based power struggle.   
As noted in chapter 2, it is this author’s opinion that there is no satisfying way to 
unite the restricted versus expanded positions on culture.  There are unique, measurable 
patterns of belief and custom that can be identified using a more restricted definition of 
culture.  When culture means any oppressed or privileged social group, such unique 
histories and concerns are rendered invisible.  The reverse is also true, if culture can be 
restricted to race and ethnicity whenever it is convenient for an author, conference 
organizing committee, or APA position paper, the voices of individuals within racial and 
ethnic communities who have multiple oppressions are weakened as are the voices of 
other entire communities who are oppressed.   
The second half of this chapter will offer a preliminary solution to this problem.  
First, an overview of Parekh’s (2006) theory of culture will be offered.  Second, the 
author will build upon Parekh’s theory to suggest that psychology adopt a definition of 
culture such as Parekh’s that focuses on set two of Baldwin et al.’s (2006) themes (i.e., 
structure, function, and process).  As part of this policy recommendation, the author will 
discuss the benefits and limitations of adopting a more restricted definition of culture and 
its implications for transforming D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC.   
Parekh Part I: A Structural, Functional, and Process-Based Theory of Culture  
Parekh (2006)  offers his own theory of political multiculturalism which will be 
integrated throughout the remaining chapters of this document.  His theory as a whole is 
built from the ground up starting first with a theory of humans leading to a broader theory 
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of culture.  In his theory of humans Parekh argues that there is a universal set of human 
capacities of which any given person or culture can develop only a small group. These 
capacities constitute a pluralistic human nature in which different sets of specific human 
abilities are selected for development through the lenses of culture and individual 
difference.  In his theory of culture, Parekh states that cultures have no specific essence, 
are of only tentative stability, and incapable of being understood through any reductionist 
list of normative or mean-based characteristics.  Instead, cultures themselves are 
dynamic, internally plural, and in a constant-state intracultural dialogue.   
Theory of humans.  Parekh’s (2006) theory of humans centers on what he calls a 
three part minimal definition of human nature.  One of the primary flaws of many 
political philosophies and ideologies is taking one of two extreme and untenable positions 
on human nature.  Some theories are based upon the assumption that the construct of 
human nature is knowable, universal, and comprised of specific qualities.  In such 
philosophies culture simply rests upon human nature as its foundation and holds little 
influence upon what constitutes humanity.  The other extreme holds that human beings 
are culturally determined and there is no such thing as any consistent human nature.  
Parekh offers a synthesis of the two positions.  He states that human beings have a 
universal nature insofar as they share a collection of species specific biological, 
cognitive, and emotional characteristics.  With the exception of certain disabilities, it is 
self evident that within the nature of all human beings is the capacity for desires, a wide 
range of emotions and thoughts, a distinct range of corporeal characteristics (e.g., internal 
organs, the need for oxygen), physical abilities, and so on. These potentials are not social 
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or cultural derivatives; all humans share them by virtue of their psychological and 
physiological constitution.  Parekh calls this universal human nature.  Yet while all 
humans may have the capacity for religious devotion, for the construction of myths, and 
to spend energy in self-reflection, not all humans do these things.  Thus, a minimal 
definition of human nature is somewhat abstract and non-specific.  It posits universal 
human properties and capacities and states that all human beings can achieve these 
capacities under certain conditions.  However, to remain accurate at the universal level, 
there can be no specific core set of human capacities.  Universal descriptions of human 
nature can only be accurate in a language of imprecise potentiality.   
Parekh (2006) also states that, in order to cope and navigate their lives, human 
beings require a relatively stable social environment.  This is where culturally derived 
human nature enters.  Cultures influence their members’ selection and regulation of these 
many universal capacities.  Culture acts as a filter helping to reduce the specific content 
of human nature from a near infinite number of skills, emotions, and styles into a smaller 
and more manageable set of choices for its members.  It offers conventions with regard to 
which human capacities (e.g., athleticism, religious devotion, child care, and so forth.) 
are most valuable.  These conventions become institutional and are often reproduced with 
varying degrees of change over successive generations.  In Parekh’s  (2006) own words: 
Cultures are not superstructures built upon identical and unchanging 
foundations, or manifestations of a common human essence, but unique human 
creations that reconstitute and give different meaning and orientation to those 
properties that all human beings share in common, add new ones of their own, and 
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give rise to different kinds of human beings. Since human beings are culture-
creating and capable of creative self-transformation, they cannot passively inherit 
a shared nature in the same way that animals do. (p. 122) 
The third and final level according to Parekh’s theory is individual human nature 
sometimes called character.  Individuals, apart from their universal capacities and 
culturally contextualized practices, also have the ability to shape themselves in 
fundamental ways.  An individual who chooses to develop a profound adherence to a 
self-created system of spiritual beliefs may feel so strongly tied to it that s/he would 
gladly die than be kept from living in accordance with such a system.  This desire may 
run very deep, be inseparable from the person’s identity, and thereby override universal 
human tendencies and cultural mandates.  It is therefore as equal to and as much a part of 
that individual’s nature as any universal potential or culturally derived practice.  
Parekh has therefore offered a fluid, tripartite model of human nature existing 
simultaneously on three overlapping and mutually influencing levels: the universal, the 
cultural, and the individual. At the universal level human nature is imprecise, general, 
and made up of potential capacities.  At the cultural level, the range of specific human 
capacities is focused through the lens of cultural conventions which prioritize and offer 
guidelines on the development of specific sets of human properties and capacities.  At the 
individual level, an even more specific set of capacities is chosen and becomes integral to 
an individual’s sense of self.  All three are overlapping and simultaneous.  Thus, to 
equate human nature with any single one of the three is an overly narrow conception of 
human beings imposing serious limitations to any political or psychological theory.  
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Parekh clarifies two final points about his theory.  First, he acknowledges that 
human beings have always lived in deeply socialized contexts making it difficult to know 
whether their innate capacities are the result of asocial evolutionary processes or common 
processes of socialization which occur across cultures.  Accordingly, any theory of 
human nature is inferential and cannot be empirically verified because of this confound 
between common socialization processes and asocial evolutionary processes.  Second, all 
students of human nature are deeply shaped by their own cultural values and contexts.   
Thus, any attempt to authenticate any theoretical point by appealing to human nature (as 
is often the case in classical political liberalism) must be received with tremendous 
caution. Appealing to human nature to justify a normative prescription for living or set of 
moral standards is intractably flawed since such prescriptions are always at least in part 
derived from culture. We must never make the mistake of thinking that we appeal to 
human nature when we are actually appealing to cultural interpretations of human 
potential.  
Extrapolating from this theory of humans, Parekh asserts that all human beings 
have equal worth and dignity.  Here, worth implies that humans have intrinsic value and 
because of this all people should be committed to positive and negative parameters in 
their treatment of other humans.  Positively, we should, among other things, aspire to 
offer all people conditions in which they can achieve their capacities and build a 
meaningful life.  Negatively, we must not appropriate human life for personal gain, 
torture or kill others, or use people for dangerous experimentation.  We ascribe worth to 
other life forms as well such as animals and plant life.  Yet the amount of worth we 
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ascribe to non-human life forms varies and is different for pets, livestock, grasses, 
insects, and so forth. This is where the concept of dignity enters.  Dignity refers in this 
context to offering humans a privileged status above other life forms and explains why 
swatting a mosquito or harvesting grain for food is not the same as killing a human being.  
Dignity is the moral threshold at which human worth is treated as greater than the worth 
of other life forms.   
All humans have common conditions for well-being including a stable social 
environment, survival, good health, access to their communities’ cultural resources, a 
measure of influence over their own lives, and so forth.  The interpretation and 
procedures for realizing each of these conditions may vary as a function of cultural, 
geographic, and other contexts.  In spite of (or perhaps because of) these variances in 
interpretation, Parekh argues that we must treat equally their differing claims to such 
conditions because all humans have equal worth and dignity.   
By asserting a tripartite theory of human nature, the existence of identifiable 
universal conditions of well being, and equality in worth and dignity for all humans, 
Parekh has laid the foundation for a powerful case of a minimum universalist theory of 
human rights. Moral relativists argue that morality shifts so greatly as a function of 
culture that there can be no universal moral values.  Moral monists conversely believe 
that we can identify universal moral standards that can be applied to all people 
irrespective of cultural context.  The minimum universal theory of morality neatly 
synthesizes the two and its key principles are as follows. (a) It is possible to identify a 
core set of universal human values that can be applied across all cultures. (b) Such core 
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values are very few. (c) These core values must be within reach for all nations and 
cultures and therefore cannot require financial or other resources beyond the means of 
any nation or culture. (d) These values constitute a kind of floor or threshold which no 
cultural distinction may justifiably cross. (e) These core moral values will be prioritized 
and interpreted differently by different cultures.   
Parekh states that there have been admirable attempts to create such core sets of 
universal standards a prime example being the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(United Nations General Assembly, 1948).  While agreeing with its spirit, many East 
Asian spokespersons critique this declaration for its liberal, atomist, individualistic 
conception of human beings.  They argue that, while the spirit and underlying concept of 
the declaration’s principles are indispensible, they view the individualist interpretation 
conception of these rights as incompatible with the more tightly knit communitarian 
structure of many East Asian cultures.  Thus, standards for human rights can easily and 
unintentionally be articulated in such a way that they disadvantage some cultures from 
realizing them.  Not all cultures have individualistic mechanisms for regulating human 
affairs.  When human rights are articulated individualistically the fact that individualism 
is itself a cultural interpretation of the concept of freedom is overlooked.  Resolving such 
conflicts is a difficult task.  Before outlining steps for navigating such tensions in chapter 
5, we must understand how culture functions as the interpreter of moral principles.     
Theory of Culture.  Parekh (2006) offers the following definition of culture:  
Culture is a historically created system of meaning and significance or, 
what comes to the same thing, a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which 
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a group of human beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and 
collective lives. It is a way of both understanding and organizing human life. The 
understanding it seeks has a practical thrust and is not purely theoretical in nature 
like that offered by a philosophical or a scientific theory, and the way it organizes 
human life is not ad hoc and instrumental but grounded in a particular manner of 
conceptualizing and understanding it. (pp. 142-143) 
While this definition is succinct, Parekh offers a nuanced discussion of its many 
implications for the nature and structural components of culture.  Briefly, Parekh states 
that culture has a dynamic nature.  It mutually influences and is influenced by its 
associated social, political, and economic institutions.  Additionally, it is reshaped as a 
function of interactions with other distinct cultures.  Culture stirs loyalty to itself among 
all of its constituent members, even its internally oppressed groups. Structurally, Parekh 
states that culture influences multiple levels of human life including language, fine art, 
and norms and rules for social behavior. Other major components of cultural structure 
include culturally derived beliefs and practices, the communities of people that belong to 
a particular culture, and what Parekh calls culture’s residual and emergent strands.  Each 
of these two areas (i.e., culture’s nature and its structural components) will be discussed 
in turn.  
Structure of culture.  Structurally, Parekh states that cultural beliefs and practices 
together constitute “the locus of its [culture’s] identity” (2006, p. 149).  Accordingly, he 
takes great care to clarify the relationship between these two distinct but overlapping 
constructs.  Cultural beliefs manifest as thoughts, are general, are open to multiple 
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interpretations, are difficult to enforce, and their coherence is based upon intellectual 
consistency.  In contrast, cultural practices manifest as behavior, are specific, easy to 
ascertain and measure, readily open to enforcement, and their consistency and coherence 
is based upon situational compatibility.  Thus, cultural beliefs may carry on covertly even 
when cultural practices are denied because of hostile political atmospheres or other 
limitations. The reverse is also true—cultural practices may manifest without connection 
to the beliefs which originally supported them. Cultural practices may also be imposed 
upon groups which do not subscribe to them and may be enforced through legal, political, 
and other societal mechanisms.  
Parekh explains that the term cultural community has two parts: (a) a set of beliefs 
and practices (i.e., culture), and (b) the group of people whose lives are organized by 
such beliefs and practices (i.e., community).  Thus gay, youth, or business community 
refers to a set of people who identify as belonging to that group whereas gay, youth, or 
business culture refers to the beliefs and practices its members use to organize their 
internal and external relations. When culture is preceded by a possessive pronoun (e.g., 
my culture, our culture), it refers to the culture with which we identify and by whose 
principles we understand and organize our individual and collective lives.  The phrase 
“my culture” need not necessarily refer to the culture in which one was born since the 
culture with which one identifies may change throughout the lifespan.  Just as individuals 
may alter their cultural identity but still be identified as the same person, so too can a 
community change or abandon its culture but continue on without major alterations to its 
membership and historical continuity.  Thus, a community’s identity is not exclusively 
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defined in terms of its culture but is also formed by its identifiable membership group and 
a traceable developmental trajectory.  
Cultural beliefs and practices are articulated at several different levels including 
language, arts, cultural status, morality, behavioral norms, and various strands of cultural 
thought.  Parekh identifies language as a culture’s most basic level of cultural expression. 
This includes the language’s syntax, grammatical structure, and vocabulary.  These 
linguistic features are the tools by which a culture may describe itself and the world.  In a 
more abstract linguistic sense a culture’s identity is also expressed by its proverbs, 
maxims, body language, greeting rituals, and so forth.  The artistic level of cultural 
expression includes a culture’s music, visual arts, written literature, and so on.  Cultural 
status refers to the contrast between high and folk or popular culture most often used to 
describe artistic expressions.  Popular culture refers to the beliefs and practices of the so 
called ordinary people in any given culture. High culture, on the other hand, refers to the 
great achievements by what a given society considers its most talented people.   
Morality is also culturally embedded and interpreted.  In a basic sense, the moral 
dimension of culture is expressed through the beliefs and practices governing social 
behavior including how, where, when, and with whom one eats, the ways in which the 
dead are to be disposed, and how to treat friends, strangers, and romantic partners. More 
broadly, morality is also expressed through a culture’s legal system, broad social 
hierarchies, and the criteria it puts forth with regard to evaluating what projects and 
human relationships are worthy of pursuit.  Moral principles are therefore interpreted by 
and mediated through culture. Thus, we may rightly say that freedom is a universal moral 
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good but that its substance in the form of beliefs and practices may vary in interpretation 
from culture to culture.  Indeed, these interpretations of the concept of freedom may have 
many equally valid forms.  It is therefore vital that one not make the all too common 
mistake of equating an underlying concept (e.g., freedom) with its cultural interpretation 
(e.g., liberal individualism).  Although liberal individualism is one possible correct 
interpretation of freedom, freedom may also take other culturally derived forms such as 
communitarianism.   
Within all of these areas of cultural structure are what Parekh (2006) calls cultural 
strands of thought which are the various collections of thought within a given culture.  
Dominant strands of thought comprise the bodies of thought held by a culture’s 
mainstream and most powerful groups.  The term residual strands of thought (Williams, 
1980) refer to those bodies of thought which were once dominant but are now only part 
of a culture’s historical memory.   Emergent strands of thought are loosely coherent 
bodies of thought confined to small intracultural groups arising out of dissatisfaction with 
dominant culture.  The relationship between these conflicting strands is an example of 
what comprises the nature of culture.   
Nature of culture.  Parekh goes on to discuss the nature of culture or the way in 
which culture behaves.  This is what Baldwin et al. (2006) chose to call the process theme 
of culture.  As the previous paragraph demonstrates, there are a variety of different belief 
systems within any culture, and so all cultures are to some degree internally varied.  This 
results in all cultures being subject to an ongoing internal and external dialectic 
negotiating such tensions as those between, for example, dominant and minority beliefs 
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or old and new beliefs. It is therefore the nature of culture’s identity to be indeterminate 
and internally contested.  No culture’s identity is ever entirely clear, stable, or free of 
ambiguity but instead is in a constant state of evolution as different parts of its identity 
are internally and externally contested. Yet it is also true that these change processes 
effect different aspects of beliefs and practices at different times.  It is almost never the 
case for every aspect of a culture’s identity to be contested because change occurs in 
different areas and at different rates.  Beyond internal dialogues, cultural identity is also 
impacted by such external shifts as changes in technological and economic resources, 
wars, natural disasters, and so forth.  Parekh’s own words summarize these tensions. 
“Culture thus is not a passive inheritance but an active process of creating meaning, not 
given but constantly redefined and reconstituted.  …like a language [culture is] a 
precondition and a context as well as a product of human choices, a source of constraint 
which is also a medium of creativity.”  
Despite this ongoing process of self-reinvention it remains possible to identify 
and describe the qualities of a particular culture because all cultures are to some degree 
coherent and stable.  Ongoing intracultural dynamism simply limits such descriptions to a 
modest level of precision thereby ruling out so called essentialist descriptions of culture.  
Parekh therefore reminds the scholar seeking to differentiate cultures of two important 
points.  First, though cultural beliefs and practices often overlap, this does not mean that 
they cannot be distinguished from one another.  To uncover those distinctions that do 
exist one must examine (a) the content of a cultures beliefs and practices, (b) the way 
these are internally regulated, and (c) the extent they form a recognizable whole.  Second, 
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no culture can be neatly summarized by any small set of principles because the identity of 
any culture is diffuse.  Understanding a culture’s identity comes only through a level of 
depth and intimate familiarity with a culture’s beliefs and practices rarely available to an 
outsider.   
Culture also has a dialogical relationship with its society.  According to Parekh, 
society is not simply a group of human beings but also the structure underpinning their 
relationships (e.g., social, economic, governmental, and other institutions).  Culture offers 
content and principles for organizing and legitimizing these societal relationships.   No 
culture evolves without a society and vice versa.  Likewise, societal institutions and 
cultural beliefs and practices mutually influence each other’s development.  Societies 
have sanctions for members who violate these principles which include ostracism and 
diminished social status.  Cultural sanctions are more covert and include the negative 
affect stirred from violating principles in which one believes and identifies.  Thus, 
members of a society may follow its practices because they fear adverse social 
consequences and/or they subscribe to the cultural beliefs by which those practices are 
deemed legitimate.  Culture is therefore a regulatory system that enforces social norms 
with built-in mechanisms to reward and discipline individual choices.  While providing 
an important structure, these regulatory mechanisms carry danger in that they invariably 
privilege some groups over others, can become overly restrictive, and distribute power 
and resources in a certain way.  We must therefore balance cultural respect with a 
measure of caution.  It is vital that room be allowed for a dispassionate intercultural 
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critique of any culture’s regulatory mechanisms and content.  Parekh offers a method for 
striking just such a balance to be discussed in chapter 6 of this project.   
Parekh (2006) explains that culture also impacts and regulates the identity of its 
members albeit to a non-deterministic extent.  Culture structures its members’ 
personalities in particular ways, offers them particular kinds of life content, and provides 
individuals a group with whom they can identify.  Yet, while no individual is entirely 
uninfluenced by culture, neither is it true that any cultural milieu fully determines a 
person’s identity.  As stated above cultures are never wholly coherent, and individuals 
always retain critical faculties for evaluating their own culture’s system of beliefs and 
practices. The extent to which individuals identify with and live according to their 
interpretation of their culture’s principles varies from high loyalty to iconoclasm.  Parekh 
states that individuals are less likely to identify with their culture if they have been 
mistreated by it, have been exposed to many other cultures, or have highly developed 
critical abilities.  
Members feel loyal to their cultural communities because their culture structures 
and contributes enormously to their lives.  Further, no cultural community could survive 
long without generating at least some obligations in all of its members. Cultural duties 
include cherishing the memories of those who greatly influenced the culture’s history, 
living with the aspiration to fulfill the culture’s best qualities, defending the culture when 
it is misrepresented, enriching the culture’s resources, and removing its defects.  Duties to 
one’s community are similar.  First, impulses such as nihilism and narrow self-interest 
are toxic to communal unity and members have a duty to resist them.  Second, members 
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must not allow their community to be appropriated or misrepresented by other groups.  
Finally, members of communities have a duty to seek out and correct the injustices 
committed within their communal groups.   
Parekh has thereby offered an extremely nuanced perspective on the nature and 
structure of culture.  Since cultures are at once stable and dynamic and are often subject 
to both external and internal contestation, it is easy to misunderstand what culture is and 
how it operates.  In light of the discussion above the scholar must be extremely cautious 
not to commit any of the common fallacies leading to misunderstanding of culture 
summarized in Table 4.2.  
Position 1: Reframing Culture in Multicultural Psychology 
Parekh’s (2006) conception of culture is comprehensive and offers tools that can 
help answer some of the most challenging questions surrounding definitions of culture in 
the multicultural psychology discourse.  He neatly addresses the relationship between 
human universality, individuality, and the ways cultural milieu moderates the two.  
Additionally, he treats cultural identity as a singular aspect of human identity for each 
person.  This is a departure from postmodern conceptions of culture in which individuals 
are thought to have many cultures (Enns & Forrest, 2005a; Pedersen, et al. 2008).  
Parekh’s theory simultaneously reinforces some aspects of MCC theories while refuting 
others.  This section will first discuss the benefits and limitations of adapting Parekh’s 




Seven Fallacies Leading to the Misunderstanding of Culture 
Fallacy Description 
Holism  Ignoring intracultural diversity and complexity by conceptualizing culture as a single and fully 
integrated whole.  
Distinctness Overestimating the ease by which cultures can be distinguished, imagining them to be entirely unique 
from one another, and ignoring or minimizing cultural overlap.  
Positivist, historicist, 
or “end of history” 
Failing to view culture as an ever-evolving dynamic construct and instead imagining it as static and 
something  to be understood and preserved in whatever its current form.  
Ethnicization of 
culture 
Conflating community and culture and imagining culture to be an expression of a community’s deepest 
beliefs, instincts, views, and so forth.  Limits one’s ability to perceive and examine features shared by 






Table 4.2, cont. 
Fallacy Description 
Closure Relating to the holism fallacy, the assumption that, if cultures are self-contained integrated constructs, any 
changes (internal or external) threaten them in unpredictable ways.  
Cultural 
Determinism 
Imagining that the beliefs, values, practices, and so forth. of members of a given culture are dictated to them 
by said culture. Such a belief leaves no room for alternate or concurrent loci of determinism which can 
include self, sub-cultural values, and so on.   
Cultural 
Autonomy 
Imagining culture as a construct that excludes economics and political power systems.  All three are in 
reality mutually reinforcing. Culture is in part a reflection of and contributor to the power relationships both 
within and between cultural communities and therefore an important component of any comprehensive 
theory of culture.  





Ultimately, this author will offer a position in favor of a restricted definition of culture for 
multicultural psychology which focuses on culture as structure, function, and process.    
Parekh and MP.  Treating Parekh’s (2006) theory of culture as a lens through 
which to understand multicultural psychology reveals several emphases or treatments of 
culture in the MCC literature.  First, Parekh’s theory most closely aligns with what this 
author has identified as set two of multicultural psychology’s semantic themes: structure, 
function, and process.  Literature focusing on populations with marked differences in 
beliefs and practices most emphasizes set two definitions and includes publications on the 
acculturation process, counseling refugees, and other such groups (Atkinson, Thompson, 
& Grant, 1993; Mori, Inman, & Caskie, 2009; Sodowsky, Wai Ming Lai, & Plake, 1991).  
This is of course only a small part of the MCC literature and illustrates how Parekh’s 
theory of culture is different from even more restricted treatments of culture in 
psychology.   
It is also useful to review D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC model of multicultural 
competency through Parekh’s (2006) theory of culture.  Here, Parekh’s theory of culture 
both reinforces and supports D. W. Sue’s interest in expanding multicultural competency 
to include interventions at organizational, professional, and societal levels.  If we 
consider culture to be a significant and distinct set of beliefs and practices which help 
organize the lives of large groups of people, and if we endorse a plurality of value 
systems, then it seems D. W. Sue and Parekh are in complete agreement that 
organizations, professions, and entire societies are right to make appropriate adjustments 
to accommodate differences between sets of beliefs and practices.  However, the list of 
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fallacies outlined in Table 4.2 is an appropriate warning to psychology not to engage in 
such advocacy uncritically.  Any organizational, professional, or societal adjustments are 
in immediate danger of the fallacies of closure, positivism, and holism.  Any 
accommodations for diverse groups must be done in a way that respects intracultural 
variance and understands that cultures are constantly evolving.  Accordingly, any policies 
must be flexible, sensitive to internal dangers, and must be reviewed frequently so as to 
keep pace with the natural evolution of every culture.   
Parekh’s (2006) theory of culture also cautions against the notion of cultural 
competence as it relates to individuals.  Simply viewing individual clients through the 
lens of group characteristics outlined in works such as D. W. Sue and D. Sue (2008) is far 
from competence – it is a form of stereotyping, cultural determinism, and ultimately 
forgets that at the individual level culture is only a partially determining factor.  In short, 
knowledge, awareness, and skills related to whole groups works well when we are 
advocating for and responding to the representatives of entire groups.  However, 
stereotype threat is enormous and clinicians are in danger of committing the cultural 
determinism fallacy if they are uncritical in their approach to understanding how an 
individual relates to his/her culture.  Consequently, D. W. Sue and D. Sue (2008) caution 
against such a stereotyped approach to multicultural counseling.  Yet beyond 
stereotyping, clinicians and MCC theorists are confronted with the fact that culture is 
difficult to understand beyond a certain level of precision.  Indeed, the level at which 
cultural characteristics become indeterminate is itself difficult to determine and likely 
varies from culture to culture.  Cultures are constantly changing, evolving, and internally 
186 
  
contested according to Parekh.  Therefore, from the lens of Parekh, KA&S approaches to 
understanding cultural difference are of only limited utility and may lead practitioners 
towards the fallacy of distinctness.  The more qualitative, imprecise, and ambiguous 
positions taken by theorists such as Enns and Forrest (2005a) may be understood as a 
safeguard against the distinctness fallacy.   
Parekh’s (2006) theory of culture also sheds light on the interactional theories in 
chapter 3.  First, since Parekh endorses a restricted theory of culture, his work suggests 
that conflating culture with any salient social identity is an inaccurate understanding of 
culture and is perhaps the inverse of the distinctness fallacy.  Pedersen, et al.’s (2008) 
ICE model is a prime example.  If KA&S approaches to competence underestimate the 
overlap between cultural groups, Pedersen et al.’s ICE model seems to overestimate the 
overlap between cultural groups.  Further, it conflates culture with any of thousands of 
other subjective identities.  From the standpoint of Parekh, this is simply inaccurate since 
culture has a much greater organizing force on communities and should therefore not be 
conflated with identities such as father, teacher, or art lover.   
In summary, Parekh’s (2006) theory, when added to Baldwin et al. (2006), offers 
us a nuanced and sophisticated toolkit for deconstructing how culture is treated in 
multicultural psychology.  This discussion helps clarify the ways in MP’s treatment of 
culture do and do not align with other fields.  In the section to follow, we turn to the ways 
in which Parekh and Baldwin et al. may help guide us towards a solution for how culture 
should be defined in psychology and how all oppressed groups may be included in 
theories of competence.   
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Redefining Culture in Multicultural Psychology 
 There are at least three possible solutions to what should constitute culture in 
multicultural counseling.  First, we may simply continue to endorse what is already the de 
facto position of the field: culture can be either inclusively or narrowly defined.  Here it 
is up to the author, conference organizer, pedagogue, or clinician to determine how much 
culture should be expanded beyond race and ethnicity.  Second, we may endorse an 
exclusively broad definition of culture as exemplified in the work of authors such as 
Pedersen et al. (2008).  Third, we may endorse a definition of culture which exclusively 
restricts to race and ethnicity.  While the work of D. W. Sue and D. Sue (2008) 
emphasizes race, it is not exclusively focused on race and ethnicity.  Indeed, this author 
has found no contemporary work in multicultural psychology endorsing such an 
exclusively restricted definition of culture.  Each of these solutions will be discussed in 
turn.   
The status quo, while vulnerable to internal contestation, has ultimately proved 
useful for uniting large numbers of psychologists towards increasing social justice in the 
United States and abroad.  The APA has adopted multicultural guidelines, requires 
accredited programs to be sensitive to students from diverse backgrounds, and mandates 
training in multiculturalism.  These are all for the greater good, and there is no reason to 
believe that the field could not continue to do well over the long term with its current 
solution.  However, for this author, this simultaneous exclusive and inclusive definition 
of culture is problematic and ultimately unacceptable.  The primary concern is that it has 
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manifested in a hierarchy of oppression statuses within MCC theory with race and 
ethnicity receiving greatest attention as demonstrated in chapter 2.  
This leads to the first alternate solution: endorse a definition of culture which is 
inclusive, broad, and speaks to all oppressions.  Here psychology would treat culture as 
an umbrella term under which all social identities must be classified.  Under this term 
psychology of gender, disability, age, and other social statuses would stand alongside 
race and ethnicity as forms of multicultural psychology.  This satisfies the need to include 
many oppressed communities and ensures their representation in multicultural 
psychology.  It would also invite more attention to the intersection of oppression within 
communities and individuals.   
Yet this solution has problematic limitations of its own.  First, it invites and 
perhaps even necessitates a hierarchy of attention among an unwieldy number of group 
identities in nearly any context (e.g., research, pedagogy, policy, therapeutic 
intervention).  It is unclear how one would determine which groups should be 
emphasized in a course on multicultural psychology or a position paper on multicultural 
competence.  Certainly it is clear that an attempt to include all groups equally would be 
inefficient, unwieldy, and unlikely to yield meaningful results.  It is also clear that 
including all groups means that race and ethnicity are easily occluded and would not 
receive as much attention to specific concerns germane to these populations.  Scholars 
preferring a more restricted definition are right to resist expanded definitions on these 
grounds since they lead to all groups receiving less attention.  This is particularly salient 
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in graduate programs in which there may only be room for a single multicultural course 
in the curriculum.  
Related to this first concern, it is unclear where research focusing on culture as 
defined in terms such as Parekh’s (2006) theory would belong if it no longer has a 
protected and focused meaning in multicultural psychology apart from other social 
identities.  For example, if culture is broadly defined, how would clinicians and 
researchers distinguish culture as it relates to the acculturation process of immigrants, 
refugees, or other populations living in communities radically different from their country 
of origin?  One can imagine treating a Saudi-Arabian born Islamic male who has recently 
moved to Miami, Florida, at a university counseling center.  Surely the meaning of cross-
cultural when working with such an individual has a self-evidently more bounded 
meaning than working with students who were born and raised in Miami albeit with 
many other diverse social identities and even ethnic differences.  This is not to say these 
other social identities are not important or even cultural when defined in group 
membership / ideological terms.  I draw the contrast only to point out that differences 
around group membership should somehow be distinguished from cultural group 
membership differences as defined by theorists such as Parekh.  Permanently expanding 
the meaning of culture weakens our ability to do so.   
The next solution then is to restrict culture back down to structural, functional, 
and process based definitions primarily focused on racial and ethnic groups.  The 
advantages here are numerous.  First, it solves the threat of avoiding discussions about 
race by making racial groups once again a primary focus of the term culture.  Second, this 
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also refocuses culture on ethnicity and would allow space for rich investigations of 
acculturation and acquiring knowledge about many different cultural groups.  An 
important sub-area of culture defined in this restricted manner are culture bound forms of 
psychopathology.  Examples include nightmare deaths discussed in chapter 9 of D. W. 
Sue and D. Sue (2008) or the wide range of other culture bound disorders such as koto, 
spells, ataque de nevios, sangue dormido, and so forth (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000, pp. 897-903).  Such measurable, concrete manifestations of culture 
bound psychiatric illness refute the notion of defining culture solely as an arbitrary fiction 
created only by the mind of Western researchers.  Third, a tighter definition of culture 
lends itself to the empirical research methods of behavioral psychology in a way that 
more abstract critical definitions of culture do not.  This is appropriate since both practice 
and research oriented psychologists are often called upon to design policy and outreach 
projects for specific populations in a variety of settings (e.g., college campuses, VA 
systems, community outreach in urban areas, rural psychology, and so forth).  Devising 
concrete policies and program content would be meaningless if it had to include every 
possible within group difference of a target population.  Restricted definitions of culture 
can therefore be extremely useful on meso and macro systems levels of intervention.  
Many communities often called “other diverse groups” do not necessarily map 
onto Parekh’s definition of culture or Baldwin et al.’s set one of definitions.  There are 
after all no native healing practices germane to LGBT status or for those with physical 
disabilities.  It would be strange indeed to see a statement such as “while culture includes 
many groups, for the purposes of this study we restrict our working definition of culture 
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to the LGBT population.”  Nevertheless, many social groups have an enormous stake in 
efforts to cease oppression, and so they too deserve an equal voice in such dialogues.  
Thus we arrive at the problem of an exclusively restricted definition of culture.  If culture 
only means structure and function and APA demands that all programs offer training 
related to groups that best map on to this definition, the voices of any culture’s internal 
minorities and entire communities of otherwise oppressed people are of only secondary 
importance.  This seems patently unjust.  Therefore, this author rejects requiring MCC 
training on an exclusively restricted definition of culture because it mandates that 
clinicians be competent to work with one set of oppressed groups but not others.  
Thus none of these three solutions seems to adequately address the needs of all 
oppressed groups.  Through examining each in turn, it is apparent that the problem facing 
multicultural psychologists is not really whether culture is defined in exclusive or 
expansive terms.  The problem lies with conflating cultural groups with oppressed 
groups.  In other words, it is this author’s position that while all cultural groups can be 
oppressed, not all oppressed groups constitute cultures.  Starting from this position a new 
solution emerges.  If we disentangle oppression from structural and functional definitions 
of culture, we may then use oppression itself as a grouping variable for all groups.  These 
oppressed groups would then include culture (defined as race, ethnicity, and national 
origin) and other oppressed (but not cultural) communities such as LGBT, gender, 
socioeconomic status, and so forth.   
In the opinion of this author, psychology would indeed do well to cease conflating 
culture with oppression status.  First, it would solve concerns about needing a space for 
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race and ethnicity on the one hand and a space for including all oppressed groups on the 
other.  There would now be two such spaces.  Culture becomes a protected space for race 
and ethnicity.  Culture would then take an equal place alongside other groups within a 
broader dialogue about oppression in general.  In other words, multicultural psychology, 
if defined as in Parekh’s theory above, would take its place alongside psychology of 
women, LGBT, disability, men and masculinity, and all other social groups.  The term for 
the communal “oppression dialogue space” for uniting all of these different community 
and group identity psychologies would perhaps be called psychology of recognition, 
identity psychology, or justice psychology.  The name for this general oppression space 
will be discussed further in chapter 5.   
Questions arising from a restricted definition of culture.  The discussion above 
illustrates that multicultural psychology, as a discipline and as a social movement, should 
at some point confront the fact that culture cannot simultaneously mean (a) various 
oppressed groups with which people identify and (b) systems of beliefs and practices 
centering on national origin and ethnicity.  The solution above, restricting the definition 
of culture while simultaneously offering a more general space for oppression gives rise to 
one very important question.  Where would multicultural competence fit into this new 
separated treatment of culture and oppression?   
If this two pronged restricted definition balanced by broad oppression dialogue 
approach were adopted, the APA would have to decide what it is mandating when it 
requires clinicians to receive training in multicultural competency.  Would MCC training 
still include all oppressed groups?  If so, why restrict the definition of culture? Or does 
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training now mean competency is only required for race, ethnicity, and national origin 
issues in which case other oppressed groups continue to be marginalized?  The answer is 
one to which many may object.  In the view of this author, multicultural competency 
would become an inadequate mandate for professionals if the definition of culture is 
restricted.  It is not right for any one group or set of groups which have suffered from an 
oppressive history to benefit more than other oppressed groups by a mandate for 
competency.   
Thus a massive policy shift would be required when it comes to addressing work 
with diverse populations.  If culture is restricted and is placed alongside identity 
psychology or some other term to discuss group membership and power/ideology 
imbalance, then clinicians, researchers, and policymakers are now tasked with an 
additional set of competencies.  Namely, one must be more than culturally competent, 
one must also be competent to work with and advocate for members of other groups as 
well.  These other groups are best understood in terms of their oppressed or marginalized 
status which may or may not be related to a cultural history.  Clinicians must be more 
than competent with culture; they must be competent with oppressed social identities and 
oppressed social groups of which culture is only one, albeit important and unique, 
component.  Thus, I would seek to replace requirements of multicultural competence with 
a mandate for something broader which we might call oppression competence.   
We therefore arrive at the first positional answer to the three core questions of this 
project.  In the case of multicultural psychology, the meaning of culture should be 
restricted in focus along the lines of Baldwin et al.’s (2006) set one of semantic themes 
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(i.e., structure, function, and process).  Communities that could be included in this more 
restricted focus are race, ethnicity, fundamentalist religious groups, and national origin.  
Parallel to this restriction, culture would simultaneously be placed alongside other group 
memberships in a larger discussion of oppression which we may call identity psychology, 
recognition psychology, or oppression psychology.  Finally, the mandate for multicultural 
competency should be expanded to include other oppressed groups and be subsumed 
under a larger competency variable such as oppression competency or identity 
competency.   
We also arrive at the first transformation for the MDCC (D. W. Sue, 2001).  First, 
the concept of culture is no longer the central organizing concept for competency.  While 
the identification of a more precise term must wait until chapter 5, the positions in this 
chapter would require a new title for the MDCC which at this point is best described as 
the Multiple Dimensions of X Competency (where X is currently an unknown more 
inclusive term than culture).  This would also mean that the content dimension of the 
model must be adjusted.  Instead of outlining content specific to five racial and ethnic 
groups, the model would now centralize oppressed social identities generally.  Thus, the 
content dimension of the MDCC would become an explicitly open container for a large 
set of social identities including, but not limited to, culture.    
Summary and Conclusions 
There are literally hundreds of definitions of culture ranging from precise 
reductionism to abstract postmodern critiques.  Some critical definitions characterize 
culture itself as nothing more than an arbitrary abstraction created by researchers for 
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researchers.  Multicultural psychology has yet to find a consensus for a precise definition 
of culture.  On the one hand MP and MCC theories are a response to the hegemony and 
oppression directed towards oppressed groups.  Consequently, all oppressed groups are 
entitled to representation within MP.  However, the definition of culture within 
multicultural psychology is often restricted to focus on racial and ethnic minority groups 
within the multicultural psychology literature.  MP is therefore vulnerable to in-fighting 
concerning which group or groups deserve the most attention in multicultural psychology 
pedagogy, policy, conferences, and research.  Building upon Parekh’s (2006) theory of 
culture, the author proposes a two part solution to MP’s inclusion of all oppressed groups 
in theories of culture but prioritizing race and ethnicity above other oppressed groups in 
practice.  First, psychology should restrict both the theoretical and working definition of 
culture towards race, ethnicity, and national origin.  This is because race, ethnicity, and 
national origin best map onto the structural, functional, and process aspects of culture 
exemplified by Parekh’s work whereas gender, sexuality, disability, and other 
communities do not.  Further, these other communities (LGBT, gender, disability) have 
their own sub-fields within psychology at large, and it is therefore important to offer race 
and ethnicity the same protected space for their own unique concerns.   
Consequently, part two of this solution must involve identifying and naming the 
broad oppression and hegemony aspects of what is now called multicultural psychology 
and instead classify research and policy in this area by some new more inclusive term 
such as oppression psychology, psychology of recognition, or identity psychology.  
Along with this, clinicians must be more than multiculturally competent, they must be 
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what we may call identity competent which must include racial and ethnic identities, 
other group identities, and the relationship among them.    
From a policy standpoint, the answer to the first question of this dissertation 
supports changing the concept of MCC itself to become a broader term in reaction to a 
restricted definition of culture.  In behavioral terms, this position generates several 
criteria for a theory of Critical Multicultural and Identity Competency.  The psychologist 
(a) is able to distinguish between culture and community, (b) understands the relationship 
between these two terms, and (c)  understands that group characteristics inform 




Chapter 5. Psychology of Recognition 
“In all ordinary uses, recognition is understood as a practical act of positive 
evaluation” (Thompson, 2006, p. 100).  
 
This chapter will identify the better umbrella term discussed in chapter 4 under 
which various psychologies of identity and culture should fall.  The solution arises from 
exploring the literature of political theory which has faced the same problem 
multicultural psychology confronts: finding an inclusive term to discuss advocacy for 
oppressed groups which do not fit into traditional definitions of culture.  Implications for 
embracing this term will be discussed in relationship to MCC theory, internal variance 
among groups, and individuals.  Following this, the author will review literature pointing 
to a more precise language for understanding social identity and multiple identities within 
the same person.   
Towards a Multicultural Theory of Politics  
This section will explore the field of political theory and search for ways in which 
its resources can be useful to multicultural psychologists.  First, the nexus of relevant 
political theories and historical events within which the ideas of political multiculturalism 
developed will be reviewed.  Second, the public philosophy of pluralism will be explored 
through the example of liberal political theory using the political structure of the United 
States as one example.  Differences between liberal political theories (e.g., John Locke, 
Charles de Montesquieu, John Rawls) and so-called liberal political ideologies (e.g., 
American Democratic Party, the Liberal Party of Canada) will be discussed.  At this 
point, the neo-theory of multiculturalism will be introduced followed by a discussion of 
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the term recognition and its meanings in the context of political philosophy.  The section 
culminates in a discussion of the ways psychology may benefit from adopting a new 
superordinate term: recognition competency theory (RCT).   
Political Theory: A Brief Overview  
Schumaker, Delehanty, Kiel, and Heilke (2008) outline the fundamental and 
wide-ranging philosophical questions which comprise the domain of political theory 
which are summarized in Table 5.1.  Among these many questions there are several 
which stand out as relevant to this project.  How should social capital be distributed?  Do 
some groups have the authority and power to restrict the practices and beliefs of other 
groups?  Contemporary political philosophers and theorists offer answers to these and 
many other questions which guide public policy.   
At this point distinctions are required among several key terms: public 
philosophy, political theory or philosophy, neo-theory (also called quasi-ideology), and 
political ideology.  The definitions and use of these and the underlying concepts to which 
they apply vary widely among political theorists (Bhargava, Bagchi, & Sudarshan, 1999; 
Kymlicka, 2002; Phillips, 2007; Schumaker et al., 2008).  Drawing from the taxonomy 
put forth by Schumaker et al. (2008), these terms shall be used within this document as 
follows.  Beginning with the most concrete, a political ideology refers to those bodies of 
thought which put forth specific and substantive positions on public policies (e.g., tax 
codes, criminal laws, and foreign policy).  These bodies most often take the form of 
political parties such as Britain’s Labor party or the Republican party of the 
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Table 5.1   
Fundamental Areas Investigated in Political Theory    
Concept Definition Sample Question(s) 
Philosophical  Broad foundational principles in politics often unarticulated and 
difficult to contest since no objective method exists to validate or 
invalidate them.  
 
       Ontology Conceptions of ultimate reality.  Is there a God? Are human lives predetermined 
or subject to human will?  
       Epistemology What can we know and how can we know it?  Is empiricism truly objective? Are there truths 
unknowable to the human mind and senses? 
       Humans  Beliefs about what constitutes the essence of humanity and human 
experience. 
Are all humans equal? What is a “good life?”  
       Society Conceptualizations of the origins and characteristics of society. What is a good society? Where does conflict 
arise within societies?  
Political Principles    
       Communities Institutions or groups, (e.g., countries, cultures, schools) that make laws 
affecting production and distribution of social goods.  
With which communities do or should people 
most strongly identify?  
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Table 5.1, cont. 
Concept Definition Sample Question(s) 
       Structures        Institutions (governments, religions, labor unions, charities) and processes 
(market transactions) that organize communities through providing a sense of 
meaning and controlling social goods. 
To what extent should structures organize our 
lives? What balance is there between 
structures?  
       Citizens Residents of a given community sometimes with varying statuses (e.g., state 
citizen, permanent resident, religious neophyte, and so forth). 
Should rights and responsibilities differ 
between residents and citizens? 
       Authority Government’s ability to intervene and influence such life areas as economic 
behavior, social interaction, religious worship, lifestyle, cultural values, and 
so forth..  
Which areas and to what extent within said 
areas should government hold sway?  
       Change Evolution in such areas as justice, structures, and so forth..  By what mechanisms should change occur? 
       Justice The principles underlying governmental law and social normality.  What guides the distribution of social goods?  
       Rulers Those who hold political power (ordinary citizens, elected officials, business 
owners, and so forth).  
How should power be distributed within 
communities?  
Note: The above concepts are summarized from Schumaker et al.. (2008)
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United States.  On the next highest level of abstraction are political theories also known 
as political philosophies. Political theories do not offer substantive applied policy.  
Rather, political theories underpin, inform, and set the boundaries for the constitutional 
systems of state governments and the policies outlined by their constituent political 
ideologies.  Examples of political theories include classical liberalism and nineteenth 
century utilitarianism.  Thus, a political ideology is the concrete interpretation of an 
abstract political theory.  
The term public philosophy is the most abstract level of political thought.  It has 
no specific community and refers only to vague moral values cutting across many 
political theories.  Examples of public philosophies are freedom, pluralism, and justice.  
In Contemporary political philosophy: An introduction Will Kymlicka (2002) argues that 
political theories such as communitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, or communism, are 
simply different interpretations of the superordinate public philosophy of freedom.  
Similarly, Schumaker et al. (2008) organize their discussion of different political theories 
and ideologies by examining how they interpret the public philosophy of pluralism.   
To constitute a full blown political theory or philosophy, a group of political principles 
must provide answers and positions regarding all or nearly all of the concepts outlined in 
Table 5.1.  A neo-theory is a political theory with only limited scope and which has yet to 
reach consensus on a comprehensive system of answers to the issues of Table 1.  The 
relationship between political ideologies, political theories, neo-theories, and public 
philosophies is summarized in Figure 5.1.   




Figure 5.1. The relationship between four key terms used in political theory based upon 
distinctions made by Schumaker et al. (2008).   
 
In the pages to follow, I will show that political multiculturalism is a neo-theory.  
Multiculturalism seeks cultural sensitivity in the interpretation of mainstream political 
theories (e.g., liberalism) and the public philosophies of freedom, pluralism, and 
recognition 
Monism and Pluralism: Two Opposing Public Philosophies 
Parekh (2006) states that moral monism “…refers to the view that only one way 
of life is fully human, true, or the best, and that all others are defective to the extent that 
they fall short of it” (p. 16).  Some of the most revered and cherished contributions to 
Public Philosophies  
Most Abstract 
(Ex. Equality, Pluralism) 
Political Ideologies (Political 
Parties, Public Policies) 
Concrete, Substantive & 
Comprehensive 
Ex: US Democratic Party 
Political Theory 
Abstract, Procedural & 
Comprehensive 
(Ex: Utilitarianism, Liberalism, 
Libertarianism) 
Neo-Theory 
Abstract, Procedural  
& Limited Scope 
(Ex: “Deep Greens”) 
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human moral philosophy would fall into this category and include the classical Athenian 
school of Aristotle and Plato, early Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Aquinas, 
and classical liberal philosophers John Locke and J.S. Mill.  It is self-evident that many 
of the tenants held in the writings of these thinkers constitute the moral good in the minds 
of a vast number of people.  Indeed, it is not difficult to think that many individuals in 
cultures for which these thinkers have not held great historical influence would find much 
to align with in the values of these systems.  The Athenian belief that cultivating the 
perfection of one’s own mind is vital to the good life, Aquinas’s position that his was the 
only true faith, which should be defended at all costs, and Locke’s view that society 
should be homogeneous and territorially bounded are values that can hardly be called 
exclusively Western.   
Yet morally monistic systems ascribing to an exclusive, totalitarian, and rigidly 
doctrinal interpretation of how human life should be organized are ultimately untenable 
for the many contemporary societies seeking to affirm more than one of their constituent 
cultures.  Parekh (2006) identifies the following limitations in systems of moral monism. 
First, monistic moral systems rest on the idea that the entire scope of human capacities, 
virtues, desires, and so forth, are combinatorial, mutually harmonious, and constitute a 
human way of life that is universally good in all contexts.  This is patently untrue.  The 
limited resources of any human life restrict one’s ability to cultivate all human capacities 
for virtue to only a small few.  It is exceedingly unlikely that in the span of any single life 
one could pursue and achieve independent wealth, a very high level of athletic, 
intellectual, and artistic achievement; cultivate and devote time to acts of profound 
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generosity, love, and kindness; all while finding one’s own sense of personal meaning 
and fulfillment. Indeed, the very cultivation of one set of abilities or virtues may preclude 
the cultivation of another.  The pursuit of an ascetic and selfless life is viewed positively 
by many Western and nonwestern cultures alike. Yet so are the pursuit of material 
security and high levels of individual achievement. It seems difficult to imagine any life 
that could combine all four of these traits simultaneously as they are by their very nature 
contradictory.  Additionally, it is nearly impossible to place such traits into a hierarchy of 
goodness both in the abstract or specific contexts. Finally, the ubiquitous and inescapable 
social context within which each human develops has a powerful and involuntary 
influence upon shaping the range and nature of capacities available to each person.  Each 
human society has different traditions, historical contexts, and even geographical factors 
such as climate that shape decisions concerning which human capacities are valuable.  
Though possible, it is as unlikely that a person from a native tribal South American 
culture would see value in a career as a concert violinist or a young person in Madrid 
would find meaning in a career as a practitioner of Inuit North American medicine.  
Accordingly, the only available option for any exclusively monistic form of government 
in a society that is constituted by anything other than an entirely homogeneous culture is 
the elimination of moral beliefs and practices which differ from its idea of a good human 
life.  If we accept that the factors constituting the good in human life are shaped and 
restricted by culture, individual resources, and the mutually exclusive nature of the 
factors themselves, we must conclude that there is no single or universal set of standards 
that demonstrably constitutes the best form of human living.  Instead, we must 
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acknowledge the reality that there are multiple systems and paths to living a human life 
that are good, virtuous, and morally correct.  Therefore, a governmental system that 
serves a population comprised of multiple cultures must necessarily allow enough 
flexibility for at least some degree of moral pluralism.  
This is not to say that all systems of morality and human life are equally good or 
just.  Indeed, the same limitations for which we must reject moral monism hold for any 
society that would embrace an entirely relativistic moral pluralism. Extreme relativism 
invites us to view all differences in various beliefs and practices as self-authenticating, 
sacrosanct, and incorrigible. Taken to its extreme, this would mean that any belief and 
practice that any group or individual believes constitutes a good life for them must be 
respected and be immune from governmental intervention. This of course leads to a kind 
of moral anarchy and a society with no unifying moral compass, system of justice, or way 
of legitimating any form of regulation or protection its government could offer 
constituent groups and citizens (Kymlicka, 2002; Parekh, 2006).  If all morality is relative 
in a multicultural society, then such deeply divisive practices as honor killings, public 
lynching, and forms of religious self or other mutilation are by their very existence self-
legitimating and must be immune from state intervention. The dangers of such a system 
of government are self-evident.  Therefore, since a democratic multicultural society must 
acknowledge the legitimacy of multiple systems of morality on the one hand, and provide 
certain limits to practices that threaten its constituent groups on the other, the only fair 
option remaining is a moral pluralism that is also non-relativistic.  
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Schumaker et al. (2008) offer a definition for pluralism as a public philosophy.  
“[Pluralist public philosophy] can initially be understood as a public philosophy that 
affirms the legitimacy of many interests, identities, and ideas that often compete with one 
another and emphasizes democratic procedures for reconciling differences, if only 
tentatively and temporarily.” (p. xiv).  They point out that this is perhaps the most basic 
philosophical principle in the political systems of many contemporary democratic nation 
states including the United States.  Pluralism is open to a variety of interpretations which 
take the form of political theories.  Liberalism will serve as an example of one of these 
many interpretations.   
Interpreting Pluralism: Liberalism as a Political Theory 
John Gray (1995) offers a succinct but thorough overview of liberalism as a wide-
reaching political philosophy. Liberalism as a philosophical term is distinctly different 
from the ideological doctrine of the United States Democratic Party which is often 
pejoratively conflated with all meanings of the terms liberal and liberalism.  It is instead a 
strain of political theory with enormous historical breadth encompassing a wide range of 
specific theories with origins tracing back to such classical thinkers as Plato and 
Aristotle.  Gray explains that the term liberal was used to describe a political party for the 
first time in 1812 by the Spanish party of Liberates.  The term was also previously used 
by Adam Smith but in his case referred to the classical virtue of liberality (i.e., open 
mindedness, humanity, and generosity) rather than any political movement or doctrine.  
According to Gray, the first moment that liberalism became an identifiable political 
philosophy is in the writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1689) who articulated the so 
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called liberal problem. Gray summarizes this problem as the specification of “…terms of 
peaceful coexistence among proponents of rival, and perhaps rationally 
incommensurable, world-views” . Gray states that the main purpose of liberal theorists 
since this first declaration has been to craft specific solutions to the liberal problem.  
Accordingly, there is tremendous variety in the specific normative moral doctrines of 
theories that have arisen within the liberal tradition. So high in fact is the degree of 
internal variance of liberal theory, that the term liberal cannot be properly understood by 
referencing any specific doctrine of normative moral content.  This is so much the case 
that Gray states that the term liberalism often risks becoming a catchall term to group 
together a variety of disparate philosophies which bear only a very loose resemblance to 
one another.  
In order to properly explore the meaning of liberal philosophy in light of this 
internal variance, Gray uses a historically grounded discussion in which he identifies four 
core themes underpinning all philosophies classified as liberal.  First, liberal philosophies 
are individualist. They assert that the claims of the individual person must take moral 
precedence over the claims of any social collective. Second, liberalisms are egalitarian 
because they deny that moral differences among human beings should lead to any legal or 
political hierarchy.  In other words, all human beings are of equal moral status and their 
differences are irrelevant with respect to the law and politics.  Third, liberal political 
philosophies are universalist in the sense that they posit a single moral unity to the human 
species which cuts across any specific cultural or historical context.  Finally, liberal 
theories are meliorist.  They argue that no social institution or political system is without 
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need for improvement and correction.  Gray concludes that it is these four basic 
principles that give all theories classified as liberal their particular identity. In other 
words, it is these four characteristics that make it possible to group such seemingly 
disparate theorists as Thomas Hobbes and John Rawls into the same philosophical 
tradition.  
With these four core tenants in mind, Kelly (2005) divides the history of liberal 
political thought into two main periods, epistemological liberalism and egalitarian or 
revisionist liberalism.  Epistemological liberalism is also sometimes called classical 
liberalism (Gray, 1995; Parekh, 2006; Schumaker et al., 2008).  Gray (1995) explains that 
the primary differences between these periods of liberal thought are their respective 
chronology and formulation of the concept of freedom.  In the case of classical 
liberalism, its principle thinkers tend to predate the twentieth century and include such 
major Western philosophers as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, David Hume, 
and J.S. Mill. Classical liberal theorists tended to see their work not only as the 
formulation of a theory of politics but the creation of a larger philosophy of human 
nature.  Consequently, their works typically included discussions of a wide range of 
topics unrelated to politics such as mathematics and epistemology.  The classical liberal 
conception of freedom was a collection of negative rights.  In other words, to be free 
would mean that one would not receive interference with their life from the government, 
their citizenship would be considered independent from other citizens, and the individual 
has a right to participate in government decision making. It follows from this negative 
conception of freedom that classical liberal theorists favored private ownership of 
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property and free market economic systems since both support the idea of a non-
interfering government.  In many ways, classical liberal theory underpins the constitution 
of the United States and much of its economic traditions.  
Egalitarian or revisionist liberalism is in many ways the product of restructuring 
classical liberalism through utilitarian and socialist lenses.  Its founding works stem from 
the mid to late nineteenth century and include theorists such as Jeremy Bentham, James 
Mill, John Stuart Mill, Leonard T. Hobhouse, and Thomas Green.  Gray (1995) identifies 
the 1973 publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice as the culmination of revisionist 
liberal thought.  Revisionist liberal scholars conceptualized freedom positively, believing 
that to be free one needed more than the absence of certain kinds of interference.  For 
these theorists, freedom means the opportunity to achieve self-realization. Since certain 
material, political, and other resources are required to do so, these should be guaranteed 
in any free state.  Consequently, egalitarian liberals favor some form of welfare state and 
economic regulation so that individuals will have access to the resources required for 
them to enjoy the freedom of making the best of their lives.  
Many classical liberal theorists saw their project as the search for a scientifically 
defensible theory of government that was applicable to all human beings irrespective of 
culture, time period, or other variables (Gray, 1995; Parekh, 2006; Schumaker et al., 
2008).  Often they would generate a theory of universal human nature and extrapolate 
from it a system of government which would best honor what they believed were 
universal principles of human life.  This allowed them to offer justification for the long 
history of cultural and political tyranny throughout the colonial period.  In their view, all 
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humans have the same nature, but only one culture and political system (i.e., liberal 
individualism) best honors human nature.  Therefore, the political component of the 
cultural imperialism practiced by Western European nations for several hundred years 
was seen by its proponents as a benevolent enterprise.  It was justified in the minds of its 
perpetrators because its practitioners were simply assisting other polities to advance more 
quickly into a superior place of cultural and societal development which would provide 
for a better way of life.     
Interpreting Liberal Theory: Contemporary Liberal and Conservative Ideologies 
Schumaker et al. (2008) outline two main political ideologies in the United States.  
The first, contemporary liberalism (CL), is an interpretation of liberal political theory, is 
pluralistic, and serves as the primary ideology underpinning the United States’ 
Democratic Party.  The second, contemporary conservatism (CC) is also an interpretation 
of liberal political theory, is less rooted in pluralism, and underpins the United States’ 
Republican Party.  The term liberal has very different meaning depending upon whether 
it refers to a political theory or to a political ideology.  On a political ideology and 
doctrinal level, liberal refers to pluralist leaning bodies such as Britain’s Labor party or 
the U.S. Democratic Party.  When describing political theory the term liberal refers to 
governmental institutions and regulatory mechanisms that are rooted in either classical or 
egalitarian liberalism.  Accordingly, great care must be taken not to confuse the term 
contemporary liberal (CL) ideology with liberal political theory.   
Both CL and CC ideologies affirm and are friendly to the general principles of 
pluralist public philosophy.  Many multicultural theorists find tremendous compatibility 
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with contemporary liberalism (Bhargava et al., 1999; Laden & Owen, 2007; Modood, 
2007; Parekh, 2006).  In contrast, CC is generally seen as incompatible with 
contemporary multicultural theory.  It is therefore only relevant for the purposes of this 
project to explain those points of CC that preclude its full alignment with democratic 
theories of multiculturalism. For a concise but more full review of CL and CC the reader 
is referred to Gray (1995),  Kelly (2005), and Nisbet (2002). 
In the United States, CC began to reach coherence into a formal ideology around 
1955 in which the first issue of the political news journal National Review was published.  
Those who align with a CC ideology are individualistically oriented, believing that 
economic and social success comes by way of hard work and adherence to so called 
traditional values.  Therefore, CC proponents believe in and support a natural hierarchy 
among human beings.  If some individuals earn less than others it is because it reflects 
the natural order of meritocratic reward for their hard work.  With regard to political 
power, a CC ideology supports a militarily powerful state but rejects expansion of 
governmental power to engender greater social and economic equality because 
contemporary conservatives believe most social inequalities are natural and just.  CC 
holds that rights are individual in makeup and reject the notion of group specific rights.  
Further, CC holds that a welfare state threatens the opportunities some individuals would 
have to receive a greater economic and social reward for harder work and individual 
success.  CC also rejects the relativism of social values common in CL and other liberal 
ideologies preferring a more (but not exclusively or intolerant) universal value orientation 
centered on building individual character.  It is therefore unsurprising that hand-in-hand 
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with this rejection of moral relativism and group rights is a critical and rejecting stance 
towards multiculturalism (Schumaker et al., 2008).  
Though we have yet to discuss the details of multicultural philosophy, it is easy to 
see why those multiculturalists who would seek to affirm the identity and maintain 
equality between different cultures have little common ground with the contemporary 
conservative movement.  It is important to acknowledge that conservatism is not openly 
hostile and destructive towards groups that differ from itself.  To reiterate, a pluralist 
public philosophy includes a supportive and tolerant stance towards multiple competing 
viewpoints and democratic rather than oligarchic or totalitarian mechanisms for resolving 
disagreements.  CC certainly meets these criteria and can indeed be classified as an 
interpretation (albeit a restricted one) of pluralist public philosophy.  For example, 
adherents to CC in the United States finds common ground with a pluralism in the sense 
that its proponents (a) affirm the right of individuals to practice different religions, (b) 
affirm the right of others to voice opinions different and even hostile to CC’s core 
tenants, and (c) affirm the right of others to participate fully in United States democratic 
politics through acts like voting.  Yet it is equally important to point out that CC takes a 
decidedly disaffirming stance towards moral differences and movements towards greater 
social equality as evidenced by its proponents’ stances on issues like abortion and 
immigration. Indeed, contemporary conservatism tends to view differences in culture and 
morality with a sense of tolerance rather than respect and regards social inequities as the 
naturalistic and just consequences of personal character failings (Schumaker et al., 2008).   
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Therefore, CC is best understood as pluralistic in its public philosophy albeit with a sense 
of restriction and a monistic skew in its principles of morality.  
Schumaker et al. (2008) offer a similarly concise overview of CL. CL is tolerant 
(even friendly) to many alternative viewpoints both within and outside liberalism 
excluding only totalitarian and rigid doctrines such as fascism and theocratic political 
ideologies based on religious fundamentalism. It is more flexible than CC as 
demonstrated by its proponents’ favor towards laws supporting abortion rights and gay 
marriage.  Regarding authority, adherents to CL hold that a strong and wide-reaching 
government is necessary for both national security and to ensure equal distribution of 
economic and social capital within a free market economy.  Thus, while adherents to CL 
generally support a free market system, they also favor government regulations of the 
economy through measures such as progressive tax systems, government regulation of 
financial and business institutions, welfare programs for the poor, and so forth..  In the 
realm of social problems CL also supports authorizing the state to implement programs 
whose goal is the reduction of discrimination on the basis of various identity statuses 
(e.g., sex, race, or religion). Regarding change, CL supports experimentation with and 
subsequent analysis of new social programs.  All of these positions amount to an 
interpretation of governmental mechanisms that emphasizes pluralism and egalitarianism 
greater than the position offered by CC.   
Framing Political Ideologies and Neo-theories in a Pluralism-Monism Continuum 
Before moving on to discuss how multiculturalism relates to the liberal political 
theory and the ideologies outlined above, two final issues must be introduced: neo-
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theories and the moderate-radical-extremist continuum.  Within and outside of the 
mainstream of political ideologies of CC and CL, there are many diverse neo-theories.  
These neo-theories are numerous, often obscure, and of only limited cohesion.  Broadly, 
they are most easily understood by outlining their relationship to two continua.  The first 
continuum ranges from pluralism to monism and the second continuum ranges from 
moderate to extremist.   
Radical and extreme neo-theories.  The terms radical and extremist refer in this 
document only to the specific mechanisms of change required by a particular political 
neo-theory or ideology.  Moderate theories are those with the least ambition for changing 
the fundamental structure of existing governments.  For example, the changes they 
demand might take the form of laws in favor of a particular position.  Radical neo-
theories are those that seek significant change to the structures of their societal and 
governmental context.  However, the mechanisms they use for change are legal and 
mainstream.  In the United States, a radical theory might require a constitutional 
amendment to legalize its position.  Extremist quasi-ideologies, on the other hand, are 
those that seek extreme or total changes in current governmental structures.  Often their 
reason for such major change is that the mechanisms outlined in governmental 
constitutions do not offer the requisite resources for its vision of the good life.  In the 
United States, an extreme form of change would not only require an amendment but a 
total replacement of the constitution.  Figure 5.2 shows several examples of such neo-
theories and ideologies mapped onto the moderate-extreme and pluralist-monist continua 















Figure 5.2. A summary of Schumaker et al.’s (2008) location of prominent political ideologies and neo-theories on two 
dimensions: the moderate-radical-extreme continuum and the pluralist-monist continuum.  The classification of 
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The above distinctions having been clarified, we come to a description of 
contemporary political multiculturalism as it is most commonly understood among 
scholars.  Multiculturalism is a radical neo-theory most comfortable and compatible with, 
and in part the genesis of, egalitarian liberal political theory.  As the next section will 
demonstrate, it is a neo-theory because of its burgeoning, non-comprehensive, and 
contested content.  It is radical because it seeks changes to existing governmental 
structures without requiring their total replacement.   
Multiculturalism: A Political Neo-theory 
Multiculturalism or multiculturalisms? Defining our terms.  Modood (2007) 
states that multiculturalism is to some extent an outgrowth of liberalism but, unlike 
liberalism, is not actually a fully comprehensive theory of politics. Rather, he states that 
multiculturalism is a “more intellectually modest and non-totalistic political perspective” 
occurring in a context of “liberal or social democratic egalitarianism and citizenship” (p. 
6).    
Parekh (2006) concisely summarizes what mainstream political theorists mean by 
the term multiculturalism and explains several related concepts which are often confused.  
Parekh’s theory of culture was elaborated in chapter 4 of this project.  To briefly recap, 
Parekh treats the concept of culture as:  
A body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people 
understand themselves and the world and organize their individual and collective 
lives. Unlike differences that spring from individual choices, culturally derived 




of being embedded in a shared and historically inherited system of meaning and 
significance. (pp. 2-3) 
Parekh (2006) also clarifies three terms describing nation states: multicultural, 
monoculturalist and multiculturalist.  When describing a nation, multicultural refers to 
the empirical fact that two or more cultures (as he defines them) coexist within the same 
state.  Most countries in the world today can therefore be characterized as multicultural.  
A state’s chosen response towards this multicultural structure distinguishes the other two 
terms. A multiculturalist state is one in which there is state recognition and affirmation of 
more than one culture, whereas a monoculturalist states seeks a single cultural identity 
and works to eliminate cultural differences through various covert and overt methods 
ranging from assimilation programs to genocide.  Canada is an example of a state which 
is both multicultural and multiculturalist because it recognizes the Quebecois as a distinct 
and separate culture from mainstream English speaking Canada.  Among others, it has 
taken such multiculturalist steps as formally recognizing both English and French as its 
two official national languages.  By way of contrast, France is a multicultural country 
because it has many minority ethnic and religious cultures. However, France’s state 
response to its culturally diverse makeup is monoculturalist because France expects its 
minorities to assimilate into mainstream French culture.  For example, in 2004 the French 
government made the monoculturalist choice of disallowing Muslim girls attending 
French public schools to wear headscarves (Sciolino, 2004).  Put simply, nearly all 
contemporary nation states are multicultural and respond to this fact through affirmation 




All of the above having been clarified, Parekh puts forth the following concise 
definition of multiculturalism.  He states that multiculturalism is a perspective on human 
life with specific positions and recommendations for how a polity comprised of multiple 
cultures (as in the case of nearly all first world countries) can best be structured to 
respond positively to the needs of all of its constituent groups.  Again, here culture has a 
somewhat restricted focus and typically centers around ethno-national groups.  
Multiculturalism is not a distinct and comprehensive political ideology with a certain 
programmatic content and cannon of theoretical texts as was the case in our discussion of 
liberalism above.  It is also not a general philosophy of the human experience.  It is 
therefore best categorized as a neo-theory (see Figure 5.1) because it is somewhat vague, 
lacks comprehensiveness, and its content and identity is contested by its proponents.  
Thus multiculturalism, as a political project, seeks to affirm human differences that are 
derived, sustained, or embedded in culture.   
Several important twentieth century scholars have rejected the concept of 
universal human nature and have tried to extend liberal theory to accommodate cultural 
plurality.  Perhaps the three most important works in this project include Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice (1971), Joseph Raz’s The Morality of Freedom (1986), and Will 
Kymlicka’s Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989).  According to Modood (2007) 
Will Kymlicka is the theorist who has come closest to offering a concrete theory of 
political multiculturalism that is both pluralistic and sensitive to culture while 
accommodating existing liberal political structures.  One of his main arguments is that 




practices that are normative at the subcultural level such as certain dress codes (e.g., 
women preferring to wear a hijab in France). The mechanism Kymlicka offers to solve 
these conflicts is similar to many political multiculturalists in that it takes the form of 
offering specific minority cultures special group rights. These special rights are typically 
exceptions to the laws derived from majority culture.  They are necessary whenever the 
laws based upon majority culture preclude important minority cultural practices 
(Kymlicka, 1989, 1995).  For example, exceptions to British motorcycle helmet laws 
have been made for Sikhs who are allowed to wear turbans instead of the more common 
hard plastic helmets (Barry, 2001; Parekh, 2006).  Each of these three theories has been 
highly influential among political theorists and scientists.  However, the majority of their 
theoretical details do not have implications for the focus of this project with two 
exceptions.  First, there is contention in theories of political multiculturalism concerning 
which groups are to be included in the concept of group rights which is analogous to 
similar debates about what constitutes culture in multicultural psychology.  Second, 
political multicultural theorists have been criticized for the relativism involved in the very 
notion of group rights and have struggled to find ways to simultaneously affirm but also 
define the limits about what should be included in these sets of rights. These are of course 
the primary concerns this author has identified for this project with regard to 
multicultural competency theory in psychology.  The remainder of this chapter will focus 
on the first of these two points while chapter 6 will focus on the second.   
Returning then to the question of what is included in political multiculturalism, 




not affirm other forms of difference such as sexuality, disability, or gender.  Likewise, 
one can simultaneously seek to affirm non-culturally derived differences while 
disaffirming cultural difference (Parekh, 2006). In other words, political multiculturalism 
is not about all differences comprising humans.  This is a point of great criticism and 
contention among multicultural political theorists.   For example, Modood  (2007) seeks 
to expand the focus of multiculturalism beyond ethno-national groups to include ethno-
religious groups and draws specific attention to Muslims in Europe.  To justify this 
expansion Modood argues that the key focus for contemporary multiculturalism is the 
interaction among two data sets.  The first are the various systems for marking negative 
difference, otherness, or inferiority towards certain groups which make it difficult for said 
groups to participate equally in their societal context.  The second is the sense of identity 
held by these same groups.  He then builds a case that while ethno-regional groups fit 
within these two categories, European Muslims are also a particularly negatively marked 
group in European society with strong identity meanings which require similar attention 
and response as ethno-regional groups do.  Accordingly, he argues for an expansion of 
the type and number of groups included in political multiculturalism.  
Thompson (2006) makes a similar observation in summarizing the evolution of 
the rising attention to different identity groups which include not just cultural identity but 
also movements for women’s rights, gay rights, peace, and environmental protection.  
However, unlike Modood (2007) Thompson draws the reader’s attention to the fact that a 
common thread across these movements is not economic redistribution or national unity 




existence and identity of these groups and the unique features they ascribe to themselves.  
Thompson notes that some theorists believe “politics has seen a shift away from ideas of 
class, equality, economy and nation towards those of identity, difference, culture and 
ethnicity” (p. 3).  Indeed several participants in the documentary film Tying the Knot  (de 
Sève, 2004) describe their desire for gay marriage as being fueled by the need not just for 
legal equality but official acknowledgement, recognition, and affirmation from the state.  
“The reality is our families do exist and we’re at the point now we need [sic] the 
government to recognize that. We need the laws to catch up with that reality” {8’01”).   
Parekh (2006), in restricting his own discussion to multiculturalism, notes that all 
areas of human identity and difference including those that are culturally derived belong 
to the general politics of recognition.  He notes that political recognition is a broader 
political discourse for which the term multiculturalism is often mistakenly used 
interchangeably. Recognition politics involve questions such as which human identities, 
traits, and groups deserve public recognition, what rights should be afforded such groups, 
and so on.  These identity groups may be (and often are) those whose identities are 
culturally derived but can also include groups whose differences arise from personal 
choice (e.g., political party affiliation), lifestyle (e.g., business executives, stay-at-home 
parents), or other characteristics (gender, sexuality) all of which fall outside the definition 
of culture given above.  Political multiculturalism is therefore distinctly different from 
and subsumed by the politics of recognition.   
Thus, the history of political multiculturalism and the contestations around what 




fortunately offers psychology a language for understanding and distinguishing the 
relationship and differences between the larger discussion of recognizing social identities 
generally and cultural identities more specifically.  We thus arrive at the answer to the 
question which ended chapter 4.  The reader will recall that if psychology does endorse a 
restricted definition of culture to the structural, functional, and process dimensions it was 
uncertain what to call a larger discourse that could address all social identities including 
culture.  The terms identity psychology, psychology of recognition, or justice psychology 
were offered as candidates.  This author formally endorses the term psychology of 
recognition for several reasons.  First, the need for including groups such as sexual 
minorities, women, and persons with disabilities
4
 stems, in my view, more from a desire 
for recognition and affirmation from psychology rather than an argument that these 
groups have a distinct psychology heavily influenced by differences in beliefs and 
practice specific to these groups.  Further, as will be discussed below, the meanings 
within the term recognition as it is defined in political theory offer psychologists a more 
powerful rationale and a different understanding of what competence might mean in work 
with diverse groups.  
In summary, the questions and debates of contemporary multicultural psychology 
parallel those in political theory and have led that field to develop tools from which 
psychology can benefit.  Just as multiculturalism is problematic in politics because of its 
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focus on ethno-regional groups, so has it also been the case in psychology.  Whereas 
psychology has tried to expand culture to include more voices, political theory has made 
an alternate choice by identifying a common thread uniting struggles based on cultural 
group or identity with those of other groups and identities: the politics of recognition.    
Politics of Recognition 
While the preceding section discussed the development of the Politics of 
recognition (POR) and its relationship to political multiculturalism more generally, this 
section will explore themes that emerge from three specific theories of POR in a 
comprehensive analysis by Thompson (2006).  The three primary sources Thompson 
examined were Taylor’s “The Politics of Recognition” (1994), Fraser’s specific 
contribution to Fraser and Honneth’s Redistribution or recognition?: A political-
philosophical exchange (2003), and Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition (1996): The 
moral grammar of social conflicts.  Thompson observes that Honneth’s theory revolves 
around three primary modes of recognition which are love, respect, and esteem.  
Thompson organizes his analysis around these three modes and argues that not just 
Honneth but all three theorists, in their own way, incorporate these three concepts.  
Thompson uses the terms love, respect, and esteem in very particular ways and the 




Love. Thompson (2006) first addresses love and observes that this concept is 
central in both Taylor (1994) and Honneth (1996).
5
  Both Taylor and Honneth draw 
attention to the fact that human beings require a form of recognition in order for the 
proper development of the psyche.  Honneth defines love for the purposes of his theory as 
feelings of close affection and attachment between and individual and a small group of 
others that mark a human being’s closest relationships such as infant-caretaker, friends, 
and romantic attachments.  Taylor, also notes that intimate recognition is vital because 
individuals need a healthy form of intimate recognition to achieve basic developmental 
tasks such as identity formation starting with caretakers in infancy and continuing 
throughout the lifespan.  Honneth argues that the concept of love is the very foundation 
of political recognition since without it, respect and esteem are meaningless. Honneth 
notes that when properly internalized, love offers human beings a sense of bodily self-
confidence.  This can be threatened when relationships collapse but also politically in the 
form of bodily terrorism (e.g., rape or torture campaigns).  Action groups like Take Back 
the Night and Amnesty International respond to such violence and in part seek to restore 
bodily self-confidence. Taylor concurs noting that misrecognition and non-recognition 
are damaging acts that often form the basis of what we refer to as oppression.  Hence, 
love or intimate recognition is a primary component of political recognition.  Its 
proponents essentially argue that intimate recognition should be supported in a just 
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society because its absence causes psychological harm. Stated differently, a just society is 
one which provides the conditions for individuals to experience the requisite love and 
nurturance to develop bodily self-confidence and become psychologically healthy adults.  
It is somewhat novel to begin the foundation of a political theory with a 
discussion of love rather than rights or the distribution of economic or social resources.  
Yet it is well supported that human beings suffer deleterious psychological consequences 
when denied proper attention in infancy, are not nurtured throughout childhood, or do not 
have their identities properly recognized as adults by individuals or society at large 
(Burke & Stets, 2009; Crain, 2005).
6
  Thompson (2006) uses the example of Fanon’s 
(1967) description of an Algerian man during the French occupation who was 
psychiatrically hospitalized after he had become convinced neither his fellow countrymen 
or the French saw him as an Algerian. The consequences of identity misrecognition 
discussed in detail later in this chapter add weight to the psychological rationale of POR.  
In short, Thompson (2006) interprets that the core to both Honneth (1996) and 
Taylor (1994) is healthy psychological development.  In POR, love comes to mean the 
conditions in which human psyches are nurtured on the individual level both by 
caretakers and society at large.   Since human beings cannot develop properly without 
love, a recognition theory of politics is one which stresses the maximization of conditions 
conducive to love throughout the life cycle.   
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Respect. Thompson (2006) then turns to the concept of respect which he defines 
as “a way of thinking about and acting in the political world which gives a prominent 
place to these themes of equal protection, difference-blindness, state impartiality and 
individual freedom” (p. 44).  Unlike the psychological argument underpinning love (with 
which Fraser does not align) Thompson points out that all three theorists of recognition 
endorse the concept of respect.  Here, the rationale for respect is the proposition that all 
human beings are of universally equal moral worth and have the capacity for autonomy.  
Thus, respect is centered around the concept of autonomy, which is a universal human 
characteristic.  Each person therefore deserves to have their autonomy respected by equal 
treatment under state procedures.  For Taylor (1994), this takes the form of what he calls 
the politics of universalism which he defines as the protection of each individual’s 
rational autonomy through a set of individual rights.  Honneth (1996) argues that a 
system of rights facilitates the process of respect for self and respect between people that 
allows individuals to achieve self-realization.  Finally, for Fraser a constellation of 
individual rights is the mechanism that ensures what she calls parity of participation in 
which no group of people is systematically denied the benefits of individually constructed 
rights by nature of its distinct qualities (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).   For example, the 
LGBT community in the United States, the Muslim community in France, and South 
Africans of color during apartheid are all groups that are denied parity of participation in 
the areas of marriage, religious self-expression, or citizenship itself, respectively.   
The object of respect is contested among political theorists.  Thompson’s analysis 




by the state since the grounds for respect are rational autonomy.  Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine any collectivity operating from this stance.  Nevertheless, both Taylor and 
Honneth leave open the possibility that groups might also be the object of respect and this 
idea is developed further by Parekh (2006) and will be discussed more fully in chapter 6.  
Fraser, however, decisively rejects the idea of groups as an object of respect.  Instead, 
Fraser supports systems of rights extended to all individuals or to none, whichever best 
supports parity of participation.  It would seem that for her, no group should be denied 
rights based on their characteristics but neither should any group enjoy an exceptional or 
unique set of rights.  She argues that when rights are conceived for and applied 
differently across groups, abuse and disrespect are likely to follow.  Further, even 
positive rights for groups that were or are oppressed are unacceptable to Fraser since this 
treatment tends to reify identities, to cement power disparities between groups, and to 
intensify power disparities within groups.  Phillips (2007) joins this position and reviews 
numerous examples of how attempts to apply cultural pluralism in the law have resulted 
in systematic bias against women minorities.   
The concept of whether or not groups or cultures can or should be the object of 
respect is perhaps the most hotly debated issue in the politics of multiculturalism and is 
one of the defining differences between POR and multiculturalism.  Political 
multicultural theories by and large endorse, and indeed are often defined by, groups as 
objects of respect whereas the three POR theorists reviewed by Thompson either endorse 




Esteem.  Finally, Thompson (2006) reviews the place of esteem in the politics of 
recognition.  Thompson defines esteem in POR as “the distinctive pattern of political 
thought and action which gives a prominent place to these themes of identity, 
distinctness, value and visibility” (p. 69).   Thompson interprets Taylor’s (1994) 
treatment of esteem as centering on what Taylor calls the politics of difference.  Taylor 
argues that both individuals and groups have the potential to define their own identity and 
consequently (a) all cultures have, at least in principle, the same moral value, (b) groups 
have a right to try to ensure their cultural survival provided their attempts do not violate 
universal human rights, and (c) that a balance can be struck between cultural protection 
and individual rights.  Thompson points to Honneth’s (1996) argument that esteem is the 
third of three primary modes of recognition.  Honneth argues that in modern societies 
esteem is earned through an individual’s distinct qualities and achievements. 
Consequently, in Honneth’s view an ethical society is one in which the opportunities to 
earn esteem are equal for all individuals.  Finally, Thompson reviews Fraser (Fraser & 
Honneth, 2003) and states that her treatment of esteem again centers on her concept of 
parity of participation.  Here, Fraser argues that individuals are treated unjustly when 
they are systematically disesteemed because of their distinct cultural characteristics by 
institutionalized conceptions of worth favoring a dominant or privileged worldview.  
Such individuals are denied a fair opportunity to achieve social esteem.  Consequently, 
such systematic disesteem must be changed if all people are to achieve equal 
participation in society at large. Methods for achieving this change may include (a) 




endorsement of diversity generally, as a value in its own right, and (c) to deconstruct 
some identities in their current form (this being perhaps the most radical option). 
Thompson disqualifies this last as a form of recognition since its ultimate goal is to 
eliminate differences among identities rather than recognize and value them.   
Thompson (2006) makes two final points relevant to this project regarding each 
author’s treatment of respect.  First, Thompson takes up the position that regarding 
esteem, both individual achievement and group characteristics should serve as objects of 
esteem.  People want their identities esteemed because their unique characteristics are 
themselves important and justify recognition in the form of positive valuation.  Further, 
such distinctions add to the complex texture of society as a whole.  Thus, Thompson 
argues that both achievement and the very existence of distinct groups are themselves 
justification for esteem.  Second, Thompson believes that because of this justification, 
groups should have the right to take measures to aid in the perpetuation of the group’s 
distinct values and characteristics.  However, he also argues no group’s culture can be 
reasonably guaranteed by the state since such a guarantee would mandate and limit the 
natural evolution and self-determination of both the culture in question and society at 
large. Put another way, the state has a duty to ensure cultures have a fair chance to 
perpetuate their way of life but has no duty to guarantee that cultures persist in 
perpetuum.  
Final points. The remainder of Thompson’s (2006) analysis concerns areas of 
little relevance to this project such as what democratic procedures best aid in achieving 




distinguish his aims in this analysis as distinctly philosophical rather than scientific in 
their purpose.  These theories “explicate and justify a set of principles that can be used to 
structure political institutions, guide political practices, and inform political policies” (p. 
9).  They are therefore best characterized as works of political philosophy rather than 
political science.  Neither Thompson nor the theorists he discusses empirically address 
whether or not these principles are feasible in practice as this is a separate process of 
investigation.  Nevertheless, Thompson is clear that any political philosophy requires 
empirical evidence to determine its ultimate utility.  This is a distinction that is deeply 
relevant to the theory and practice of MCC and will be explored more fully in chapter 7 
of this dissertation.    
Towards a Recognition Theory of Identity Competence 
The reader will recall that the end of chapter 4 endorsed a restricted definition of 
culture and left open two important questions.  First, if culture is restricted what term can 
be used to talk about the need for competency training with all diverse groups including 
culture?  Second, on what grounds can parallels in need be drawn between culturally 
oppressed groups and other oppressed groups that justify both of them being included in 
such a large discourse? The review of the politics of recognition offered above offers a 
framework for answering both questions.   
Arguments in favor of requiring such a thing as multicultural competence are 
based on many reasons which this author finds the following most prominent.  First,  it 
has been observed that cultural background and differences in social context require 




Association, 2000; D. W. Sue & D. Sue, 2008).  Psychologists can only make valid 
determinations of the relative level of psychopathology when cultural context is 
considered.  Second, the population of racial and ethnic minorities is expected to steadily 
increase over the coming decades and given the first point, psychologists must become 
knowledgeable and effective in their work with these groups since encountering their 
members is inevitable (APA, 2003).  Third, psychology must learn from its damaging 
history (e.g., mistaking cultural difference for pathology, classifying homosexuality and 
other sexual minorities as mental illness) and by learning from these errors try not to 
repeat them (D. W. Sue & D. Sue, 2008),  Finally, some authors have interpreted the 
principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice in the APA ethics code to mean 
that psychologists have an ethical duty to be multiculturally competent (Arredondo & 
Toporek, 2004; Mintz et al., 2009).  In short, psychologists should be multiculturally 
competent so that they are making valid determinations and offering effective treatments 
to members of diverse social groups and the groups themselves thereby upholding 
psychology’s own ethical principles and prevent the recurrence of past injustices. The 
rationale stems from a desire for validity in research and practice and a commitment to 
aspirational moral principles.  
However, this author would suggest that the Politics of Recognition offers 
psychologists an alternative, super-ordinate rationale supporting affirming work with 
diverse social identities and groups.  We may begin from the position that social groups 
must have conditions of love, respect, and esteem in order to be recognized and for their 




appeal to other a priori ethical principles of justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence for 
affirming these groups although they can continue to add weight to the argument.  We 
may argue that affirming these groups provides conditions for a pluralistically defined 
good life and that such conditions themselves constitute a substantive moral good that 
justifies a professional duty to work towards them irrespective of other ethical or moral 
principles.   
This author would therefore offer the term Recognition Competency Theory 
(RCT) as an alternative approach to multicultural competency.
7
  While the two share 
many common goals, they may be distinguished in three important ways.  First, in MCC 
the definition of culture and which groups deserve more emphasis in its literature is 
sometimes contested.  In RCT, culture has an explicitly narrower definition so that it can 
be contrasted with other social identities but is treated as equal in importance to these 
other identities.  Second, in MCC theory, expanded definitions of culture subsume other 
social identities whereas in RCT cultural identities are subsumed along with other 
identities by the theme of recognition. Third, the rationale for MCC and RCT overlap but 
have identifiably different emphases.  In MCC, effective work with different cultures is 
supported by (a) the existence of actual differences in psychological characteristics as a 
function of culture and social experience, (b) interpretations of the APA ethics code to 
require affirmation as a way to meet ethical standards, (c) a desire to repair identifiable 
injury to oppressed groups that has been caused by psychology over the course of the 
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twentieth century, and (d) the pragmatic reality that the United States will continue to 
become ever more diverse in areas of race and ethnicity in the decades to come.   RCT, 
by contrast, eschews the empirical rational apart from the conditions of psychological 
well-being.  Thus, by observing that many groups including culture are marked as 
inferior and as such are systematically denied their needs in the areas of esteem, 
recognition, and love, their members live in conditions antagonistic to emotional and 
physiological well-being.  Psychologists, as a profession promoting psychological well-
being, should correct these conditions at all levels of practice ranging from individual to 
societal on the moral grounds that only when these conditions are met are human beings 
able to lead meaningful and psychologically healthy lives.  In this way, both MCC and 
RCT can be seen as having justice as their core principle but with differing emphases on 
the content of what justice means.   
Thus, RCT aligns with MCC theorists who reject a hierarchical organization of 
oppressed identities where race and ethnicity are treated as either prototypes for all 
oppressed identities or as first-among equals in discussions of oppression (Cornish et al., 
2010; Fukuyama, 1990; Hays, 2008; Pedersen, et al., 2008).  However, RCT offers us a 
rationale for including these other group identities that does not rely on finding parallels 
between culture in a restricted sense and other social groups that are not best described by 
regionally and historically situated sets of beliefs and practices.  We should be competent 
with those groups not because we can identify ways in which they organize life that are 




identity groups because both share a marked negative otherness that leads to conditions 
antagonistic to love, respect, and esteem.    
In summary, the fundamental positions of RCT are (a) culture has a restricted 
definition, (b) culture and other identities can be marked as negative and inferior, (c) all 
of these groups desire recognition in the form of conditions of love, respect, and esteem, 
and (d) psychologists should actively work to implement such recognition on individual 
and distal levels of identity.  Accordingly, the next step in the transformation of D. W. 
Sue’s (2001) MDCC becomes clearer. The model itself is centered not around any 
particular identity group, but around the concept of recognition itself.  
To review the progress thus far this project has completed two important tasks. 
First, the definition of culture has been clarified and a restricted definition has been 
endorsed in chapter 4.  Second, the term RCT has been offered as a superordinate theory 
to subsume MCC and has offered an alternative rationale for competence with diverse 
groups.  Two important questions remain.  First, given that individuals are members of 
multiple groups at the same time, should psychologists attend to all of these identities and 
if not, how do we determine which are important?  Second, how should psychologists 
manage the delicate balance between group and individual rights described by Thompson 
(2006) above?  We turn now to the first of these two questions.  
Multiple Group Identities 
In both chapters 2 and 3 one of the primary critiques of existing models of MCC 
are their imprecision with regard to multiple group memberships for the same person.  D. 




one person.  Pedersen et al. (2008) goes as far as to discuss potentially hundreds of 
internalized culture teachers which counselors should be able to discern and respond to 
appropriately.  This author argued that these theories require more precision with regard 
to multiplicity.  This section will therefore answer five important subordinate questions.  
First, what is a more precise way to identify the multiple social identities in one person? 
Second, what is the relationship between the norms of an identity group and an 
individual’s unique experience of an identity? Third, what can social psychology tell us 
about the consequences of having identities affirmed and disaffirmed?  Fourth, how can 
we distinguish which identities are important to RCT and which are not?  Fifth, is there a 
more precise way to understand identity conflict within one person? This section will 
draw upon two works to answer these questions.  The first is comprised of sections of 
Burke’s Contemporary Social Psychological Theories (2006) which will set the stage for 
the discussion (Hogg, 2006; George J. McCall, 2006; Stets, 2006).  The second source, 
Identity Theory (Burke & Stets, 2009) is the primary source for the details of this 
discussion.   
McCall (2006) observes that discussions of multiple identities and the reciprocal 
relationship between society and the individual in identity formation can be found in 
Western psychological philosophy as early as Smith’s (1759) concept of the looking glass 
self.  In this model, the self is divided with one part having desires towards a particular 
behavior (i.e., the I) and the other part imagining how others would perceive and respond 
to the behavior (i.e., the me).  In this way, the notion of the self is a functional tool.  It 




behavior in the eyes of the generalized other (i.e., society in general).  The internalization 
of the perspective of others offers the individual a reflection (hence the looking glass 
metaphor) from which they can judge the prudence of the desire.  McCall points to 
James’s (1892) position that there are multiple social selves.  In James’s view, there are 
as many social selves as there are distinct groups of people (i.e., generalized others), the 
opinions of which a person has internalized and deems important.  McCall also highlights 
Cooley’s (1902) point that it is the process of examining what judgments the individual 
imagines others would have in response to the desired behavior and the emotions these 
imagined judgments stir in the person that is most important.  Thus, individuals do not 
just mechanically react to their imagined reflection, but to the imagined judgments of 
others that are called up in response to the reflection.  Into this, McCall draws the 
reader’s attention to Park’s (1927) idea of social roles as masks.  Individuals, having 
internalized a society’s interpretation and expectation of a particular role, strive to live up 
to it and often subjugate their idiosyncratic desires or what might be called their true 
selves.  In other words, the societal expectations become a kind of mask which people 
place over their personal desires.  McCall states that the looking glass self is still 
considered the primary link between individual and society among structural interaction 
theorists today.  He concludes by stating that current debates center on how many 
internalized societal voices participate in the internal psychic dialogue of the looking 
glass self.  It is to these many internalized voices we now turn.  
Stets (2006) offers an overview of Identity Theory (IT).  She holds the position 




turn, society itself is comprised of the patterns of behavior and meaning across groups of 
people.  The relationship between the self and society is therefore bi-directional or twin-
born with one giving rise to and influencing the other.  Burke and Stets (2009) define the 
self-concept as a global self-representation arising from all the information (emotional 
and cognitive) one has about oneself.  Within this self-concept Stets identifies three types 
of identities: (a) role identities, (b) group or social identities, and (c) personal identities.  
A role is a set of behavioral expectations associated with a position in society such as 
mother, teacher, or citizen.  A role identity is the set of meanings a person has towards 
oneself when performing these societal positions.  Group or social identities are the self-
meanings one has as a member of a particular category of people such as feminist, Jew, 
or Republican.  Thus, role identities are meanings about one’s behavioral performance 
and impact a sense of efficacy whereas group identities are meanings related to who one 
is and impact one’s sense of self worth.
 8
  Finally, Stets refers to person identities as those 
meanings that distinguish oneself as a unique individual from others such as one’s unique 
sense of morality, justice, or professionalism.  Stets states that personal identities are 
generalized across situations and “are always on display” (p. 90).  Personal identities can 
be partially distinguished in this way from role and group identities, the salience of which 
varies more across time and situation.  Nevertheless, a person will always have some 
combination of personal, group, and role identity activated simultaneously at any given 
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moment.  The relationship among role, personal, and group identities is summarized 
below in Table 5.2.   
 
 Table 5.2    
Distinguishing Role, Group, and Person Identities 
Features Role Group Person 
Bases Behavioral expectations 
stemming from culture 
Social Group Individual’s 
idiosyncratic self-
concept 
Definition Meanings tied to a role Meanings tied 
to a group 
Meanings that define 
someone as uniquely 
individual 
Self-Reference “Me” as the role We Me 
Behavior Complimentary of others Similar to 
others 
Independent of others 
Outcome of 
Verification 
Self efficacy Self worth Authenticity 
Note: From Identity Theory (p. 129), by P. J. Burke and J. E. Stets, 2009, New York: 






Stets (2006) draws upon McCall and Simmons (1978)  to discuss the ways all 
three of these identities have both a cultural and an idiosyncratic dimension.  Culturally, 
the meanings and stereotypes associated with the teacher role, the feminist group, and the 
qualities of a just personal identity will vary tremendously between the average citizen of 
the United States, Saudi Arabia, or Aboriginal Australia.  Sets of meanings that are 
normative in a culture for any group identity constitute a prototype which Hogg (2006) 
describes as “a fuzzy set of attributes (perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors) that 
are related to one another in a meaningful way and that simultaneously capture 
similarities within the group and differences between the group and other groups” (p. 
118).  Thus, identities are not simply a matter of self-identification.  To truly have an 
identity requires others to also accurately identify a person as having a particular identity.  
Burke and Stets (2009) use the example of a police officer as a role identity that would 
have no efficacy unless both the officer herself and others both identify her as a police 
officer and agree upon what meanings are associated with that role (e.g., power to write 
tickets, make arrests).   
In describing the idiosyncratic dimension, Stets (2006)  points out that in addition 
to internalized identity prototypes, each individual will have their own idiosyncratic 
interpretation of what being a teacher, feminist, or fair-minded individual means to them.  
This idiosyncratic component may align completely or depart radically from prototypes 
for identities that comprise the cultural dimension of identities.  On the individual level, 
Burke and Stets (2009) describe the concept of prototypicality which is “the degree to 




the group as a whole by being most like ingroup members and simultaneously most 
different from outgroup members” (p. 118).  Burke and Stets go on to explain that 
prototypes are often hypothetical individuals whose characteristics maximize 
characteristics that group members believe represent a particular group and maximize 
differences from non-group identities.  Prototypes are thus idealized, hypothetical, and 
stereotyped group members and do not describe the average real life member of any 
group.  They do, however, provide a marker for what prototypical meanings are 
associated with a particular group within a particular culture.  Burke and Stets use the 
example of masculinity and state that each person in a culture exists “along a continuum 
ranging from very stereotypically masculine to very stereotypically feminine, covering all 
the points in between” (p. 63).   Thus, a heterosexual, cisgendered male who identifies as 
a feminist activist is likely high on the idiosyncratic dimension of feminist group identity 
but is low on feminist group identity typicality and is therefore very un-stereotypically 
feminist in Western European culture.   
The discussion above offers the tools to answer the first two of the five 
subordinate questions outlined at the beginning of this section.  First, the concept of 
identity can be expanded to include the aspects of role, group identification, and personal 
characteristics.  Using these three concepts, we now have a more precise language to 
understand what is targeted in MCC and to frame the internal contestations about which 
of these three aspects it should address.  From the reviews in chapters 2 and 3 of this 
project, it seems that the early models of MCC arose from Western psychology’s failure 




words, early MCC models drew attention to the ways expressions of psychological health 
and maturity vary because different cultures have very different prototypes for the 
behaviors and meaning of roles such as mourner, mother, or husband.  The debate over 
whether to expand the definition of culture seems to be a debate about whether the focus 
should shift from group identities whose oppression arises from misunderstanding their 
associated role identities to a larger discussion of social identities in general.  Proponents 
of an expanded definition of culture seek to define culture in terms of group identities 
because of the fact that other social groups, like cultural social groups themselves, are 
also oppressed.  Yet the oppression of non-cultural group identities arises less from 
differences in role identity prototypes between, for example, gay and non-gay or obese 
and non-obese identity groups.  These historically non-cultural but oppressed identity 
groups are instead targets of oppression for reasons of moral (e.g., the LGBT community) 
aesthetic (e.g., obesity) and any number of other grounds.  Further, the moral, aesthetic, 
and other negative markers for these identity groups occurs within and across various 
traditionally defined cultural groups.  Thus, when culturally derived role prototypes are 
the focus of knowledge, awareness, and skills paradigms social identities that do not map 
as well onto role differences become marginalized. The fear from those preferring a more 
restricted definition of culture or an approach that emphasizes groups that fit within such 
a restricted definition, is that cultural role identities and the differences therein will 
become marginalized.  Further, if all such groups are included, there is the potential to 
misuse the expanded discourse by avoiding focus on social groups that are most 




The proposed RCT is decidedly aligned with recalibrating the discourse of 
diversity competency by widening the rationale for competency away from culture itself 
and thereby moving beyond the debate of whether or not to expand its definition.  
Instead, RCT uses the POR rationale reviewed above for conceptualizing oppressed 
groups’ need for special attention within psychology on the grounds that these groups 
(including culture) are the perennial targets of disrespect and disesteem for a wide range 
of reasons.  Since these reasons include the historical and contemporary derision of 
cultural groups’ associated role identities, recognition competency seeks to subsume 
multicultural competency as only one aspect of a larger conversation about recognition.  
While this means culture is decentralized, it must be clearly noted that RCT does not seek 
to centralize any particular group identity.   
Regarding the second question, how to understand the relationship between 
cultural norms and individuals, the theorists above show us that these are two mutually 
influencing dimensions of identity.  Thus, the framework and rationale for RCT having 
been explained, we arrive at another competency – namely that the psychologist 
understands that on the individual level, identities are a dual function of individual 
difference and culturally normed prototype.  Assessing, understanding, and working 
responsively with both a client’s idiosyncratic and prototypical dimension for any 
identity is crucial. While this seems related to knowledge and skill, it also sets the stage 
for a fourth dimension of RCT, what will be called the critical dimension of competency 
for working with diverse groups.  Here, a psychologist must be able to understand the 




identity and how the degree of prototypicality has impacted the client.  This will be 
discussed more fully later on. We now turn to a discussion of how identities function.  
Stets (2006) goes on to offer an overview of the Identity Control Model which 
explains the ways identity influences behavior (see Figure 5.3).  This model has four 
components, the most important being the identity standard.  The identity standard is the 
total set of self-meanings (i.e., culturally and idiosyncratically determined) in a particular 
identity for a person.  The input component is comprised of one’s own perceptions of the 
situation which includes reflected appraisals (i.e., the way one perceives other’s reactions 
to oneself).  The comparator is the internal cognitive process of comparing perceptions to 
the identity standard.  The final component, output, is comprised of behavior that is 
dictated by the discrepancy between the identity standard and the perceptions through the 
comparator process.  Thus, the ultimate goal is for the perceptions to match the identity 
standard. When the two match, this is called identity verification.  In short this model’s 
primary goal is to influence perception, and behavior change is therefore only a 
subordinate and instrumental mechanism to achieve a match between perceptions and 
identity standards.
9
  Thus, the interaction between perception and identity standard in the 
comparator determines behavior.  In short, identity control theory explains how identity 
controls the environment rather than how the environment controls identity (although 
Burke and Stets (2009, Chapter 9) also explore the latter).   
                                                 
9
 Burke and Stets  (2009) use the analogy of a thermostat.  Here, the set temperature is like the identity 
standard and the external room temperature and its fluctuations (i.e., disturbances) are the input.  The input 
(e.g., 63º) is compared with the identity standard (e.g., 68º).  If discrepancy is found the thermostat behaves 





Figure 5.3.  Stets’s cybernetic model of the identity maintenance process.  From “Identity 
Theory” by Stets in Contemporary social psychological theories  (p. 97) edited by P. J. 
Burke, 2006. Stanford, CA: Stanford Social Sciences.  Copyright 2006 by the Board of 
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Reprinted with permission. 
 
This model is self-adjusting (i.e., cybernetic) and is non-linear.  Thus, the model can use 
the same construct (identity standard) to predict very different and seemingly 
contradictory behaviors as a function of situational and perceptual variance. This model 
is used to explain social behavior generally and was not intended to describe reactions to 




verification offer a framework for a more precise discussion of the individual level of 
competence in both MCC and RCT.  
Identity verification is hypothesized to produce positive affect while identity non-
verification is believed to produce negative affect such as hostility or depression  (Stets, 
2006).   Stets references Burke (1991) who outlined two mechanisms of non-verification 
that lead to emotional distress, frequency of non-verification and the source of non-
verification.  The more often non-verification occurs, the more the otherwise smooth 
process of the identity control loop is interrupted and the greater the amount of cognitive 
and physiological resources must be used to reestablish verification.  Further, an 
interruption in identity verification from a valued significant other should produce more 
distress than interruptions from insignificant sources.  Consequently, the more often 
identity verification is interrupted and the more important the source of the interruption, 
the greater dysphoria and stress a person will experience.  
Burke and Stets (2009) reference Cast and Burke (2002) to add further nuance to 
the positive outcomes of identity verification.  Burke and Stets explain that the identity 
verification process can be used as the foundation for a theory of self-esteem (i.e., the 
judgments about the self made by the self).  Consistent identify verification will produce 
high levels of self-esteem which becomes a sort of reservoir that protects individuals 
form the stress of identity non-verification and motivates people to gain more self-esteem 
thereby replenishing the reservoir.  Consistent identity verification (a) strengthens 
individuals commitment to the verified identity, (b) increases interpersonal commitment 




define social identities, and (d) allows people the resilience to move through situations of 
stress and non-verification to meet long term goals.  Thus, identity verification not only 
aids individuals’ self esteem and life projects but it strengthens interpersonal and 
community connections as well.   
The above discussion thus answers the third question of what consequences arise 
from affirming or disaffirming identities.  As we can see, identity verification has 
positive implications not just for individuals or groups but for society at large.  It also 
stands to reason that persistent disconfirmation will have a negative impact on not just 
individuals but also their interpersonal relationships, identity groups, and societal 
relations.  This offers new conceptual tools for understanding privilege.  We can think of 
social privilege as having social and group identities that are routinely verified by societal 
structures.  Social identities here concern aspects of who one is not what one does).  
Thus, socially privileged individuals should have greater reservoirs of self-esteem and 
therefore more internal resources for handling situations in which their role and personal 
identities are not verified.  This adds weight to the love, respect, and esteem rationale of 
RCT.  Those who are privileged to have identities verified institutionally enjoy greater 
social resources and a greater amount of positive affect associated with identity 
verification than those whose identities are not.  The institutionalized pattern of unequal 
distribution of social resources related to social identity is an example of what disrespect 
is in the politics of recognition, and the pattern of deriding and humiliating individuals 
who are members of targeted groups is an example of disesteem.  Psychologists are 




and seek verification of group identities at institutional and societal levels through 
research, consultation, and public advocacy in an attempt to correct this systematic 
disrespect and disesteem.  Such increases in institutionalized respect and esteem for these 
identities should, in theory, impart a greater sense of internalized worth and love at the 
individual level.   
The discussion up until now has focused on hypothetical single identities. Yet 
clearly individuals have a multitude of group, personal, and role identities any number of 
which may be salient and relevant in a social situation.  Stets (2006) discusses the ways 
multiple identities are thought to be organized within each person and the mechanisms by 
which they may become salient.  She synthesizes the works of Stryker (1968, 1980) and 
Stryker and Serpe  (1982, 1994) who propose a salience hierarchy of identities.  Here 
salience refers to three things, the likelihood that an identity will become activated (e.g., 
behaviorally performed) in a given situation, the likelihood a person will seek out 
situations in which to perform the identity, and the likelihood that a person will perceive 
a situation as a chance to perform an identity.   Stets further explains that one of the 
prime modulators of an identity’s place on the salience hierarchy is a person’s level of 
commitment to the given identity.  Here, commitment is a function of two dimensions: 
(a) the number of interpersonal connections one has related to a particular identity and (b) 
the quality of those connections.  It is proposed that the more committed to an identity a 
person, the higher the identity will be on the salience hierarchy.  Further, the salience 
hierarchy is understood as the more enduring pattern of how ready and available 




any given moment. Hogg (2006) also states that identities vary in the level of subjective 
importance and value individuals have for them which would, in the view of this author, 
also influence commitment to the identity.  In short, the more committed a person is to an 
identity, the more effort they will exert trying to verify it which, if successful, will 
increase commitment. Conversely, the less committed a person is to an identity, the less 
effort they will put forth towards its verification.   
If salience hierarchies are enduring and comprised of patterns of internalized 
commitment and understood over time, how do we understand the relative importance of 
identities in a discrete situation?  Hogg (2006) points out that “group behavior and self-
conception varies from context to context” (p. 127).  Thus, while someone may be most 
committed to their identity as a parent such that it ranks first in their salience hierarchy, 
they will nevertheless behave very differently as a member of their company’s softball 
team mid-game than they would assisting with homework at the dinner table because at 
the game their softball team member identity is activated and their parent identity is, 
presumably, not. Note this activation would change very rapidly if the parent receives a 
message during the game indicating that their child has just been admitted to the hospital 
following a traffic accident.  Thus, Hogg draws a distinction between chronic 
accessibility of identities and situational accessibility of identities.  The situational 
accessibility of identities changes as the social context or situation changes but the 
relative chronic accessibility of identities is a more enduring pattern across situations.   
As reviewed in chapter 1 the concept of a hierarchy of identities and in particular 




is important to clarify that the discussion above is referring to an idiosyncratic hierarchy 
of commitment and salience identities both of which have very restricted meanings in the 
above context.  These are thus not moral hierarchies or value hierarchies of identity 
trying to rank one as more generally worthy of attention in scholarship or more oppressed 
in society than another. They are instead analytically and empirically distinguished on the 
basis of the frequency of their activation.  Also, the theorists mentioned above allow for 
equal level of commitments to more than one identity, and Hogg is very clear that a 
group can be defined with as few as three people.  Thus, one can have equal salience and 
commitment to their identity as a Black person, their identity as a woman, and their 
identity as a womanist both in discrete social situations and in their overall pattern of 
living.  One may also have varying levels of commitment to these three groups, and of 
course, the commitment and salience can change over time. A person can therefore be 
thought of as “a container for multiple identities” (Burke & Stets, 2009, p. 144).   
Burke and Stets (2009) explain that multiple identities often operate 
simultaneously with one exerting greater influence over another.  Burke and Stets explain 
that when multiple identities are situationally activated, identities with greater general 
prominence and commitment tend to be verified first with other identities verified after.  
As shown in Figure 5.4, a higher identity exerts influence over a lower identity by 
becoming part of its input.  In other words, the higher identity’s input is theorized to 
come directly from the environment, whereas the lower identity’s input is made up of 
both the environment but also the output from the stronger identity.  As Burke and Stets 





Figure 5.4.  Burke and Stets model of two hierarchically related identities within a single 
person.  From Identity Theory (p. 177), by P. J. Burke and J. E. Stets, 2009, New York: 
Oxford University Press.  Copyright 2009 by Oxford University Press. Reprinted with 
permission. 
 
it only tells the lower identity what meanings need to be verified” (p. 136). In Figure 5.4, 
for example, we might imagine that identity standard H is the average person’s parent 
role identity and identity standard L is their political identity. When both are activated at 
once, the parent identity takes precedence and helps guide the political identity because 




their salience hierarchy.  Of course for a senator, the two may be reversed, with political 
identity coming first.  Burke and Stets also discuss a range of other relationships among 
identities such as two equally influential identities operating simultaneously, one stronger 
identity influencing two equal subordinate identities, and so on.  However many identities 
may be in operation, Burke and Stets also clarify that these are all ultimately organized in 
a single stream of behavior enacted by a single person.   Thus, even though there is more 
than one identity at play, there is only one stream of behavior present at any point in time 
available to verify the several identities.  When meanings among the identities overlap, 
this process is easier. However, when meanings are at odds and the behavior required to 
satisfy both is contradictory we encounter identity conflict.  Thus, to answer the fifth 
question posed at the beginning of this section, identity conflict can be understood as 
arising from the inability for a single stream of behavior to satisfy the meanings held by 
two or more simultaneously activated identities.  The reader will recall that the third and 
final core question of this project asks whether psychologists should aid in conflict 
among cultural and other identities within the same person or groups of people.  This will 
be explored more fully in chapter 6.  
The discussion of identity verification above is of course an internal process.  
Burke and Stets (2009)  also explain how identity theory can be used as a framework for 
understanding relationships in society and the world at large.  They point out that the 
number of identities people develop is in large part determined by what identities are 
available to them.  The fact that both identities and the resources associated with them are 




while individual outcomes vary, it is self-evident that having a role identity as a legacy 
student in an Ivy league institution offers conections to more identities and social 
resources than the role identity of a non-traditional adult learner at a community college.  
Hogg (2006) points out that this is also true for social identities in that groups (i.e., 
collectivities of individuals sharing a group identity) compete amongst each other for 
distinction in areas such as prestige.  Burke and Stets note “identities using persons as 
their agents maintain the patterned and coordinated flows of [social] resources. Identities 
(not persons) are responsible for the vast network of [social] resource transfers and 
transformations” (p. 105).  
Finally, Burke and Stets distinguish between obligatory and voluntary role 
identities through a review of Thoits (2003).  Obligatory identities are those role 
identities which, once acquired, are difficult or impossible to exit, whereas voluntary 
identities are exited with realtive ease.  For example, the role of soup kitchen volunteer is 
quite easy to exit when compared with exiting the obligatory role of parent.  Stets and 
Burke explain that the obligation arises from legal and social mandates and can be a 
barometer for assessing the relative importance a culture or state places on particular 
roles.  
From the discussion above we add further nuance to several preliminary positions.  
First, with regard to which identities are important to RCT, it was stated before that social 
identities are the primary focus.  To be more precise, RCT emphasizes oppressed, 
obligatory social identities since these are difficult to change and their non-verification 




identities, it is clear that oppressed social identities are often marked by their obligatory 
nature.  Indeed, social identities related to size (large or little), disability, race, religion, 
and gender are difficult or impossible to change.  Second, it is clear that on the individual 
level of clinical practice, the question of which identities are important will vary 
tremendously between persons with each person having a salience hierarchy of identities 
stable across situations, an accessibility hierarchy of identities that changes across 
situations, and an activation hierarchy of identities that changes moment to moment.  
Thus, while RCT emphasizes social identities, acentric of any particular identity, in 
practice psychologists must be able to determine the relative commitment and value an 
individual places on their palette of social identities.  This is further tempered by the fact 
that these social identities are themselves each comprised of an idiosyncratic and 
prototypicality dimension.    
Limits of identity theory.  Identity control theory is intended to be scientific and 
while it does have a strong body of empirical evidence supporting many of its principles, 
there are areas that have yet to be tested empirically and may lie beyond the scope of 
quantitative methods entirely.  Stets (2006)  points out that distinguishing among multiple 
activated identities and the relative control of one over another in a situational hierarchy 
is very difficult to operationalize in empirical research.  She also states that the topic of 
multiple identities in general requires further development in identity theory.  Other areas 
she identifies as needing further investigation are the means by which identities change 
over time, exploring the relationship between externally ascribed social status’s impact 




hierarchies.  Burke and Stets (2009, pp. 197-221) offer a detailed review of these and 
other areas requiring further investigation.   
Summary and Conclusions 
The discussion above, by synthesizing the Politics of Recognition and Identity 
Theory, has yielded several results so far.  First, Recognition Competency Theory is 
offered as the name for a model of diversity competency that subsumes a restricted 
definition of multicultural competency and is based on a rationale of love, respect, and 
esteem which can be contrasted with the more empirical rationale offered for MCC by 
many theorists.  Through the discussion, RCT has begun to develop three unique features 
of its own that distinguish it from D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC.  First, the identity level of 
RCT is decentralized focusing on oppressed social identities generally but emphasizing 
no particular group above any other, at least on the purely theoretical abstract level of 
discussion.  Second, the individual level of the focus dimension of competency must be 
transformed in light of the ways multiple identities are conceptualized in identity theory 
to place greater emphasis on each person’s salience hierarchy of social identities rather 
than any centralized set of identities, as in the MDCC.  Finally, a fourth dimension of 
competence (i.e., the critical dimension) to the identity, foci, and components dimensions 
of MCC offered by D. W. Sue (2001) has begun to emerge and helps to explain both of 
the first two features.   
Returning to the MDCC, D. W. Sue (2001) centralizes culture in the identity 
dimension of competence and specifically identifies five racial and ethnic groups (i.e., 




dimension of RCT is decentralized with respect to any particular identity group, at least 
at the abstract theoretical level.  In RCT the identity dimension is imagined to be a 
container for the multiple identities that may be relevant to a particular situation on the 
foci dimension with no a priori emphasis on any particular category of social identity.  
Once a specific context is identified, the particular identities at hand become those 
relevant to the content dimension.  Thus, in some situations these may be cultural and 
indeed may focus exclusively on race.  In other contexts that may include a variety of 
social identities none of which are cultural in a restricted sense of the word.  Thus, in 
RCT the identity dimension is a decentralized container open to any number and 
combination of social identities that may be relevant to a given personal, institutional, or 
societal context.   
With regard to the foci dimension, RCT also departs from D. W. Sue (2001) on 
the individual level.  In D. W. Sue’s MDCC the individual level of competence is 
conceived as requiring KA&S for any number of single identities that may become 
salient (what identity theorists would call activated) in a particular context.  This is also 
true for Pedersen et al. (2008) who enjoin therapists to become adept at discovering the 
shifts in which culture teachers are most important to a client throughout the counseling 
interview.  Whereas both D. W. Sue and Pedersen et al. seem to approach the concept of 
identity salience as singular (i.e., a single identity becomes activated beyond others) RCT 
acknowledges that several social identities may be activated in a situation, and these may 
or may not reflect a client’s salience hierarchy of social identities.  Thus, psychologists 




discover which are important across time (i.e., salience hierarchy) and which are 
important in the moment (i.e., situational hierarchy).  Note that this reinforces the 
container approach to the identity dimension taken above.  Since there is tremendous 
variance across individuals, it is important to work case by case at the individual level 
rather than trying to articulate a rationale for which identities must be understood a priori 
to a particular case.   
Yet by what mechanism is a psychologist to determine the salience hierarchy for 
the individual level of focus and thereby fill the container of the identity dimension? This 
is where a fourth dimension that is not included in D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC must enter 
and where the ability to pictorially represent RCT breaks down because of the two-
dimensional nature of the page.  The psychologist must acquire a critical set of faculties 
with regard to diversity competency which allows the counselor to accurately determine, 
collaboratively with the client, their salience hierarchy and to determine how this fits into 
the client’s treatment presentation.  While this overlaps with the skills aspect of the 
content dimension, the next chapter will show that the notion of a critical dimension 
transcends the skills area in particular because of its reflexive and evolving nature as well 
as the fact that it will be shown to require evaluations and moral critiques by the 
psychologist which transcends skills stemming exclusively from the identity dimension.  
We therefore now turn towards answering the third and final core question of this project: 





Chapter 6. Bounded Moral Pluralism: A Critical Dimension of RCT 
I hope to explore some of the conclusions that have emerged from my 
research on the relationship between medical cultural sensitivity and domestic 
violence in South Asian immigrant communities. I am particularly interested in 
the ways in which multiculturalism in this context actually replicates structures of 
oppression within these communities, resulting in unequal treatment of South 
Asian patients on the grounds of ‘respecting’ cultural difference: a difference, 
moreover, that is defined predominantly by male religious leaders within these 
communities, if in fact it is defined with any community involvement at all. (Puri, 
2005, p. 417) 
 
The sentiments above are the driving force behind this dissertation.  Stated very 
simply, how can psychologists simultaneously honor cultural autonomy while also 
challenging the oppressive aspects of every culture’s internal power structure?  On the 
one hand, the multicultural theories explored in chapters 2 and 3 act to compensate 
Western psychology’s long history of pathologizing difference by creating a non-
judgmental and affirming responsiveness to cultural differences.  Replacing assimilation 
and denigration of difference with support of difference, in the opinion of this author, is 
exactly the right response to psychology’s historical mistreatment of minority groups.   
The challenge arises when internal minorities are factored into the equation of 
what constitutes a stance of cultural responsiveness.  To challenge a culture’s internal 
structure leaves dominant group psychologists vulnerable to accusations of paternalism.  
It is offensive to imagine Western psychologists taking on the role of self-appointed 
rescuers of women, people with disabilities, and other internal minorities of different 
cultures simply because other cultures may not align with Western conceptions of the 




cultures should change internally, without challenge from psychologists who are 
members of dominant groups.  This respects cultural autonomy at the expense of 
endangering women, the LGBT population, and members of many other groups who are 
the perennial victims of social power disparities in majority and minority cultures alike. It 
is too easy to claim that multiculturalism in psychological practice does not carry the 
danger of cultural relativism.  The work cited at the beginning of this chapter is a very 
practical example of how common sense approaches to individual versus group rights 
conflicts are inadequate and that explicit boundaries around both cultural and individual 
rights must be drawn.    
This chapter will return to Parekh’s (2006) theory of multiculturalism and review 
his approach to intercultural evaluation.  Following this review, the author will discuss 
the ways in which Parekh’s theory can serve as a framework for a preliminary critical 
component to multicultural competence.  With such critical skills woven into the 
competency framework, psychologists can begin identifying the limits of cultural 
relativism as applied to groups and individuals.  A recent debate in the counseling 
psychology literature offers a rich foundation for the discussion.   
Limiting Relativism in Psychology: An Example 
In the July 2009 issue of The Counseling Psychologist several authors took up the 
question of how to approach the conflicts that may arise when cultural values conflict 
with individual human rights.  In 2008 an e-mail discussion took place among training 
directors nationwide following a post asking how one training director should approach 




conflicted with her religious values.   This discussion brought out many nuanced points 
around a longstanding paradox: How can counseling psychologists respect differences in 
sexuality and religious values when the two may be in conflict?  Overall, the consensus 
was that counselors must demonstrate an ability to resolve the conflict between their 
religious values and their professional ethical responsibility to serve all clients and affirm 
their social identities.  However, it was pointed out that this stance may be considered 
hypocritical.  Specifically, how can counseling psychologists ask trainees to respect and 
affirm culturally embedded value systems that may differ from their own on the one hand 
while saying that internally the field need not exercise the same respect for the religious 
values of its own aspiring practitioners?  Some found it disconcerting to ask trainees to 
jettison their own deeply held, culturally embedded values when it comes to their 
professional work (Mintz & Bieschke, 2009).  
This debate eventually led to a major publication in The Counseling Psychologist 
in which a stand was taken on such values, “Counseling Psychology Model Training 
Values Statement Addressing Diversity” (Council of Counseling Psychology Training 
Programs, Association of Counseling Center Training Agencies, & Society of Counseling 
Psychology, 2009).  This publication is hereafter referred to as the Values Statement.  
While the statement itself is short and aspirational, Mintz and Bieschke (2009) interpret 
the specific implications of the position statement for the trainee’s value conflict 
described above.  The key point is the difference between professional values and 
personal values.  According to Mintz and Bieschke “trainees must be able to evaluate and 




oppressed groups, as such values, rigidly and inflexibly held, can prevent one from 
performing the behaviors and competencies expected in our profession” (p. 635).  In 
short, Mintz et al. (2009) start from the position that working with marginalized groups is 
a core professional duty and value of counseling psychologists.  They determine several 
key implications of this position.  First, this position should be declared and endorsed in 
the form of a concrete values statement, which it has.  Second, a mechanism for 
addressing trainees’ conflict among personal values and the expected professional duties 
and competencies of working with oppressed groups must be detailed.  In their view, this 
mechanism is to require that trainees explore those personal values which do or might 
prohibit them from fulfilling the professional behaviors in supervision and to have 
supervisors prepare trainees to engage in these behaviors in spite of any conflicts with 
trainees’ personal beliefs.   They also note that if, in spite of exploration and training, a 
trainee cannot perform her or his duties because of personal convictions then that person 
should not be granted entry into professional psychology.  Further, Mintz et al. argue that 
a willingness and skill set for examining questions of values, morality, and philosophy so 
that trainees can align with professional duties must be a required component of 
professional training in CP.   Finally, Mintz et al. note that their position does not mean 
that trainees must change any part of their personal value system, only that they must be 
able to reconcile their behaviors and attitudes in professional work to align with the 
professional duty to work effectively with oppressed and marginalized groups.  In this 
way it is hoped that the Values Statement, properly implemented, will guard against 




inhibiting such work because of their own religious beliefs or any other diverse identity 
(Bieschke & Mintz, 2009).   
Two response articles are relevant. The first by Vera (2009) aligns with the 
positions taken by Mintz et al. (2009).  Vera reinforces Mintz et al.’s position that 
challenging hegemonic views of socially privileged groups (e.g., anti-gay interpretations 
of Christian doctrine) is not an act of oppression or hypocrisy but is simply the 
enforcement of professional standards protecting and affirming oppressed groups.  Vera 
also addresses footnote 4 of Domain D (diversity) of the APA accreditation guidelines 
(APA, 2007).  This footnote allows religiously affiliated training programs to use 
standards associated with the religious affiliation in the admission process for the 
program so long as this policy is publically stated.  Vera argues that religiously affiliated 
programs should be required to explain how they are not in violation of domain 4.  Vera 
states that footnote 4 should itself be removed since failing to exclude beliefs hostile to 
oppressed groups from professional psychology invites conditions of maleficence and 
injustice.  Vera concludes by stating “perhaps it is time that a critical mass of 
psychologists, as social justice advocates, finally pushes our association to adopt a 
singular commitment to cultural competence, without qualification” (p. 748).  
McCutcheon and Imel (2009) are less supportive of Mintz et al.’s (2009) positions 
and offer three main concerns.  First, McCutcheon and Imel argue that great caution 
should be exercised when taking a hard line stance on issues of value conflict.  In their 
opinion, it is ironic that academics who themselves seek to deconstruct and subvert 




to a particular interpretation of professional values.  In many ways McCutcheon and Imel 
view this as a misuse of power that recreates a form of moral authoritarianism that “can 
suffocate the intellectual freedom and the earnest questioning of the received view that 
are necessary for counseling psychology to flourish” (p. 765). Further, it is unlikely that 
trainees can really be expected to engage in genuine and open self-reflection of their 
personal values if they know their success in an academic program depends upon 
aligning with a fixed professional ideology.  In such cases social desirability may lead to 
reported attitudes not correlated with internal beliefs and actual counseling behaviors.  
Further, there is not sufficient empirical evidence that self-awareness and exploration will 
result in change of biased attitudes and behaviors.  Second, it is not always possible to 
simultaneously affirm cultural pluralism while challenging all forms of oppression.  
Further, it is unclear which of these two principles (e.g., support of cultural context or 
challenge of oppression) should be honored when the two collide. For example, if a 
female client from a patriarchical culture presents for treatment, should a counselor 
valuing egalitarianism honor social justice and challenge the patriarchy or honor culture 
and offer no challenge?  Would this change if the client was unhappy in the marriage?  
How should a counselor proceed in the case of couples counseling with a male from a 
patriarchicical culture seeks treatment so his wife will be more submissive?  For 
McCutcheon and Imel the Values Statement inadequately grapples with values conflicts 
between people or within individuals and privileges cultural relativism over social justice.  
Third, McCutcheon and Imel point out that the Values Statement endorses training 




reference several articles when noting that (a) MCC measures are of questionable validity 
(Hoyt, Warbasse, & Chu, 2006), (b) much MP research relies on self-report measures 
which are not correlated with observer ratings of MCC (Constantine, 2001), and (c) there 
are no studies comparing MCC with clinical outcomes (Worthington, Soth-McNett, & 
Moreno, 2007).  McCutcheon and Imel conclude that “we do not yet understand what 
MCC is, how to assess it, or the impact it has on clinical outcomes” (p. 766).  For all of 
these reasons, McCutcheon and Imel recommend a more cautious and stepped approach 
to operationalizing these values in any way that is not supported by empirical research as 
definitively leading to behavior change and more positive counseling outcomes.   
Discussion.  In many ways this debate is one of the first times psychologists have 
taken a direct, head-on position on how to resolve value conflicts between religion and 
sexuality.  Perhaps more importantly, it is one of the first clearly set limits on value 
relativism when two values are mutually incompatible.  In doing so, they have laid the 
groundwork for resolving other value conflicts in the field at large.  Some hold that 
counseling psychology’s professional standards require the affirmation of oppressed 
identity groups and that trainees with personal values that prohibit affirmation and 
effective work with these groups must be screened out of the profession (Bieschke & 
Mintz, 2009; Mintz & Bieschke, 2009; Mintz et al., 2009; Vera, 2009).  Are McCutcheon 
and Imel (2009) right to take pause at such a strident position?  What larger issues does 
this debate call forth that remain unaddressed by either set of authors?  This section will 
explore each of these questions.  Ultimately, the answers hold deeper implications for the 




There are several problems with Mintz et al.’s (2009) interpretation of the Values 
Statement.  First, McCutcheon and Imel (2009) are right to point out the challenges in 
Mintz et al. on practical grounds.  It seems unlikely that any trainee aware that there is a 
requirement to resolve one’s personal values in favor of professional duties would be 
likely to engage in the self-exploration process of supervision authentically.  Indeed, the 
more likely result seems that trainees with such personal tensions would simply choose 
not to disclose let alone explore them in supervision if they know failing to align with 
their program’s interpretation of the value’s statement may result in dismissal.  Further, it 
is hard to find positive evidence to say demonstrably that a trainee is not being honest 
about their internal experience in supervision.  For these reasons, it may be more fruitful 
for trainees to explore such personal value differences outside of any evaluative context.  
It seems more in the spirit of critiquing authoritarian rigidity to enjoin others to take up 
value pluralism and political recognition for oppressed groups rather than demanding 
trainees do so as a criterion for academic success. As it stands, Mintz et al.’s solution 
seems to have somewhat totalitarian implications and minimally needs more development 
in terms of defining criteria for success in self-exploration and whether or not the 
evaluative process of supervision is a suitable or even valid venue for resolving such 
tensions.   
The limitations above notwithstanding, Mintz et al.’s (2009) fundamental point, 
that trainees must understand, work within, and uphold a particular set of professional 
values and standards, remains valid. To be clear, while the mechanism Mintz et al. 




boundaries of one’s professional code of conduct is a necessary skill for all aspiring and 
active professionals in any applied field involving human life no matter how much they 
may disagree with those codes and values on a personal level.  Mintz et al. (2009) are 
therefore right to argue that doctoral level trainees should gain the ability to acquire the 
moral, philosophical, and critical skill sets required to reconcile their personal values with 
the behavioral standards expected of them as set forth by the field’s leadership bodies.  
Yet beyond professional standards generally, it is also an important superordinate skill 
for recognition competence.  Accordingly, the ability to apply moral and philosophical 
knowledge towards critical self-examination may be said to constitute one key 
component to the critical dimension of RCT.   
However, equally if not more important to this author is the ability to understand 
the principles on which such professional standards are based, how they are derived, their 
implications, and to offer a rational critique of the same standards when necessary 
leading to their ongoing evolution.  McCutcheon and Imel (2009) seem to be pointing out 
that these professional values regarding multicultural competency and affirmation of 
oppressed groups are themselves unclearly defined and at the current moment have only 
limited empirical support.  Thus, the profession is poorly served if it invites the kind of 
critical scrutiny into one’s personal values but closes off this kind of scrutiny towards the 
values themselves.   To be sure, this is not what Mintz et al. intend. Indeed they conclude 
by stating “we also hope that the Values Statement will serve as an initial point in an 
ongoing and evolving dialogue of our professional training values and expectations” (p. 




and critical abilities so they may align with a particular interpretation of our ethics code 
as it is interpreted and determined by their mentors and seniors in the field.   They must 
also develop the ability to take these critical faculties a step further and develop those 
same codes of professional standards through scholarly critique.   Thus, an additional 
criterion for recognition competence will be the ability not just to critique one’s own 
values to align with professional standards, but to also be able to reflexively critique and 
develop the professional standards themselves.   
Another concern is that there are negative implications for individuals, groups, 
and society at large embedded in Mintz et al. (2009) which the authors may not have 
considered in their desire to advocate for LGBT groups.  For example, they explicitly say 
that the standard is bi-directional, in that trainees from oppressed groups would be 
expected to (and indeed do) successfully work with members of groups hostile to their 
identities giving the example of LGBT therapists working with openly homophobic 
clients.  Yet we may wonder if challenging oppression in society at large but not 
challenging hostile personal views towards oppressed groups held by our clients is a 
positive thing.  What utility does it serve for psychologists to screen out those individuals 
who endorse hegemonic values from our training ranks but then to affirm (or minimally 
fail to challenge) bigoted or hostile views in the individuals and groups we serve?   In 
other words, Mintz et al.’s solution could be seen as unintentionally advocating a 
situation where psychology indirectly supports hegemonic views in society at large. For 
most of the twentieth century psychology directly oppressed entire groups of people 




groups by using an unexamined European individualist treatment framework.
 
 
Psychology also directly harmed entire groups in many ways including treating 
differences in diagnosis, test results, customs, practices, and beliefs as deficits and 
evidence of inferiority.   Taking the position of Mintz et al. to its most extreme 
implication, psychologists would now be choosing a position that is also negative for 
society at large.  Failure to challenge bigoted hegemonic group-based beliefs through a 
relativistic approach on the individual level allows them to go on unchallenged in larger 
power structures.  Rather than perpetrating social violence directly, we would instead 
collude with it indirectly. Neither of these solutions seems acceptable.  That is why 
McCutcheon and Imel’s (2009) point about the clash between affirming minority cultural 
values and challenging gender oppression in any context is so apt.  
Consequently, setting aside the question of how to act on it from a policy 
standpoint, a third component to the critical dimension of RCT is the ability to recognize 
and critique oppression in both minority and majority cultures alike. Counselors must 
recognize the dangers posed to internal minorities by a stance that respects individual 
rights to treatment above counseling values.  Therefore, this author is not offering a 
position with specific content on what the professional standards should be as this is a 
separate question from the main thrust of this project.  Instead, I simply propose that 
being able to critically engage such contentious issues will be ever more vital for 
counseling psychologists as globalization brings diverse groups with ever greater 
disparities in value systems closer together within the same polity.  This ability should 




In summary, trainees require three abilities in order to negotiate the complex 
intersection of conservative religious values and sexual minority identities.  In other 
words, there is a need for trainees to develop what the last chapter foreshadowed—a 
fourth dimension of RCT which we may call the critical dimension.  Here critical refers 
to engaging in issues of social identity, social justice, and conflict among social groups in 
a moral and theoretical analysis.  Critical, in the context of RCT, in no way refers to 
engaging in a polemic against any particular set of cultural values.  First, students must 
have the skill to understand the concept of bounded moral pluralism and reason through 
clashes among values associated with different identity groups.  They must understand 
how the values of some identity groups in a plural society must be bracketed in order to 
protect the recognition and minimal human rights of other groups.  Second, as argued by 
Mintz et al. trainees must have the critical skills to examine their personal values enough 
to align them with professional expectations. Third, and perhaps most important, trainees 
must be able to synthesize these first two skills into the ability to critically examine, 
evaluate, and help evolve these same professional standards.   This third is especially 
important because current trainees will become the senior psychologists who will one day 
shape those same professional standards and expectations over time. 
The sections that follow will flesh out a supportive foundation for the first of 
these abilities because it is the foundation for the other two.  Ultimately, this author will 
martial a theory of intercultural critique to offer psychologists the preliminary method to 
go beyond simply supporting oppressed groups while remaining neutral towards 




critiquing hegemonic religious, cultural, and other value structures directly.  In other 
words, we may begin to find a way to disavow violent aspects of culture (broadly 
defined) not because those aspects harm other groups, but because these aspects are 
morally wrong for inter-subjectively (though not universally) derived reasons.  It is very 
important to clarify that this author intends that there be times when RCT not only 
permits but actively suggests that psychologists engage in making intercultural and 
intergroup value judgments.  Since this is very treacherous moral ground, great caution 
will be exercised in the next section to draw clear parameters for when such occasions are 
called for and by what standards such judgments can be made.   
The next section will discuss the ways political multiculturalism has been 
critiqued for endangering human rights.  Following this, Parekh’s (2006) theory of 
multiculturalism will be presented with specific attention paid to the notion of bounded 
pluralism and intercultural evaluation.   From this discussion, several final components of 
the critical dimension of RCT emerge.   
The Problems of Political Multiculturalism and Group Rights 
Returning to the theories of political multiculturalism discussed in chapter 5, the 
reader will recall that one of the primary solutions of political multiculturalism involves 
either special group rights or exceptions to laws on the basis of cultural and religious 
differences.  Examples might include the laws in Quebec requiring French signage over 
English or exempting Sikhs from British motorcycle laws since their turbans are argued 
to functionally replace helmets.  The very concept of special group rights offered by 




as allowing alterations in dress codes to permit Jewish males to wear the kippah receive 
little serious criticism, many would react with horror if group rights were to extend far 
enough so as to permit such practices as untouchability, slavery, or genital mutilation.  
Therefore, some scholars offer powerful arguments against special group rights because 
they believe these legal exceptions may too easily be marshaled as justification for the 
abuse of internally oppressed peoples within minority cultures (Baber, 2008; Barry, 2001; 
Phillips, 2007; van den Brink, 2007).   
On February 5, 2011 British Prime Minister David Cameron delivered a speech at 
the Munich Security Conference in which he offered several key critiques of British 
multiculturalism ("PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference," 2011, February 5; 
"State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron," 2011, February 5).  First, 
Cameron argues that state multiculturalism weakens a collective sense of identity.  In his 
view state multiculturalism does not lead to the unified plurality of groups multicultural 
proponents hope for.  Instead, state multiculturalism invites a kind of separatism among 
groups that weakens a national sense of unity.  Second, Cameron cited the failure of 
dominant groups to condemn practices by non-dominant groups (e.g., forced marriages) 
as a failure resulting from this social fragmentation.
10
  Third, in his view this separatism 
invites individuals to identify with one group identity most in a way that distances them 
from their other identities.    In summary, Cameron cites social conditions that disinvite 
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all members in British society from being welcomed into the collective British identity as 
the cause for a failed sense of pluralist-unity.  He argues that in the absence of such 
belongingness people are more vulnerable to radicalization.  His hope is, through a 
variety of political and economic measures, to create the conditions in Britain where each 
member of society can identify with multiple identities simultaneously. In the paragraphs 
to follow, we will see that these remarks constitute a concise summary of the critiques 
leveled at political multiculturalism by contemporary political theorists.  
Hogg (2006) explains the difficulties of uniting disparate groups into a common 
social identity.  First, Hogg points out that individuals strive for both a sense of inclusion 
(i.e., group membership) and distinctness (i.e., individuality), and when the two are 
balanced, optimal distinctiveness is achieved.  Since few groups are completely 
homogenous, when a group identity becomes salient for a group member they engage in a 
healthy form of depersonalization (i.e., self stereotyping).  This helps simultaneously 
accentuate similarities of the person with the in-group and differences with the out-group.  
This gives rise to the within group favoritism (e.g., ethnocentrism) and competition for 
resources (e.g., prestige, status, and so forth) that typify intergroup relations.
11
   
Hogg (2006) explains that the typical hope for solving intergroup conflict (e.g., 
combining the two warring groups into a single harmonious group) is extremely difficult 
to achieve.  Hogg states that the proposed larger group can become a crucible in which 




and leaving the other marginalized, wounded, and fighting again for distinctiveness and 
separation.  In some ways multiculturalism itself is such a crucible.  Some groups 
struggle to achieve parity in political multiculturalism which is currently dominated by 
issues of ethnicity and national origin leading to the marginalization of religious 
minorities in political multiculturalism (Modood, 2007).  As has already been reviewed, 
this is also the case in multicultural psychology with hitherto un-included oppressed 
groups (e.g., people of size) fighting for inclusion in multicultural competency whereas 
other groups struggle to retain prominence in focus (e.g., race and ethnicity).  
For Hogg, the larger group solution is most likely to succeed when subgroups 
extend their characteristics so there is some overlap (and therefore identification) 
between them and when the defining feature of the larger group is the characteristic of 
within group diversity itself.  This would seem to be Prime Minister Cameron’s goal for 
Britain. Yet Hogg (2006) acknowledges that such pluralist unity can often be an 
unrealistic and naïve goal in the face of deep ideological divide, historical injury, or 
insurmountable desire for group distinctiveness.  Irreconcilable differences in values and 
practices between cultures lead scholars such as Baber (2008) to declare multicultural 
aspirations to be nothing more than a fantasy.    
The discussion so far questions the practicality of political multiculturalism if its 
ultimate goal is a form of cultural pluralism unified by a superordinate and inclusive 
national identity.  Yet this author has identified at least two other prominent areas which 
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question political multiculturalism.  The first area attacks multiculturalism on 
philosophical grounds.  Some scholars remain unconvinced that  multiculturalism is 
necessary at all in liberal societies and even go so far as to argue that at its worst amounts 
to a threat to human rights (Barry, 2001).  Baber (2008) argues that political 
multiculturalism, when understood as endorsing the kind of pluralist-unity hoped for by 
Prime Minister Cameron, (a) makes assimilation to the mainstream difficult thereby 
perpetuating the marginalization and disenfranchisement of minority groups, (b) 
encourages prediction and explanation of individuals behavior through their cultural 
identity which runs counter to the desires of most people to be viewed as individuals 
rather than a group prototype, and (c) is grounded in the questionable assumption that 
people like their cultures, want them to persist, and want to remain members of their 
cultural community in perpetuum.  
The second area of critique is related to this last, namely that many cultures have 
behavioral norms and beliefs that run counter to the idea of human rights.  For Baber  
(2008) this means that in some cases people might be better served by facilitating escape 
from such cultures and that multiculturalism is problematic for endorsing the value of 
groups with such practices.
12
  Susan Okin and other scholars explore the potential danger 
in multiculturalism with regard to women in the aptly titled essay collection Is 
                                                                                                                                                 
diversity.  Results indicated that the more recently diverse a local community, the more individuals pulled 
away not only from outgroups but also from their in groups (Putnam, 2007).   
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human misery. Perhaps instead of affirming the value of such cultures or adopting policies aimed at 
preserving them, we should…be working to dismantle them or at least helping their members to escape” 




multiculturalism bad for women? (Okin et al., 1999).  Okin highlights several reasons 
why group rights endanger women.  First, she argues that, because a large portion of 
cultural beliefs and practices regulate personal, sexual, and life functions, women’s lives 
are at higher risk of being negatively affected by any special group right impacting such 
life areas.  This is supported by the work of Philips (2007, Chapter 3) who shows that 
attempts to apply cultural context to interpretations of the law (particularly in Britain and 
the United States) have enabled misogynous practices using a cultural defense.
13
  Second, 
Okin states that the control of women is often one of the defining characteristics of most 
contemporary cultures.  To support this claim, she cites the fact that the myths of ancient 
Rome and Greece and the principle texts of Christian, Judaic, and Islamic faiths all 
explicitly subjugate women to men.  She states that all of these faiths “…consist of a 
combination of denials of women's role in reproduction; appropriations by men of the 
power to reproduce themselves; [and] characterizations of women as overly emotional, 
untrustworthy, evil, or sexually dangerous...”  .  Third, the leaders of minority cultures 
are frequently the most privileged members of their group.  Such leaders have a vested 
interest in minimizing their cultures internal variance and the maintenance of their 
culture’s internal hierarchies since both will offer them a continued position of power and 
status.   For all of these reasons, Okin rejects the idea that feminism and multiculturalism 
are easily compatible and urges extreme caution when dominant cultures consider 
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making group-based exceptions to their laws.  Okin concludes with the very liberal 
individualist assertion that because of all the nearly invisible within group oppressions 
throughout the world’s cultures, the rights of the oppressed individual must take 
precedence over that of any oppressed group.   
The critiques of political multiculturalism run parallel to the concerns about MCC 
outlined by this author in the preceding chapters.  On the one hand, communitarianism 
and multiculturalism are positive forces in that they promote the political recognition of 
groups easily oppressed and marginalized by the mainstream.  Yet it is difficult to 
balance this recognition against the threat of societal fragmentation and intragroup 
hegemony.  The most difficult challenge is finding a mechanism for intercultural and 
intergroup evaluation that does not pit one group of privileged moral benchmarks against 
another, usually disempowered, set of group normed moral beliefs.  Thus, the critical 
dimension of RCT, as is true for political multiculturalism itself, requires some means of 
intergroup evaluation in order to solve the dilemmas of conflicting group-based moral 
beliefs that opened this chapter.  As we will see, Parekh’s (2006) project offers a theory 
of a pluralist, non-relativistic, multicultural state which balances the need for group 
recognition with the concerns of feminist and liberal theorists critical of group rights.  
Parekh Part II: A Non-Relativist Theory of Political Multiculturalism  
Following his theory of culture (reviewed in chapter 4 of this project) Parekh 
(2006) completes his theory of multiculturalism with three large scale points.  First, he 
explains why, beyond the fact of their existence, multiple cultures should be affirmed and 




may transition from homogenizing orientation to a pluralist orientation to culture.  
Finally, he explains why and how aspects of culture must be critically examined and 
evaluated.  While this last is what will help complete the critical dimension of RCT, it 
can only be understood in the context of the first two points, to which we now turn.  
Building a Case in Support of Cultural Diversity 
Why is it important that there be many different cultures? Parekh (2006) states 
that any viable multicultural theory must make a convincing and persuasive case that 
diverse cultural groups and their practices should be affirmed and accommodated in 
democratic societies.  Political systems change only as a result of difficult work, social-
psychological adjustments, and a range of sacrifices.  The simple fact that minority 
cultures coexist within dominant culture(s) and may continue to grow does not in and of 
itself offer any persuasive reason why the dominant cultures should engage in such 
difficult work.  Parekh therefore argues that an adequate theory of multiculturalism must 
demonstrate that majority cultures also have a stake in the change process.   
Parekh (2006) summarizes the four most common arguments in support of 
cultural pluralism.  First, the existence of multiple cultures expands one’s number of 
choices with regard to the values underpinning a rewarding life.  Second, if people have a 
right to their culture, it stands to reason that the existence of many cultures is a by-
product of such a right.  Third, there are aesthetic arguments favoring cultural diversity 
(i.e., a more rich and beautiful world).  Fourth, cultural diversity facilitates a healthy 




While acknowledging these four points as important, Parekh (2006) states that 
none of these arguments are sufficient.  Consequently, he offers his own rationale for 
cultural diversity. First, because no single culture can support every human capacity, the 
existence of many cultures allows each culture to complement, correct, and illustrate new 
untapped areas of human potential.   Second, the existence of other cultures offers us a 
position from which to understand, interrogate, and extend our own.  The existence of 
other cultures facilitates human freedom by offering us an otherwise unavailable chance 
to step out of our own culture.  Without such external standpoints, we would be trapped 
within our own cultural context and less able to understand both our culture and 
ourselves.  Third, no culture is singularly uniform.  All cultures have many internal 
shades of difference and sub-cultural communities worthy of recognition and 
understanding.  Extra-cultural diversity helps us remain alert and able to perceive 
intracultural diversity. Fourth, cultural dialogue is mutually beneficial and can only occur 
when two or more cultures exist.  Such dialogue allows each culture to experiment with 
the other’s beliefs and practices in the areas of art, morality, politics, and so on.  New 
beliefs and practices can thus be generated cross-culturally which would be unavailable 
to either culture independently.  Fifth, extreme cultural homogeneity risks becoming 
oppressive, lacks the resources for internal critique, and lacks resources for developing 
such traits as critical self-reflection, open-mindedness, and humility. Thus, supporting 
many cultures helps to reduce such tendencies.  Finally, Parekh states that it is a point of 
historical fact that nearly all contemporary societies are to some degree culturally diverse.  




attempts at such internal homogenization in Iran and Saudi Arabia, Parekh states that 
since suppression is not realistic and is morally wrong,  “the only choice open to any 
society today is to manage and build on the creative potential of its diversity.” .
14
   
From a Homogenizing Modern State to a Multiculturalist Modern State 
The positive case for cultural pluralism having been made, Parekh (2006) turns to 
the barriers faced by contemporary democratic governments in realizing cultural 
pluralism.  The key challenge is the balance between accommodating cultural diversity 
while simultaneously engendering civic and political unity among cultures.  Parekh 
(2006) argues that the need for unity is equally proportionate to the degree of internal 
cultural variance within a given state since a state high in internal cultural diversity but 
low in political unity risks a chaotic and internally tumultuous existence.  However, many 
contemporary multicultural polities achieve unity by simply homogenizing their internal 
cultural differences (e.g., the melting pot).  Parekh states that this is because most modern 
states are often simply ill-equipped to strike a more even balance between civic unity and 
cultural diversity because liberal individualism is woven into their very constitution.  
Parekh explains that by liberal individualist standards (to which he seeks alternatives) 
modern states are thought to require several features: (a) They must be organized by a 
single set of constitutional principles and exhibit a uniform political identity. (b) 
Citizenship within a state is conceptualized as a relationship between the individual and 
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the state unmediated by any other group identity. (c) Rights are universal within the 
state’s authority and apply to individual citizens without regard to their individual and 
group based differences. (d) Rights should be equal among citizens and because 
citizenship is conceived irrespective of subcultural difference equal rights generally mean 
identical rights for each person. (e) The state must be politically unified and so the 
majority of people may speak for and determine rules governing the entirety of a state’s 
people.  All of these principles mean that modern states treat cultural and other 
differences among their citizens as politically irrelevant.  
Thus, by their very constitution, most modern states only have the political 
resources to take advantage of the homogenization option when balancing diversity with 
unity.  Because rights must be equal and are defined individually, citizens are expected to 
privilege their identities as citizens above all other identities including membership in 
cultural, religious, or other communities. Indeed, the requisite criterion for state 
recognition of one’s citizenship is that an individual publically resign him/herself to a 
polity’s dominant practices for defining him/herself and how he or she relates to both 
other citizens and the state.  While cultural differences may be affirmed in the private 
realm of a modern state, its political capital will only distributed with regard to genuine, 
illusory, or even coerced similarities among its citizens.
15
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Some theorists believe this homogenization is necessary for a government to 
function safely and equitably.  Assimilation into the mainstream is certainly part of the 
positions taken by Prime Minister Cameron, Barry, and Baber discussed above.  Yet 
Parekh (2006) argues that the modern state need not disenfranchise its citizens’ cultural 
identity out of fear of losing the ability to function since subcultural allegiances need not 
exclude state allegiance.  Parekh identifies several key structural changes that would be 
required in the conception of rights, citizenship, and equality to successfully move from 
homogenization to cultural pluralism.  First, the focus of rights must be expanded from 
the individual to include explicit rights for cultures and groups.   Just as focusing on 
groups can endanger the rights of individuals, so too can a state’s overemphasis on 
individuality threaten the important nongovernmental cultural systems that regulate and 
give meaning to the lives of people.  Second, the definition of citizenship must be 
expanded from an exclusive focus on the individual as a discrete and independent entity 
to include the group aspects of an individual’s identity.  This would mean that for some 
citizens their relationship with the state may be indirect and occur through the mediation 
of their cultural community.  In some contexts this may require that groups have some 
measure of governmental authority over their members in areas such as divorces, 
religious rites, and so forth.
16
  As a result of these other two shifts, the third and final 
change is state conceptualizations of equality.  Treatment and interpretation of a state’s 
laws and practices can no longer be identical for each citizen but will instead shift as a 
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function of cultural context.  For example, what constitutes violation of one’s right not to 
be coerced into marriage may be conceived very differently for a financially privileged 
White Christian female than for a Chinese-British female entering an arranged marriage.  
Together, these changes would result in what Parekh calls an asymmetrical distribution of 
state power which would be more equitable to its citizens than current attempts at a 
uniform and identical distribution of power, and a more accurate reflection of the cultural 
diversity within modern states.    
The Nature of Evaluating Culture 
Thus far Parekh (2006) has established that cultural pluralism is good for 
dominant and non-dominant cultures and has identified ways states must change in order 
to reduce homogenization.  However, the final area to address is the inherent danger in 
allowing groups the right to regulate their own members.  Taken to their worst extremes, 
some of Parekh’s recommendations for altering state conceptions of rights and 
citizenship have grave implications for human rights.  Internally oppressed members of 
some cultures could be left with no state recourse to fight against or receive protection 
from their culture’s internal injustices if group rights allow minority cultures a high level 
of self-governance.  It is therefore vital that there be some universal, explicit, and 
enforceable standards for evaluating and regulating cultural practices.  It is equally vital 
that such standards not be abused to justify devaluation and suppression of minority 
cultures.  Further, these universal standards cannot simply be derived from dominant 




Parekh (2006) begins by framing the boundaries of intercultural comparison 
which he limits in several important ways.  First, he states that cultures have multiple 
dimensions including their values in areas of aesthetics, morality, the spiritual, and so on.  
The standards regulating these areas of life may overlap but it does not follow that these 
standards are additive, synergistic, or a reflection of any single underlying principle. A 
culture’s standards for regulating many different areas of life are necessarily as disparate 
as the life areas themselves.  Accordingly, the standards regulating art in a theocratic 
culture will likely have a very different relationship to the standards governing art in a 
secular culture.  Indeed, the relationship between the principles of aesthetics and 
spirituality will also differ widely being of low correlation in a secular context and high 
correlation in a theocratic context.  Accordingly, comparisons between whole cultures are 
not possible because of these structural variances. One may only make honest 
comparisons between cultures in tightly focused dimensions.  We may fairly make 
comparisons between one culture’s vision of God, visual art, or civic laws and judge 
them as having greater depth, affect, or richness provided we have a full understanding of 
each culture involved.  Thus, since regulatory beliefs and practices shift depending on the 
area of life to which they pertain, it is not possible to offer a wholesale critique of any 
culture.  It is possible to make fair comparisons, critiques, and judgments only between 
specific aspects of any two cultures.   
Indeed, this parsing of cultural critique into smaller comparable dimensions of 
belief and practice is positive because it reduces splitting.  As Baber (2008) points out, 




aesthetics are not typically a point of objection by those against political 
multiculturalism.  The most controversial dimensions of cultural difference are morality, 
politics, and the standards for regulating human bodies and human relationships.  Parekh 
(2006) reminds the reader that all human beings require certain minimal conditions to 
grow into physically and psychologically healthy adults including access to food and 
shelter, caretaking during infancy and old age, access to cultural resources and so on.  
Further, all human beings suffer when they or their loved ones are subjected to violence, 
humiliation, and other forms of abuse.  Satisfaction of these and other basic needs along 
with protection from abuses constitute minimal conditions for a satisfying human life and 
are not culturally derived.  They are instead derived from the universal dimension of 
human nature described in chapter 4 and therefore constitute an objective and universally 
defensible good.  As a result, comparisons can and should be made between cultures with 
regard to how well they respect these and other universal human features.  Taylor (1994) 
also makes the argument that a stance of a priori affirmation of cultures is inauthentic.  
Authentic positive valuation, for Taylor, can only come from critical analysis and 
judgment.   
Note, however, that this is not a culture to culture comparison, but is instead a 
comparison of systems regulating only three very specific aspects of a culture:  morality, 
politics, and prescriptions for human relationships.   Further, cultures will interpret and 
meet these minimal needs differently.  Parekh (2006) states that all children need some 
form of family structure, but it is not true that this need take the form of a nuclear family.  




different regulatory or constructive purpose in another.  Comparisons across cultures 
must be done cautiously and with tremendous sensitivity to cultural differences.  There 
are a nearly infinite potential variety of cultural systems that are sensitive to and 
successfully provide for minimal human needs.  We must be cautious not to hold up any 
particular cultural interpretation of access to food or disposal of the dead as a universal or 
singularly best model.   Instead we need clear, universally agreed upon minimal standards 
for cultural interpretation of these and other universal human needs.  These should 
constitute the boundaries of what a culture must provide its members.  Once these are 
met, cultures are free to vary in their interpretation of morality and all other aspects of 
culture.  Parekh refers to this position as pluralist universalism because it demands 
universal standards on the one hand and allows for a large plurality of interpretations of 
these standards on the other.    
Parekh (2006) outlines several important points.  First, all communities have a 
right to their own culture which deserves our respect.  Yet it does not follow that the 
content, that is a group’s exercise of that right, deserves our respect.    As with 
individuals, we respect the right of people to regulate their own lives, but this does not 
mean we must not critically evaluate the way they exercise that right.  Indeed, should we 
still find their choices outrageous and grossly unacceptable after carefully understanding 
their internal world and reasons for their actions, we have a duty not to respect their 
choices.  At times we may even intervene to limit their exercise of individual rights and 
freedoms for the safety of others as in the case of violent criminals.  Likewise, those 




distribution of power, and do not violate other cultures’ right of existence are more 
deserving of our respect than those which do not.  Thus, we arrive at Parekh’s second 
point: evaluating and criticizing cultures is not the same as disrespecting their right to 
have a culture so long as said culture’s beliefs and practices are first fully understood.  A 
cross-cultural critique is fair only to the extent that it rests upon a rich understanding of 
the culture’s internal world, history, and belief systems.  
Implications for RCT.  It would seem that in some ways multicultural 
psychology has offered professionals the ability and rationale to affirm minority and 
oppressed identities, beliefs, and practices.  Yet, unlike Parekh’s view above, we have 
stopped short of taking the next step into critiquing those moral and interpersonal 
regulatory dimensions of cultures.  We say “gays should be affirmed” but we stop before 
saying “moral dimensions of cultures and religions hostile to sexuality are unjust and 
incompatible with pluralism and are, at least in this regard, worthy of objection and 
critique.”  This is likely because we prefer to be affirming and value neutral particularly 
in our individual work with those we serve. This is incompatible with both Parekh and 
Taylor and also an illusion about our individual work, which is deeply value laden. Their 
position is not that all cultures should be affirmed in an a priori sense. Rather, their 
position is that all cultures should be respected and that aspects of all cultures must be 
critiqued and evaluated against a universal standard of human rights and that part of 
respect entails engaging in this process. Further, this process assists both cultures in not 




theories by taking this next step: to move beyond affirmation to a place of respect 
tempered by bounded evaluation.   
Parekh’s (2006) observations help to clarify the need of psychology regarding 
intercultural evaluation.  His observation that the nature of internal structural differences 
precludes wholesale comparisons between any two cultures is apt.  Thus, we can guard 
against a kind of splitting whereby psychologists would be obliged to make value 
judgments about entire cultures.  Since this option is closed from the beginning we may 
instead ask which particular aspects of culture require us to draw boundaries around 
relativism in psychology.  Parekh’s choice of three such aspects (i.e., morality, 
interpersonal regulation, and politics) is appropriate for political theorists but likely 
exceeds the need of psychologists.  For our work and expertise we may restrict our 
discussion to differences in morality and expand interpersonal regulatory systems to 
explicitly include aspects of the body (e.g., sexual practices, alterations of the body) and 
behavior between human beings.  Further, Parekh points out that fair comparisons 
between cultures can only be made when both parties fully understand the other and the 
larger cultural context for the dimension in question.  This brings us full circle to a re-
endorsement of the continued need for specific knowledge and awareness of cultural 
differences.  In short, if psychologists wish to draw boundaries around relativism, their 
duty to acquire an intimate and comprehensive understanding of the cultural belief and 
practice in question is greater than ever before. 
These observations can therefore be marshaled to expand the set of core 




this chapter.  First, in indentifying the limits of cultural relativism, psychologists assume 
that no two cultures can fairly be compared in their entirety.  Instead, comparisons can 
only be made between very specific dimensions of cultural beliefs and practice.    
Second, the specific areas of which comparisons can be made are limited to morality and 
interpersonal regulation of human bodies, behavior, and relationships.  Three, 
comparisons between these two dimensions are made through the lens of minimal human 
rights (discussed in chapter 4).  Fourth, a comparison between two cultures can only 
fairly be made when a full knowledge and understanding of both cultures exists.  Finally, 
when comparisons between moral and interpersonal regulatory systems show that one 
system more successfully meets these minimal human rights than another, such a moral 
or interpersonal regulation system can be said to be better than those which do not meet 
them.   
Procedures for Intercultural Evaluation  
Parekh’s (2006) most important position related to intercultural relationships is 
that no culture is self-authenticating.  In other words, for multiculturalism to work, no 
culture (majority or minority) can be considered immune from internal or external 
pressure for change simply because they are honoring their current or historical set of 
beliefs and practices.    Further, Parekh states clearly that in his view there are times 
when others may rightly stop a culture’s practices as a last resort when cultures constitute 
an immediate threat to their own members or to others.  We would never accept citing 
Nazi or Hutu culture as a valid defense for the genocide of European Jews and Rwandan 




cross-cultural and intracultural evaluation is not only acceptable but is a vitally important 
process in a multicultural state.  In Parekh’s view all cultures should be actively and 
consciously engaged in this process at all times.   
 Some examples of the most intensely contested cultural practices include neonatal 
clitoridectomy (i.e., female circumcision),   polygyny (i.e., simultaneous marriage to 
multiple wives), arranged marriages, marriage between close relations (e.g., first cousins, 
nieces, and so forth.), subordinate status of women, facial scarring during African 
initiation ceremonies, and making exceptions in dress code standards for military, school, 
and other uniforms.   In each of these cases the context of the practice and nature of the 
cultures involved in the controversy have enormous variance.  Therefore, rather than 
prescribing specific content for properly regulating each these practices, Parekh (2006) 
instead lays out rules which may safely guide cultures to resolution when these and other 
controversies arise between dominant and minority cultures in the same polity (e.g., 
Canada and the Quebecois).   
Parekh frames the intercultural evaluation process by identifying the starting point 
of such debates and the typical outcomes that are available.  Typically, a minority cultural 
practice will run contrary to the larger society’s operative public values (OPVs).  These 
are the constitutional, legal, and civic values which structure a society.   OPVs are 
necessary in every society from the most culturally uniform to the most diverse because 
they allow for minimal civic coherence and smooth day to day functioning.  They are 
nearly always a reflection of the dominant culture.  There is one of three possible 




practice, and the minority practice is legally banned.  (b) Proponents of the cultural 
practice succeed in convincing the majority culture to alter OPVs to accommodate the 
practice.  (c) Both OPVs and the cultural practice are altered in some way.   
Multiculturalist states therefore require difficult cultural compromises so that no 
one of these three outcomes is always the solution to cultural conflict. If every 
controversial minority practice was banned for the sake of civic unity this would 
undoubtedly stir a sense of anger among minority groups leading to a fractured and 
malcontent population.  It is also true that widely different rights and laws for each of a 
society’s many different groups would be equally threatening to a dominant culture’s 
sense of identity leading to a similarly damaging form of civic fracture.  Having 
identified the start and end points to any given cycle of the intercultural evaluation 
process, Parekh (2006) begins to frame the components of the process itself.  He states 
that both openness and reasonableness are required in multiculturalist societies if conflict 
is to be resolved while still maintaining civic unity.  Here, openness refers to all parties 
agreeing that some degree of ongoing change for both majority and minority cultures 
alike is required.  Reasonableness, entails that individuals and groups (a) listen carefully 
to the arguments of others, (b) are willing to engage in self reflection and criticism, and 
(c) accept that their view is not self-authenticating. “Unreasonable people participate in a 
dialogue and demand reasons from others, but refuse to give or be guided by them when 
these do not justify their preferred conclusions” (p. 129).  In Parekh’s view, reasonable 
people and cultures deserve our patience, compassion, respect, and best intensions.  




righteous stance in all dialogue do not deserve our respect and can only be managed and 
contained since they refuse to engage in constructive and reasonable diplomacy (e.g., 
religious and political extremist groups).   
In addition to a commitment to openness and reasonableness, Parekh identifies the 
threshold for determining if change is necessary.  When OPVs and cultures meet pluralist 
universal standards, we may still wish to offer our critique, but should not interfere or 
press them for change simply because they run contrary to our own vision of the good 
life.  Such indulgent critique and pressure for change truly would amount to cultural 
intolerance in addition to being chaotic, exhausting, and unnecessary.  Critics should 
therefore only press for change when they can offer a case that either OPVs or minority 
practices violate minimal pluralist universal human values discussed above.  This is 
certainly the case for each of the highly controversial cultural practices mentioned 
previously such as permanent alteration of children’s genitals or the disallowance of 
minority religious expressions.   
Yet pinpointing the threshold for when such violations occur is itself an 
amorphous process.  Parekh (2006) assumes that the foundation for moral boundaries of 
cultural practices is never completely indisputable or objective.  Rather, the bases for 
such boundaries take the form of intersubjective principles derived through a dialogue 
(grounded in openness and reasonableness) between two or more cultures.  This key point 
distinguishes Parekh’s theory as what we may refer to as dialogical multiculturalism 
(Pierik, 2002).   For Parekh, no argument in favor of a boundary for cultural practices can 




Therefore, such precise thresholds are not available for resolving intercultural conflict.  
Arguments for a given boundary are not indisputably true or false but instead vary in 
their degree to which they are better or worse than the argument for a different boundary.  
Thus, critics cannot make charges of unreasonableness when their opponent fails to offer 
a conclusive argument for a value since no moral argument can ever be conclusive.  
Instead, critics must offer a better or equally convincing case in favor of the opposing 
moral value.  Parekh states that resolution occurs after arguments have been offered and 
evaluated.  If arguments are deemed equally valid for each side, then both parties must 
agree to leave the cultural practice under question as it is.  If a better argument is made 
for its alteration or banning of the contested practice, the contested culture should 
gracefully concede the point and abide by the practices supported by the better argument.  
If the argument is more convincing for the allowance of the minority practice, majority 
derived OPVs must be altered with similar grace.  
In summary, Parekh’s (2006) theory of multiculturalism approaches intercultural 
conflict in multicultural states through a dynamic and ongoing process of mutual cultural 
interrogation rather than an isolated act of decision.  In matters of contested cultural 
practice there will always be some level of contestation and dissatisfaction and so the 
goal must be to minimize rather than eliminate misunderstanding.  Parekh’s pluralist 
universalism is therefore not a stable entity of specific content but a dialectical process 
between cultural structures.   
Parekh fully acknowledges that the threshold for his model being realistically 




to cross-cultural controversies can easily break down, may not be achievable if tensions 
are running too high, and requires tremendous patience, empathy, and commitment from 
all parties involved.  Parekh believes that at times of intense controversy it may be 
impossible to engage in and maintain a reasonable dialogue and recommends that in such 
cases negotiations be set aside for the time being.  In times of humanitarian crisis, urgent 
action may be required and intercultural dialogue must occur retroactively in such cases.   
Implications for RCT.  Drawing from these final points of Parekh’s theory we 
may complete the assumptions, boundaries, and content for the fourth dimension of RCT.  
First, returning to the notion of reflexive criticism outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter, we see that the critical dimension of RCT is an ongoing process with any single 
resolution of conflict constituting only one cycle of an ongoing intercultural, 
intersubjective dialogue about the limits of cultural affirmation in psychology.  Further, 
we can also identify (with obvious limits) the fact that arguments about the boundaries of 
cultural affirmation, while not simply arbitrary, can never be anything more than a 
temporarily agreed upon threshold that best honors the principles of political recognition 
and minimal human rights.  Such judgments can never be based on indisputable empirical 
fact but when occurring in a context of open reason, grounded in the principles of RCT 
and Minimal Human Rights, and a full knowledge and awareness of both contexts 
involved, should guard against the arbitrary or attempts to abuse this critique as an excuse 
for denouncing whole cultures or groups.  
Further, Parekh’s (2006) use of two levels of critique is helpful.  He identifies the 




only be engaged when minimal human rights are violated.  A good example of this 
threshold in psychology is when psychologists come together to not only reject 
conversion therapy but to conclusively denounce the practice and admonish psychologists 
not to engage in the practice.   
The second level is the concept of critiquing cultural values and interpersonal 
regulation systems but without pressing them for change from a legal standpoint.  Parekh 
offers counselors a useful rationale to free up space for such healthy and constructive 
critique both amongst ourselves, but also with the populations and individuals who are 
consumers of our professional work and stakeholders in our research.  Recall that RCT is 
explicitly focused on many groups (not only cultures as Parekh (2006) defines them).  
RCT includes many social identities with the hope of creating conditions for all people to 
experience recognition as defined in chapter 5.  Thus, psychologists will engage not just 
in cross-cultural critique, but critique between many different social identities of which 
culture is only one.  When engaging in cross-cultural critique this author would suggest 
that the Politics of Recognition principles discussed in chapter 5 provide the best 
framework for discussion.  Without such a core set of standards that are abstract and 
endorse a particular structure but not a particular content of the good society, it would be 
too easy for critique to be appropriated and misused as an excuse for prejudice.   
Thus, the final assumption or principle of the critical dimension of RCT is that 
psychologists should engage in a critical evaluation of the moral and interpersonal 




conditions of recognition for all social identities.  Further, psychologists should do so at 
all levels of RCT intervention (e.g., individual, institutional, and societal).    
Critical dimension at the societal and organizational level.  At the societal 
level, psychologists should only actively work for legal bans of certain beliefs or 
practices based on scientific evidence that such practices are psychologically damaging to 
those who experience them.  Such research should involve a full knowledge and 
awareness of the context of these beliefs and practices, should involve stakeholders in 
those communities, and is limited only to violations of Parekh’s minimal human rights. 
This is perhaps the only time psychologists should legally press for external change for 
the meanings and practices of a particular group.  However, psychologists should engage 
in critique of moral and interpersonal practices of all groups that undermine recognition 
of their own member and of other groups using the principles of POR. The difference in 
the latter critique is that no legal means for suppressing such practices is actively sought.  
Healthy and constructive mutual dialogue is the goal here. Another key difference is that, 
now that we have external standards, we can critique groups’ beliefs and practices in a 
tight set of areas without having to compare them to the standards of a dominant group 
thereby avoiding some of the problems of relativism.  
The institutional, organizational, and professional levels of intervention are 
somewhat different than the societal level in the nature of their policies and standards.  
These levels allow psychologists to provide themselves their own professional standards 
and regulate the behavior of psychologists internally while acknowledging there are no 




Statement and its resultant interpretations discussed at the beginning of this chapter offer.  
In the view of this author, though the content of the interpretations has identifiable 
weaknesses and problematic implications, the Values Statement and its resultant policy 
recommendations is an example of the fourth dimension of RCT at the professional level.  
The Values Statement is based in psychological ethics rather than the principles of 
political recognition.  RCT at the professional level would therefore free psychologists to 
press for policy (though not legal) changes at a lower threshold than the threshold for 
societal interventions.  Here, suppression of beliefs and practices could be advocated 
because they do not violate the APA ethics code (although ethics violations are an 
equally valid argument). Instead, suppression of practices may be advocated because 
those practices violate the principles of POR, not just the minimal set of human rights (a 
much higher threshold to meet).   
Critical dimension at the individual level.  The final piece remaining then is 
discussing how the fourth dimension can be applied to intergroup conflict at the 
individual level.  One of the core questions of this project is how psychologists should 
proceed when clients have multiple social identities whose meanings are irreconcilable 
and when, if ever, we may suggest one take precedence over another or that one should 
change.   
The reader will recall that chapter 5 discussed Burke and Stets (2009) review of 
multiple identities within the same person and that identity conflict can be conceptualized 




meanings within the same person.
17
  Burke and Stets (2009) suggest that distress arises 
from this conflict leading to an eventual alteration in the meanings of both identities 
which will likely move towards one another.  In other words, identity conflict is one of 
the ways identities change.  However, the movement in sets of meanings for each identity 
may not be equidistant and according to Burke and Stets will be a function of (a) the 
degree of commitment to each of the identities, (b) the level of salience for each identity, 
and (c) the number of connections between each identity and the total number of other 
identities for the person.  Transitioning between identities for transgendered individuals is 
incredibly stressful and can be partially explained with this framework.  Gender, being a 
public identity, is connected to nearly every social identity a person has and is therefore 
very prominent.  Since by definition to be transgendered means that one experiences 
mismatch between their biological sex and the gender with which they identify, every 
time this becomes salient the person will experience conflict.  However, because this 
gender identity is also connected to many social relationships and life roles (e.g., work) 
transgendered individuals face a tremendous amount of risk if they wish to change their 
external appearance and physical body to reduce internal identity conflict.  This is a 
powerful dilemma where transitioning may be too risky for the number of social and role 
identity connections to gender, but failing to transition will mean ongoing and sometimes 
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 Burke & Stets (2009) use the fictional example of Mary whose meanings for her role as a woman may be 
strength and independence while her meanings for wife could be collaboration and compromise.  There 
may be times when both identities are activated and compromising as a wife may be in conflict with her 




unbearable conflict between their internal meanings for their gender role and their 
external performance of the gender role.   
 Chapter 3 of this dissertation critiqued the solution for conflict among multiple 
identities offered by Pedersen et al. (2008) who suggested that the role of a psychologist 
is to allow space for ambiguity and conflict among identities within the same person.  In 
short, their position was that psychologists should shed light upon these various social 
identities without favoring or denouncing any identity in particular.  Perhaps in the case 
of intrapersonal identity conflict in which the meanings of one social identity are 
oppressive to another, psychologists can draw from the critical dimension of RCT to 
move beyond neutrality and instead offer a bounded critique of specific aspects of two 
mutually exclusive identities.   
If, as Burke and Stets hypothesize, identities tend to change in favor of those with 
greater salience, commitment, and number of connections to other identities it stands to 
reason, all other things being equal, that internalized systems of oppression set up conflict 
between identities internally to favor the most privileged identities.  It seems likely 
privileged identities will likely resist change more than those which are oppressed when 
any two collide.  Accordingly, the critical dimension of RCT may be engaged at the 
individual level to help psychologists go beyond simply offering recognition and support 
of an oppressed identity.  We may go another step and offer clients the tools to 
understand and critically evaluate the oppressive moral and interpersonal meanings of 
their other internalized identities and thus the opportunity to change those meanings.  In 




constructive argument against the oppressive aspect of the other identity and offer client’s 
the means by which they can do the same.  The individual, as always, will ultimately 
make their own decisions about which identity meanings will change and to what degree.  
However, from an RCT perspective, psychologists would do well to mobilize POR and 
minimal human rights in their work to help frame and direct the debate among these 
identities within the same person not from a position of neutrality or blanket affirmation 
of the oppressed.  Instead we should utilize the same critical tools and resources that we 
use when engaging in the critical dimension of RCT at organizational and societal levels 
to denounce oppression and affirm marginalization at the same time.   
Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter has served to answer the final questions asked in this project and has 
developed a fourth dimension in the RCT model of competency which is summarized in 
Table 6.1.  Through jettisoning the idea of wholesale comparison between social groups, 
limiting our critique of only specific aspects of any social identity, requiring knowledge 
and awareness of both identities, and pointing to specific superordinate principles of 
recognition and universal human nature, we arrive at the ability to make evaluations, 
offer constructive and precise critique, and set appropriate boundaries for the process that 
guards against splitting.  All three components of the RCT model having thus been 
offered, we now turn to a summary and discussion of the entire model, its limitations, and 






Table 6.1  
A Summary of the Core Positions in the Critical Dimension of RCT 
1. Psychologists are able to apply moral and philosophical knowledge to examine their 
own values.  
2. Psychologists can apply these same philosophical and moral critical faculties to 
professional standards and competency models themselves while simultaneously 
working within these expectations as they are currently conceived. 
3. Point 2 means that a core assumption of RCT is that this model will develop 
reflexively over time as a result of conversations involving constructive critique.  
4. Psychologists recognize that cultural relativism is dangerous to any group’s internally 
oppressed minorities. Psychologists can recognize, critique, and work to diminish 
oppression in both minority and majority cultures alike. 
5. Cultures are synergistic and wholesale comparisons between them is not possible.  
6. Comparisons between dimensions of morality and interpersonal regulation are 
possible. 
7. Fair comparisons can only be made when groups are fully understood.  
8. We should make these judgments and have a duty to do so.  
9. POR principles underpin critique of groups. Minimal human rights supports 







Part III. Conclusions 
Chapter 7. Summary, Implications, Limitations, and Future Research 
Part I of this dissertation reviewed a wide range of literature in multicultural 
psychology and multicultural competency theory ultimately leading to three core 
questions.  First, how do psychologists address the concerns of a wide range of social 
identities without systematically favoring any particular set of them?  Further, can 
expanding to a wide range of identities be done in a way that does not invite an avoidance 
of discussing race and ethnicity? Second, what boundaries can be drawn around cultural 
relativism with regard to oppression of within group minorities?  Third, should 
psychologists ever offer a direct critique of cultures and social groups, and if so what are 
the parameters for such criticism?  In Part II of this dissertation the author drew from 
scholarship bridging several disciplines to address each of these concerns.  The responses 
offered in chapters 4, 5, and 6, when taken together, constitute a new theory of 
competency for work with diverse social identities which this author has called 
Recognition Competency Theory or RCT.  This chapter will first summarize this new 
theory and discuss its relationship to D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC.  RCT’s theoretical 
implications will be discussed throughout this summary followed by a separate overview 
of RCT’s practical implications.  Third, the limitations of RCT will be addressed 
alongside a discussion of the ways future research can help develop and strengthen the 
model.  The chapter will conclude with an aspirational statement for the future of 





Summary of RCT 
RCT can be characterized as both the next step in D. W. Sue’s (2001) three 
dimensional MDCC but also the next step in conceptualizing what should constitute the 
foci and purpose of scholarship about competent work with diverse populations.  This 
summary is organized in two parts.  First, the core assumptions of the RCT model are 
reviewed and the implications for changing the parameters of the debate about 
multiculturalism in psychology are clarified.  Next, each of the four dimensions of RCT 
is explained and contrasted with the MDCC.  Finally, significant interactions among the 
four dimensions are reviewed.  A bulleted summary of the RCT model is included in 
Appendix A.    
Core assumptions.  
RCT is based on several core assumptions about (a) the definition of culture, (b) 
the rationale for developing competency for work with diverse groups, and (c) the limits 
of relativism in work with diverse identities.  Each is discussed in turn.  
Attempts to expand definitions of culture in multicultural competency theories 
have led to a hierarchical treatment of oppressed groups emphasizing race and ethnicity.  
RCT is grounded in a two part position on this matter.  First, psychology should restrict 
both the theoretical and working definition of culture towards race, ethnicity, and national 
origin. Second, psychology should centralize the rationale for work with diverse social 
identities around the broader more inclusive concept of recognition as defined by political 
philosophers Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth.  This concept gives rise to 




as defined by recognition in areas of love, respect, and esteem.  RCT assumes that all 
social identities, including cultural identities, require these three forms of recognition and 
that a just society is one which provides this recognition.  Therefore, the purpose of RCT 
is to assist psychologists in increasing recognition for a wide range of oppressed and 
marginalized social identities at the individual, institutional, and societal levels.  RCT is 
therefore first and foremost a political position on the nature of work with diverse groups 
and the role psychology should assume in such work.  The structural principles of the 
four dimensional model described below are designed to assist in increasing this 
recognition.  RCT is therefore a conscious and explicit statement of values.  
RCT recognizes that conflict can easily arise between social identities and 
cultures in particular.  Therefore, RCT builds from Parekh’s (2006) theory of minimal 
human rights and dialogical multiculturalism to endorse the position that intergroup 
evaluation of beliefs and practices is beneficial and indispensable in pluralist societies.  
Consequently, psychologists can and should engage in critique of oppressive beliefs and 
practices in the areas of morality and interpersonal regulation.  Such critiques must be 
made against the standards of the politics of recognition and minimal human rights rather 
than the content of another group’s moral and interpersonal regulatory systems.  When 
flagrant violations of universal human rights occur, psychologists should advocate that 
groups change their beliefs and practices in the areas of morality and interpersonal 
regulation.  The assumptions of RCT having been clarified, we now turn to a summary of 




Dimension 1: Social identities.  RCT is designed to focus on identities which are 
targets of misrecognition and maintaining proper recognition of identities which already 
receive recognition.  However, the emphasis in RCT is primarily on the former as the 
purpose of recognition competency is largely reparative and proactive.  The latter 
emphasis is to ensure that as recognition for targeted identities increases, it does not lead 
to or come at the expense of misrecognizing and devaluing identities of privilege which 
deserve recognition as much as any other.  Since RCT endorses a decentralized position 
on identity content, it does not advocate for psychologists to become familiar with any a 
priori set of identities.  This contrasts sharply with identity models such as D. W. Sue’s 
MDCC which centralizes five identities (e.g., European American, Asian American, and 
so forth).   
As a result, in RCT the concept of social identity is treated as a place holder the 
contents of which should be filled as a function of the idiosyncratic salience hierarchy for 
the person, institution, organization, or societal context of attention.  In other words, RCT 
argues that the way to approach identity content is to first determine which identities are 
important in a given situation, and psychologists should then become familiar with the 
resulting identities as needed.  This is very different than identifying which identities 
psychologists are most likely to come across and centralizing those as the focus of 
content in the hope that maximizing these odds will better arm psychologists in their 
future work (Locke, 1990).  Since the unique character of the institution, region of a 




content needs for increasing recognition should be determined on a case by case basis.  
The process of determining prominence hierarchies is part of dimension 4.  
Dimension 2: Level of intervention.  In the case of the level of intervention there 
is little in the view of this author that can be improved upon D. W. Sue’s (2001) position 
that competency should move beyond the individual level of intervention to include 
organizations, the profession of psychology, and society at large.  This author can find no 
level of intervention that could be added to these four and certainly no reason that any of 
them should be removed.  Further, at the organizational and societal levels, RCT does not 
shift from D. W. Sue’s position that counselors act as needed to ensure that changes 
occur in the structure of organizations and societal institutions.  However, RCT’s focus is 
on increasing respect and esteem for any set of identified social identities within the 
structure of these institutions.   
At the individual level RCT holds that social identities are comprised of both a 
prototypical or stereotyped set of meanings and a set of idiosyncratic meanings unique to 
the individual.  The interaction of the two means that the individual’s identity will vary in 
the degree to which it is prototypical ranging from very prototypical to very 
unprototypical.   Individuals are viewed as having many such social identities and the 
likelihood of an identity becoming activated for a person determines that identity’s place 
in that individual’s salience hierarchy of identities.  If more likely to be activated it is 
higher in the salience hierarchy, if less likely to be activated it is lower.  While expected 
to evolve over time, the salience hierarchy is relatively stable across situations, whereas 




The situational hierarchy therefore changes much more rapidly (Burke, 2006; Burke & 
Stets, 2009).  This conception of identity is true for counselors and clients alike.   
Psychologists are expected to work to understand interactions among salience hierarchy 
and identity prototypicality for themselves and their clients.  Further, conflict among 
identity meanings at the individual level is approached through a desire to increase 
recognition for all of a person’s identities.  Critique of the moral and interpersonal 
regulatory meanings of any identity may be permitted in the service of resolving 
intrapersonal identity conflict in order to increase recognition of the oppressed identity.   
At the professional level RCT competent psychologists should advocate that the 
professional identity of psychologist be adjusted on an ongoing basis to become ever 
more successful at recognizing diverse social identities.  As was explained in chapter 6, 
this author argues that the critical dimension of RCT suggests that RCT competence 
psychologists simultaneously act within but are also able to critique current standards of 
professional practice.   
Dimension 3: Components of competence.  Returning full circle to the concept 
of knowledge, awareness, and skills, we see that these retain a place in RCT.  However, 
the emphases on each is distributed somewhat differently than the MDCC (D. W. Sue, 
2001).   
Knowledge is at the center of all levels of intervention discussed in dimension 2.  
A wide range of perpetually misrecognized groups require psychologists to understand 
the meanings those group members (and nonmembers) hold for the group’s social 




knowledge from an RCT standpoint is the understanding that prototypical meanings for 
any identity rarely map on to any individual person perfectly.  Further, those prototypical 
meanings often favor and are disproportionately influenced by those subgroups within a 
social identity group that have the most power (Phillips, 2007; Puri, 2005).  Additionally, 
a thorough knowledge of any group and in particular its meanings and practices in the 
areas of morality and interpersonal regulation is required before any critique of those 
beliefs and practices can be executed.   
Related to awareness, this author is in full agreement with D. W. Sue (2001) and 
many others: in order to be competent to work with identities different than one’s own, 
particularly those prone to misrecognition, a psychologist must have self-knowledge and 
self-awareness of her or his own moral positions and values related to her or his own 
identity meanings.  This self-awareness is paramount and is the first line of defense 
against oppression.  One way RCT may differ, however, is the additional requirements 
that psychologists have a thorough awareness of their own salience hierarchy of 
identities, their own level of prototypicality of those identities, and the ways meanings 
interact among their identities.   
Finally, the selection of intervention skills is also in marked contrast to D. W. 
Sue’s (2001) MDCC.  For D. W. Sue, the goal is to maximize development of both client 
and client systems which are responsive to all groups.  In RCT the goal is instead to 
maximize conditions of political recognition for all social identities and misrecognized 
identities in particular.  The goal is also to increase universal human rights at individual 




cause the misrecognition (e.g., disrespect, disesteem) for targeted social identities.  
Further, part of this goal is to create either change or containment of values and practices 
that violate minimal conditions of human rights.   
Dimension 4: The critical dimension.  The most important contribution of RCT 
is the critical dimension which is comprised of (a) the internal processes of the other 
dimensions, (b) interactions among the other dimensions, (c) evaluating characteristics of 
RCT theory as an aggregate, and (d) intergroup evaluation and critique.  The word critical 
here is meant to describe the theme of process (as opposed to content) in aspects of this 
model and the act of rational evaluation in matters of morality and justice.  
There are three themes related to the process aspect of the critical dimension.   
Arising from the first dimension is the process of determining which identities are 
important to a given intervention situation and, if on the individual level, their associated 
hierarchy.  Related to the second dimension is the ability to critically evaluate and 
propose changes to the professional standards of psychology when those standards do not 
meet or could meet better the political recognition of social identities.  This process is 
understood as radical but not extremist (as defined in chapter 5), and psychologists 
should always be expected to obey current policies even as they may advocate for policy 
change.   RCT itself is conceived as a stably structured but constantly evolving 
framework.  RCT competent psychologists critique the RCT model itself with the aim of 
extending and altering its principles over time in response to inevitable shifts in the 




Related to moral critique, RCT psychologists understand the primary critiques of 
cross-cultural relativism and the processes of dialogical multiculturalism proposed by 
Parekh (2006) and the politics of recognition as reviewed by Thompson (2006).  
Intergroup comparisons are made against the tenants of the politics of recognition and 
minimal human rights and only pertain to a group’s conception of morality and 
interpersonal regulation.  RCT competent psychologists offer critiques of morality and 
interpersonal regulation systems with respect to how well these values achieve 
recognition of both members and nonmembers of a given social identity group.  RCT 
competent psychologists offer these bounded critiques across all levels of intervention 
(e.g., individual, societal, organizational).  RCT competent psychologists press for legal 
change or containment of a social group’s practices on a societal level when such 
practices violate minimal standards of human rights.  Greater latitude is given for 
regulating interpersonal and intergroup relations on institutional and professional levels, 
and in such cases the principles of political recognition may serve as a starting point to 
guide policy deliberations.   
As can be seen from the discussion above, RCT is in many ways an extension of 
D. W. Sue’s (2001) MDCC and subsumes the MDCC’s three dimensions.  However, the 
assumptions, rational, and goals of RCT are distinct from the MDCC as are the ways 
KA&S are distributed, and a fourth dimension is added to the model.  These features are 






Implications and Related Future Research 
Policy.  The core assumptions of RCT offer psychologists a solution for the 
contestations about the definition of culture.  Restricting the definition of culture would 
allow the field to maintain a protected space for identities traditionally defined by culture 
(i.e., race, ethnicity, and national origin). Further, centering the discussion around the 
more broad and non-hierarchical concept of recognition would offer a more inclusive 
space where culture would no longer have to fight to distinguish itself from other socially 
oppressed groups.  This is useful because we are able to move beyond a semantic debate 
about what groups are contained in the concept of culture and instead ask how we will 
serve a variety of social identities whose recognition needs vary and may have oppression 
mechanisms that may be quite similar or different from cultural identities. New journals 
could be offered that centralize recognition and include articles on a wide range of social 
identities, including culture.  Specialized journals on multiculturalism could once again 
focus on acculturation processes and ethnic beliefs and practices without having to 
qualify their approach with statements such as “for the purposes of this paper, culture is 
understood as race and ethnicity.”  This is also true of the APA Guidelines on 
multiculturalism.  Further, conferences that focus on a wide range of identities should be 
renamed for similar reasons. For example, the National Multicultural Conference and 
Summit is, from an RCT perspective, only partially about culture and centering culture in 
the title of this conference seems to privilege that identity above the other identities 
organizers deemed important such as gender, LGBT status, disability, and so forth.  In 




larger, non-hierarchical concept which subsumes but also maintains space for cultural 
difference.   This solution allows those wishing to specialize and discuss issues 
particularly germane to race, ethnicity, and national origin the opportunity to do so 
without qualification or fighting with others not represented by offering culture a seat at a 
larger round table in which many social oppression issues are addressed.   
Stemming from the above, multicultural competency would then become one of 
only many identities requiring recognition competency.  Accordingly, in the view of this 
author, the APA mandate requiring multicultural competency must be broadened and 
RCT should be required for the accreditation of training programs with the understanding 
that it is intended to include MCC.   This will doubtlessly be an unstable and 
controversial proposition.  Accordingly, more development is required for the exact 
parameters by which such a change could be made.  It is not yet clear whether required 
courses in multiculturalism should be replaced by a course in RCT, if RCT should 
supplement such courses, or if the two should somehow be combined in curricula.  
Further development for the ways in which RCT would inform program design, 
curriculum design, recruitment, and accreditation in graduate training programs will be 
required.  
The position above also generates a wide range of other questions which require 
further research to answer.  First, what are the specific implications for how attention to 
culture and race in particular will be distributed in a new dialogue about recognition 
which centralizes no particular social identity?  It is not true that RCT is an attempt to 




RCT requires that no identity, including race and ethnicity, should be placed above others 
in discussions of the need for recognition for socially oppressed groups.  In this situation, 
we either centralize one or more identities or none.  However, specific positions and 
interpretations of how race can remain an unavoidable but decentralized topic in such a 
large tent must be offered.  Development is also required with regard to which specific 
identities should receive attention in RCT since, as many have pointed out, including too 
many identities in discussions of diversity yields an unwieldy and diffuse conversation 
about individual differences.  Such diffusion must not be allowed to render the concept of 
identifiable social identities meaningless.   
Pedagogy.  RCT has implications for a wide range of areas involving the training 
of future psychologists.  At the level of individual coursework, RCT would suggest that 
courses should centralize the concept of justice (defined as political recognition), identity 
theory, the distinction between culture and other social identities, and the skills for 
critically examining the ways recognition is systematically denied some social identities 
in institutions, society at large, and even within individuals.   Alongside this theoretical 
and political material should be included content for the specific meanings associated 
with a range of social identities.  However, the selected identities should not centralize 
any a priori selection of groups.  Identities could instead be chosen in response to the 
makeup of the students within the class and specifically target identities about which they 
do not already have a depth of knowledge.  The primary contrast between a course 
implied by RCT principles and one that might stem from D. W. Sue’s MDCC is the 




political justice.  Texts such as D. W. Sue and D. Sue’s (2008) Counseling the Culturally 
Diverse make room for many identities but also explicitly centralize racial and ethnic 
groups and content specific to those groups.  RCT, by contrast, would centralize the 
political position first and then use examples of different social identities and intergroup 
conflict as the vehicle for implementing the political position.  
The structure of such a course could take many forms.  For example, the specific 
identities discussed could be presented to the whole class each week.  Alternatively, 
students might be asked to choose a specific client with whom they are working or have 
worked, conduct a salience hierarchy assessment, and then research content specific to 
the identities relevant to that client. This could culminate in a class presentation, written 
case study, or any of a number of forms for a final project.  Further, more research is 
required to investigate what constitutes a practically achievable curriculum for RCT 
within an APA approved training program.  Space for courses is already at a premium in 
many training programs.  Clearly these goals are wide-ranging and likely extend beyond 
what is achievable in one seminar.  Sample course syllabi could be developed and tested 
using both qualitative and quantitative measures.   
It also seems important that these principles be woven into the fabric of training 
programs as a whole and the recognition based stance on justice be an explicit value that 
is integrated into applied courses such as assessment training and practica.  However, 
recognition could also inform the general atmosphere of the program including web 
content, physical space decorations, and so forth.   Further, as RCT is built on the 




treated with dignity, one implication is that departments should ensure that privileged 
identities, while necessarily a target of intellectual deconstruction, must not be treated 
with ridicule, hostility, and shame.   
Standards for evaluating performance in RCT must also be developed.  Some 
aspects of RCT lend themselves to self-report measures and multiple choice exams such 
as the knowledge and comprehension of both the main assumptions of RCT and the 
prototypical meanings of specific social identities.   The ability of students to synthesize 
and evaluate these components into meaningful interventions that increase recognition 
across the foci of intervention is far more abstract.  Evaluation of such skills would best 
rely on conceptualization papers, the development of rubrics for observer ratings of RCT 
interventions, and critical analysis papers of RCT itself.  
Practice.  Perhaps the largest implication of RCT for psychologists in practice is 
that it has provided a groundwork through which a more substantive dialogue about the 
limits of group normed values can take place.  Using the principles of minimal human 
rights, psychologists would now be able to engage in a critique of some aspects of social 
identity based meanings against the principles of political recognition rather than from an 
unconscious mandate to uphold European American values.  One implication of this is 
that psychologists, when working on the societal level, have the potential role of 
consultant to law makers and other regulatory officials when questions of legal exception 
for a group’s practices or legal banning of a group’s practices are sought.  As stated 
previously only violations of minimal human rights should be considered justification for 




psychologists must build an empirical case that the practice in question is causing 
demonstrated psychological harm to individuals.  In contrast, when advocating for a 
group’s beliefs and practices others might seek to ban, psychologists are in the position to 
offer an empirical case that no harm occurs from a practice psychologists support.    
The early versions of KA&S models reviewed in chapter 2 of this project yielded 
lists of behaviors that would reflect multicultural competence.  Therefore, the next logical 
step for RCT is to make similar interpretations about the behaviors that would 
accompany an RCT competent psychologist.  Some of these are already described in this 
project and a preliminary example of such a list is found in Appendix B.   
Limitations and Areas for Further Development  
This dissertation offers the groundwork for what is hoped to be a nuanced and 
more systematic theory of RCT.  At present, the moral principles and positions outlined 
above are sweeping, aspirational, and are in many respects the raw material from which a 
more polished and precise theory may continue to emerge.  Some areas for future 
research related to the implications of RCT have been reviewed above.  The limitations 
of the current project and their implications for future research map onto three thematic 
levels: theoretical, interpretive, and empirical.  Each theme is discussed below along with 
the future research required to strengthen RCT.   
Theoretical.  There are several limitations to the theoretical constructs in RCT.  
First, there is an alternative interpretation to the fourth dimension of RCT whereby it 
could be broken down into two parts where the theme of the model changing over time 




might set alongside knowledge, awareness, and skills as a fourth component of 
competency (as opposed to a fourth dimension).  This is complicated by the fact that the 
change over time aspect of the fourth dimension is still the result of critical analysis by 
RCT competent psychologists.  In other words the process aspect of the fourth dimension 
is still contingent upon critical analysis which supports the current single-dimensional 
solution.  However, this distinction should be developed further and the implications of 
its alternative explored.  
Second, regarding the critical dimension as applied to critique at the individual 
level, it is not clear who determines identity conflict.  Is it possible for the therapist to 
identify conflict between two of the client’s social identities and the client to disagree or 
vice versa?  If so, should the therapist still offer critique of certain aspects of one identity 
or another?  Further, how might this play out in family or group modalities where conflict 
may occur simultaneously between social identities within the same person and across 
two people? All of these questions should be addressed in future work.  
Related to the second limitation and one of the core critiques of relativism (e.g., it 
is dangerous), RCT theory as it is proposed here also carries its own set of dangers.  First, 
RCT has the strong potential for becoming a political tautology that amounts to an 
indoctrination of psychologists rather than an invitation to critically examine the field’s 
political position.  Second, RCT is intended to be reflexive and to change over time, yet 
there is no guarantee that its evolution will be constructive or beneficial.  While no theory 
can be foolproof, clarification of the process by which RCT should be altered and 




Another danger is that, because RCT decentralizes race and ethnicity, these 
statuses will become marginalized in this broader discourse, drowned out by larger 
numbers of other identities.  While this author’s position is that such a danger is real, it is 
also my position that it does not follow that the best solution to this danger is to centralize 
the discussion around racial and ethnic social identities.  However, no provisions for 
ensuring that this does not happen have been offered either.  Further, the systematic 
marginalization of other identities could occur within RCT, and this is also troubling. In 
short, while justice is centralized in theory, the social identity with the loudest voice and 
greatest numbers could become the de facto center of RCT discourse.  Provisions 
responding to this possibility can and should be added to the critical dimension.   
Finally, this project has focused on multicultural competency in psychology and 
has not fully explored the large number of works in the psychology literature exploring 
social justice.  The relationship between justice as defined by the politics of recognition 
and the ways social justice is treated in the extant psychology literature is unclear.  
Exploring the relationship between the two could help strengthen both RCT and social 
justice paradigms that already exist in psychology.  Further investigation is required.  
Interpretive. The next step for developing RCT is to offer practical 
interpretations of RCT’s theoretical principles not unlike the effort by Mintz et al. (2009) 
to interpret what the Values Statement (Council of Counseling Psychology Training 
Programs et al., 2009) would look like on an actionable policy level.  Concrete examples 
of RCT principles applied across all foci of interventions with a wide range of identities 




particularly attend to the ways intergroup critique can be made against the principles of 
recognition and minimal human rights.  One place to start could be the fictional case of 
Ron that opened this dissertation.  The discussion should address not only what RCT 
interventions would be valid on the level of his individual psychotherapy but also 
comment on any professional advocacy his therapist might engage in within psychology, 
the institutional setting, and society at large.  Another important area for development is 
creating procedures for deliberation on a policy level within the profession and for 
institutions and organizations when conflict between identities arises.  Of greatest 
importance is determining an actionable threshold for making changes or siding for or 
against a proposition.  Parekh (2006) points out that while arguments are rarely 
conclusive and invulnerable to critique in human affairs, greater or weaker arguments can 
be made and that better arguments should generally hold sway.  Yet by what criteria can 
we judge the merits of such arguments?  Greater development and attention to these 
details would make RCT a more useful tool for mediating conflict between social 
identities.    
Empirical.  Like the relationship between political theory and political science, 
the ultimate fate of RCT will rest in its practical applicability and validity from an 
empirical standpoint.   The biggest limitation of RCT at this point is that it is purely 
speculative.  Once interpretations of RCT principles are made for policy, education, and 
clinical interventions, their utility must be demonstrated empirically to give convincing 
weight to this author’s position that moving towards an RCT position would actually 




towards meaningful constructive change that increases political recognition on individual, 
organizational, and societal levels. 
One possible starting place for such work would be to conduct qualitative 
research to see if recognition itself has any validity and utility as a potential 
psychological construct or if it is best treated as a moral position.  If it does have utility as 
a psychological construct, measures of recognition (self or other report) would aid 
potential outcome research.  Second, methods for determining prominence and salience 
hierarchies should be developed and their reliability tested.  Burke and Stets (2009) state 
that finding more precise ways to determine these is a cutting edge topic in identity 
theory.  All of these areas would aid advocates of RCT and the development of the theory 
itself.   
Conclusions: Realizing Justice 
This dissertation offers a new approach to understanding work with diverse social 
identities.  More than an attempt to reinvent multicultural competency, this project is 
ultimately about reframing the concept of diversity itself within the field of psychology.  
I have argued that psychology, to meet its goals, must decentralize culture in discussions 
of social identity and instead centralize the concept of justice, defined as love, respect, 
and esteem.  From this new position have emerged the core features of a theory of 
recognition competency which, like political recognition theory itself, extends the work 
of multiculturalism into a new and more inclusive frame. 
This dissertation is therefore more than an attempt to improve upon theories of 




of psychology inspired by political recognition.  Thompson (2006) describes the goal of 
political recognition thus:  
Here it appears that the ideal of recognition is present in embryo in every 
struggle for recognition, and that this ideal is gradually realized through the 
process of struggle itself. It is as though human beings bring about by degrees a 
goal which is independent of their intentions, a goal which is encoded in the very 
structure of their interactions .  
This dissertation is not a discrete project.  It is a snapshot in this gradually 
unfolding process of realizing justice.   This narrative signifies this process and its ideal 





Appendix A. Bullet Summary of RCT 
Core Assumptions 
 The problems and contestations over the meaning of the term culture cannot be 
adequately solved by expanding the definition of culture to include more and more 
groups.   
 The definition of culture should be conceived in process, structural, and functional 
terms which are best reflected in statuses of race, ethnicity, and national origin.  
 The larger, non-hierarchical term recognition should be endorsed as the larger central 
concept in discussions of social identity instead of culture.  This endorsement gives 
rise to the name recognition competency theory (RCT). 
 The rationale for RCT is first and foremost a matter of political philosophy and is 
explicitly designed to encourage psychologists to press for changes which stem from 
a particular philosophy of a just society. This philosophy of justice focuses on the 
concepts of love, respect, and esteem.  
 The press for these changes is gradual and works within established professional 
standards.  RCT is therefore, at its core, a radical but non-extremist policy and 
political position with particular competencies stemming from said position.  
 RCT is a reflexive theory which is expected to be contested and to change gradually 
over time.  RCT is therefore simultaneously structured and open ended.  
Dimension 1: Identities 
 RCT rejects centralizing any core set of identity groups and expects that the identities 
requiring recognition will shift from person to person and across institutional, 
organization, and societal contexts.  
 The identity dimension is therefore treated as an empty container which can only be 
filled when the specifics of a given situation are encountered.  
 Identities are informed by a prototypical set of meanings for the identity the fit of 
which varies along a continuum for each person.  Further, the identity is also 




Dimension 2: Level of Intervention 
Individual 
 Each person has a salience hierarchy of identities 
 Each of these identities is comprised of (a) an idiosyncratic set of meanings and (b) 
can be placed on a continuum of prototypicality (or stereotypicality) for the given 
identity.   
Institutional / Organizational and Societal 
 As in the MDCC (D. W. Sue, 2001) psychologists are enjoined to press for change 
across all of these more distal system levels. However, the change should balance 
increasing recognition for oppressed social identities and ensuring minimal human 
rights for all individuals.  
 Professional is seen a subtype of the organizational component.  
Dimension 3: Content of intervention 
Knowledge 
 Should be acquired about specific identities but no core set of identity specific 
knowledge is endorsed irrespective of a specific case or context.  
 A very thorough knowledge of the meanings a particular practice holds for a 
particular group identity is required before any critique or evaluation can be made.   
Awareness 
 Psychologists are aware of their own social identity meanings, their own salience 
hierarchy of identities, and the level of typicality they represent for any of their social 
identities.   
Skills 
  Because of the high variance between individual’s prototypicality of identity 
meanings and the inevitable changes they incur in idiosyncratic contexts, skills are 
not intended to be developed from group norms at the individual level.  
 Group normed policies can be more useful at institutional and societal levels of 
intervention with the caveat that prototypical identity meanings tend to favor those 




Dimension 4: Critical / Process  
 Psychologists are able to apply moral and philosophical knowledge to examine their 
own values, professional standards, and the RCT competency model itself  
 Psychologists recognize that cultural relativism is dangerous to any group’s internally 
oppressed minorities. Psychologists can recognize, critique, and work to diminish 
oppression in both minority and majority cultures alike 
 Cultures are synergistic and wholesale comparisons between them is not possible 
 Comparisons between dimensions of morality and interpersonal regulation are 
possible   
 Fair comparisons can only be made when groups are fully understood 
 We should make these judgments and have a duty to do so 
 POR principles should underpin any critique of moral and interpersonal regulatory 
dimensions of social identities.  
 Principles of minimal human rights supports advocating legal suppression of some 





Appendix B. A Sample of Potential RCT Behaviors 
Research 
 A psychologist can discuss the pernicious history of dominant group participation in 
cross-cultural studies.  
 Can explain and account for the ways dominant group identities impact research 
design and outcome.  
 The psychologist considers social identities throughout the research process (e.g., 
examines which social identities are represented on a research team and reports how 
this may positively and negatively impact the interpretation of results).   
Philosophical Knowledge 
 The psychologist distinguishes between multiculturalism and the politics of 
recognition and can explain the relationship between the two.  
 The psychologist can explain the seven themes of meaning in the word culture and 
how they are contested among disciplines.  
 The psychologist distinguishes the problems that can arise from conflating social 
identity and oppression with culture.  
Multiple Identities 
 The psychologist can distinguish between prominence and salience of identities.   
 The psychologist evaluates a client’s level of typicality for any of their given 
identities.   
 The psychologists distinguishes between a client’s salience and situational hierarchy 
of identities.  
Critical Evaluation 
 Evaluates social identity based practices in light of the politics of recognition and 
minimal human rights.  Offers critique when social identities systematically 
disesteem and disrespect certain social identities.  
 The psychologist evaluates RCT and seeks to improve its blank spots, weaknesses, 
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